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  • 2013

  • Godman, Marion (2013): Why we do things together. The social motivation for joint action. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (4), S. 588-603. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.670905

    Abstract: Joint action is a growing field of research, spanning across the cognitive, behavioral, and brain sciences as well as receiving considerable attention amongst philosophers. I argue that there has been a significant oversight within this field concerning the possibility that many joint actions are driven, at least in part, by agents' social motivations rather than merely by their shared intentions. Social motivations are not directly related to the (joint) target goal of the action. Instead, when agents are mutually socially motivated in joint action this is because they find acting with others rewarding in its own right. Moreover the involvement of social motivation in joint action typically enables individuals to achieve the long-term benefits associated with being part of a social bond. I argue that taking social motivations into account better prepares us for explaining a broader range of joint actions, including those that are of an antagonistic, competitive, or explorative character. Finally, I show that recognizing the importance of social motivations entails that joint actions (in general) should be understood as having the two primary functions of (1) achieving the intended target outcome of an action, and (2) attaining the benefits related to being part of a social bond.

    Keywords: Herkunft von Sozialität, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Joint Action, Joint Intentions, Social Bonds, Social Emotions, Social Motivation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, Neuropsychologie, Philosophical Psychology, Soziale Motivation, Spezifika von Menschen

  • 2009

  • Rochat, Philippe (2009): Others in mind. Social origins of self-consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812484

     

    Abstract: Introduction : main ideas -- Self-conscious species -- Six propositions -- Variety of self-reflective mind states -- Mind states in development -- Birth of self-consciousness -- Shame and self-knowledge -- Roots of guilt -- Giving and sharing -- Origins of owning and sharing -- Social construction of identity -- Conclusion : moral space and the self In this book, Philippe Rochat explores self-consciousness, how it originates and how it shapes our lives, arguably the most important and revealing of all psychological problems. Why are we so prone to guilt and embarrassment? Why do we care so much about how others see us, about our reputation? What are the origins of such afflictions? Rochat argues that it is because we are members of a species that evolved the unique propensity to reflect upon themselves as an object of thoughts; an object of thoughts that is potentially evaluated by others. Based on empirical observations, this is a book of ideas, tapping into both developmental and anthropological phenomena and guided by strong existential intuitions regarding the human condition. At the core of these intuitions, there is the idea that human psychic life is predominantly determined by what we imagine others perceive of us

    Keywords: Aufmerksamkeit, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erklärung und Genese von Sozialität und Zwischenmenschlichkeit, Herkunft von Sozialität, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychologie, Selbst, Selbstbewusstsein, Self, Self / Social aspects, Self-consciousness (Sensitivity), Self-knowledge, Theory of, Social aspects

  • 1993

  • Hobson, Robert Peter (1993): The emotional origins of social understanding. In: Philosophical Psychology 6 (3), S. 227-249. DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573090

    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co‐ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of ‘persons’ who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism.

    Keywords: Autismus, Entwicklungspsychologie, Evolutionsbiologie, Herkunft von Sozialität, Interpersonale Wahrnehmung, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Pathologie, Person Sein, Philosophical Psychology, Soziales Miteinander, soziales Verhalten, Sozialphilosophie, Spezifika von Menschen, Verstehen
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