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2013
Strijbos, Derek W.; Bruin, Leon C. de (2013): Universal belief-desire psychology?. A dilemma for theory theory and simulation theory. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (5), S. 744-764. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.711034

Abstract: In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up AU in light of the cross-cultural evidence; or (ii) defend AU with respect to core capacities underlying different culture-specific folk psychologies, and explain why the BD-model will be genuinely explanatory at this level.

Keywords: BD, belief-desire, belief-desire (BD), belief-desire model, Belief-Desire Psychology, Cross-Cultural Differences, Folk Psychology, Simulation Theory, Theory Theory, cross-cultural, Disziplin, folk psychology, Kultur, kulturspezifisch, Kulturtheorie, Psychologie, Social Simulation, universal human tendencies
2007
Maibom, Heidi L. (2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981

Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.

Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung

2013

2007

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