Alle Publikationen
2019
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(2019): Interactional Moral Systems: A Model of Social Mechanisms for the Moral Regulation of Exchange Processes in Agent Societies. In: IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems 6 (4), S. 778-796. DOI: 10.1109/TCSS.2019.2926950
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2019.2926950 Abstract: In this paper, we first introduce the concepts of moral agent and moral system of agent society and, in particular, the central concept of moral agent sensible to moral sanction. Next, we introduce the concepts of moral gain and moral loss in social exchanges and of reputation-based persistence of exchange processes. Following, we elaborate the notion of negotiated moral regulation of reputation-based persistent exchange processes. Finally, we combine those concepts in the notion of a reputation-based mechanism for the negotiation-driven moral regulation of exchange processes of agents that are sensible to moral sanctions.
Keywords: Agent societies, agent society, Avatars, Computational modeling, Ethics, ieee xplore, interactional moral systems, Law, Moral & Ethik, moral agent, moral gain, moral loss, moral regulation of social exchanges, moral sanction, Morality, multi-agent systems, negotiation-driven moral regulation, reputation-based mechanism, reputation-based persistence, reputation-based persistent exchange processes, Robots, social exchanges, social mechanisms, Social Processes 2018
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(2018): People are averse to machines making moral decisions. In: Cognition 181, S. 21-34. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 Abstract: Do people want autonomous machines making moral decisions? Nine studies suggest that that the answer is ‘no’—in part because machines lack a complete mind. Studies 1–6 find that people are averse to machines making morally-relevant driving, legal, medical, and military decisions, and that this aversion is mediated by the perception that machines can neither fully think nor feel. Studies 5–6 find that this aversion exists even when moral decisions have positive outcomes. Studies 7–9 briefly investigate three potential routes to increasing the acceptability of machine moral decision-making: limiting the machine to an advisory role (Study 7), increasing machines’ perceived experience (Study 8), and increasing machines’ perceived expertise (Study 9). Although some of these routes show promise, the aversion to machine moral decision-making is difficult to eliminate. This aversion may prove challenging for the integration of autonomous technology in moral domains including medicine, the law, the military, and self-driving vehicles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018) : Implicit moral cognition. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 516-524
Abstract: What is the best method for understanding moral judgment? We use implicit measurement and mathematical modeling to capture implicit moral evaluations, because this method can address debates over the role of intuition and reason in moral judgment and over domain-general versus domain-specific views of moral psychology. A man kicks a puppy as hard as he can. A son slaps his mother across the face. A soldier betrays his unit. A terrorist defiles a temple. These actions all seem like moral transgressions. And before you deliberate about why they are wrong—that is, what principles do they violate—you probably have an immediate gut reaction: 'That is wrong!' If you don’t have that reaction, that is important for us and everyone else to know, because it might mean you have fewer inhibitions about engaging in such behaviors. And you might know what the 'appropriate' reaction is supposed to look like, so it’s important to find a way to reliably assess your gut reactions b efore yo u can edit your responses. In this chapter, we discuss a new approach to measuring moral intuitions that draws upon advances in implicit social cognition and mathematical modeling. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): The moral psychology of anger. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International (Moral psychology of the emotions)
Abstract: The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, the editors explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. This volume also examines the ways in which rage--anger's cousin--is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society and how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Anger, Emotions, Emotionsforschung, Moral, Morality, Philosophies, social psychology, Sozialpsychologie -
(2018) : Moral coherence processes and denial of moral complexity. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: How do people deal with a morally complex and contradictory world? Moral judgment is an intuitive phenomenon, best understood as a process of implicit meaning making that often results in the denial of moral complexity and the shaping of descriptive beliefs to be consistent with prescriptive intuitions. Scholars have long recognized individuals’ tendency to mold seemingly contradictory information about their social world into a coherent whole. Moral judgment, we suggest, is no different, and in this chapter we explore how a desire for moral coherence can lead to the denial of moral complexity and encourage people to shape their descriptive understanding of the world to fit their prescriptive understanding of it. Moreover, we argue that people’s tendency to conflate moral and practical good plays a crucial role in exacerbating political conflict by leading individuals and groups with differing moral values to hold differing factual beliefs as well. (PsycINFO Database Record ( c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Moral Emotions Toward Others at Work and Implications for Employee Behavior. A Qualitative Analysis Using Critical Incidents. In: Journal of Business and Psychology 33 (1), S. 155-180. DOI: 10.1007/s10869-016-9484-3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-016-9484-3 Abstract: We propose a theoretical framework for and, via critical incidents, inductively investigate (a) the situations that trigger moral emotions toward others at work and (b) worker responses to these situations. Critical incidents were collected from a heterogeneous sample of 423 workers. Participants described an incident that caused each of four moral emotions (gratitude, anger, admiration, and contempt) and their response. Incidents and responses were coded, and frequencies, differences across the moral emotions, and associations between incidents and responses were analyzed. Several morally relevant situations at work were found to trigger the moral emotions. Participants responded in ways that had implications for their performance and their own well-being. The incidents largely align with moral foundations theory (Haidt and Graham in Social Justice Research, 20, 98–116, 2007). Responses also show evidence for social exchange, social learning, and rational expectancy-ba sed proc esses and behavior. The incidents specify several practices for managers and organizations to encourage and avoid. This was the first qualitative study of moral emotions at work and one of the few workplace studies to examine these emotions empirically. Several understudied factors and behavioral responses emerged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018) : Into the wild: Big data analytics in moral psychology. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 525-536, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: How can we investigate moral values in the real world? We propose that naturally generated linguistic data, such as social media content, can be used to study morality outside of the laboratory. Moral values are culturally variable entities that emerge from dynamic, hierarchical interactions between individual- and group level phenomena. Human-generated unstructured data from sources such as social media offer an unprecedented opportunity to observe these phenomena in a natural habitat, which is an essential vantage point for understanding moral values and their role in moral judgment and behavior. We believe it is vital that researchers supplement traditional methodologies with alternative approaches that have greater ecological and external validity and that are better able to capture the full social–functional range of morality. In this chapter, we argue that a range of computationally intensive methods, drawn predominantly from computer science and computational linguistics , can help researchers do just this. By mining psychologically relevant information from large-scale, human-generated, online data such as blog posts, news articles, tweets, Facebook status updates, and social network structures—collectively referred to as 'big data'—researchers can use these methods to investigate morally relevant phenomena in the real world. These methods enable researchers to investigate large-scale, diachronic moral phenomena such as the diffusion of moral values through populations and the moralization of specific topics. They also offer researchers new opportunities to investigate the relationship between moral values and moral behavior, which is both notoriously difficult to study in the laboratory and deeply important for understanding how morality functions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 2
Keywords: Data Mining, Medien, Interaktionsforschung, Moral, Judgment, Morality, social media, VALUES -
Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.) (2018): Atlas of moral psychology. What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.. New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: What do people evaluate when they assess another person’s moral character? In this chapter, we define moral character in novel social cognitive terms and offer empirical support for the idea that the central qualities of moral character are those deemed essential for social relationships. We approach this chapter from the theoretical standpoint that the centrality of character evaluation is due to its function in social life. Evaluation of character is, we think, inherently a judgment about a person’s qualifications for being a solid long-term social investment. That is, people attempt to suss out moral character because they want to know whether a particular agent is the type of person who likely possesses the necessary (even if not sufficient) qualities they expect in a social relationship. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess other s’ mor al character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. In developing these ideas theoretically and empirically, we consider what form moral character takes, discuss what this proposal suggests about how people may and do assess others’ moral character, and identify an assortment of qualities that our perspective predicts will be central to moral character evaluation. We begin by putting forward a new idea of what we think moral character means, rooted in a social-cognitive view of the person as a moral being. We introduce the idea that a person’s moral character takes the form of moral cognitive machinery—essentially a processor that accepts inputs that, if the processor functions well, should output morally relevant judgments and behavior. We next take on the question of content: What are the more specific characteristics of a person with good moral character? That is, instead of considering t he abstr act form that moral character may take, we ask what qualities define moral character. In this section, we present several forms of preliminary evidence suggesting that moral qualities are those that describe necessary conditions of social investment. In so doing, we engage with two questions. First, we consider how our perspective is compatible with both moral pluralism and moral universalism— how moral codes may show variety and consistency across cultural contexts. Second, we consider in what circumstances people should be more or less likely to assume that others’ character is more or less upstanding. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3 "This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 57 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind"-- "Description: This comprehensive and cutting-edge volume maps out the terrain of moral psychology, a dynamic and evolving area of research. In 56 concise chapters, leading authorities and up-and-coming scholars explore fundamental issues and current controversies. The volume systematically reviews the empirical evidence base and presents influential theories of moral judgment and behavior. It is organized around the key questions that must be addressed for a complete understanding of the moral mind. Key Words: altruism, badness, beliefs, convictions, ethical behavior, evil, evolutionary psychology, free will, goodness, human behavior, immorality, justice, moral character, moral emotions, moral judgments, moral philosophy, moral psychology, moral reasoning, personality, social cognition, social norms, social psychology, values"--
Keywords: Moral, Morality, Peer Evaluation, Personality Traits, Social Cognition, social sciences, Sonstiges -
(2018) : The model of moral motives: A map of the moral domain. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: Motivation is fundamental to morality, which involves both an understanding of right and wrong—of what we should or should not do—and the activation or inhibition of these behaviors. The model of moral motives (MMM) has its roots in the most basic motivational processes recognized in psychology: approach and avoidance. The MMM crosses approach and avoidance processes with distinct levels of analysis reflecting the focus of one’s moral behavior: oneself (intrapersonal), another person (interpersonal), or the group (collective). As evident in this chapter, this produces six cells with unique moral motives, each reflecting how to be moral in that context. Our model explains these two innate processes that are generic from a psychological perspective and culturally uniform in their social function, with a special focus on how these processes manifest in different social contexts. However, it is important to clarify that our model does not try to explain the many ways in which c ultures elaborate on these basic processes. Learned cultural innovations, including everything from rituals and tradition, gossip and reputation, the rule of law, religion, governmental institutions, penal systems, leadership, and various forms of tribalism, are woven into moral behavior in different ways from culture to culture. These cultural elaborations on the two basic processes of moral behavior lead to unique societies that emphasize differing moral motives with differing levels of effectiveness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018) : Moral judgment: Reflective, interactive, spontaneous, challenging, and always evolving. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press
Abstract: Why is moral reasoning fundamental to an explanation of the development of morality? Reasoning is the process by which humans create and apply principles for how individuals ought to treat one another; it is neither innate nor inculcated, but constructed through everyday interactions over the course of development. In this chapter, we discuss the developmental origins of morality, drawing on theories and empirical research in developmental science. Understanding the origins and developmental changes of any phenomenon provides insights into sources of influence, change, and evolution throughout the life course. Although morality was once thought to be the province of adulthood (children were viewed as selfish, antagonistic, or as a blank slate), a large body of research has demonstrated that children are social beings, oriented toward others, motivated to help others and to cooperate, and, beginning in early childhood, capable of drawing categorical distinctions between mo ral cons iderations and other social organizational norms. Moreover, starting at preschool age, children justify moral judgments by reference to fairness, rights, or others’ welfare, whereas they justify conventional judgments by reference to rules, authority, and social traditions. Over several decades, empirical evidence has demonstrated that the developmental emergence of morality stems out of social interactions, both with peers and through adult-child exchanges, and changes slowly over the life course. Morality is constructed through social interactions and observations of events in the world, involving evaluation, reflection, and judgments about the fair treatment of others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): The role of a "common is moral" heuristic in the stability and change of moral norms. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 147 (2), S. 228-242. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000365
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28891657 Abstract: Moral norms are fundamental for virtually all social interactions, including cooperation. Moral norms develop and change, but the mechanisms underlying when, and how, such changes occur are not well-described by theories of moral psychology. We tested, and confirmed, the hypothesis that the commonness of an observed behavior consistently influences its moral status, which we refer to as the common is moral (CIM) heuristic. In 9 experiments, we used an experimental model of dynamic social interaction that manipulated the commonness of altruistic and selfish behaviors to examine the change of peoples' moral judgments. We found that both altruistic and selfish behaviors were judged as more moral, and less deserving of punishment, when common than when rare, which could be explained by a classical formal model (social impact theory) of behavioral conformity. Furthermore, judgments of common versus rare behaviors were faster, indicating that they were computationally more efficient. Finally, we used agent-based computer simulations to investigate the endogenous population dynamics predicted to emerge if individuals use the CIM heuristic, and found that the CIM heuristic is sufficient for producing 2 hallmarks of real moral norms; stability and sudden changes. Our results demonstrate that commonness shapes our moral psychology through mechanisms similar to behavioral conformity with wide implications for understanding the stability and change of moral norms. (PsycINFO Database Record zitiert von: 1
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(2018): Individual differences in social control. Who 'speaks up' when witnessing uncivil, discriminatory, and immoral behaviours?. In: The British journal of social psychology 57 (3), S. 524-546. DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12246
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29468703 Abstract: This research examined the personality characteristics of individuals who 'speak up' and confront perpetrators of norm transgressions. We tested whether those who intervene tend to be 'bitter complainers' or 'well-adjusted leaders'. In four studies (total N = 1,003), we measured several individual differences that are directly implicated by at least one of the two concepts. We also presented participants with uncivil, discriminatory, and immoral behaviours and asked them how likely they would be to intervene if they were to witness each of these behaviours as a bystander. The results confirmed the well-adjusted leader hypothesis: Participants' self-reported tendency to confront perpetrators correlated positively with altruism, extraversion, social responsibility, acceptance by peers, independent self-construal, emotion regulation, persistence, self-directedness, age, occupation, and monthly salary, but not with aggressiveness or low self-esteem. Individuals who confront prejudice also speak up against other immoral and uncivil behaviours. We discuss the implications of these findings for the perpetuation and change of social norms. zitiert von 2
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(2018) : The history of moral norms. In: Gray, Kurt James; Graham, Jesse (Hg.): Atlas of moral psychology: What do we evaluate when we evaluate moral character? - Helzer, Erik G.; Critcher, Clayton R.: New York, NY: The Guilford Press, S. 266-267
Abstract: How does history shape moral values? There are several different theoretical perspectives on moral change, and each has led to lines of evidence that shed light on the nature of morality. The cognitive sciences tend to focus on synchronic methods: studying mental life here and now in living populations. Occasionally, work is also done exploring evolutionary accounts, which is an especially popular approach when it comes to studying morals. Far less frequent is work on the history of morals. This is, in part, because history is difficult to study using psychological methods. This neglect is unfortunate, however, because changes over historical time can deepen our understanding of moral psychology. Like evolutionary approaches, historical approaches help us understand both the mechanisms of morality and their function. But historical approaches also shed light on moral learning, sociocultural contributors to moral norms, transformations over time, and moral conflict. In thi s chapte r, I consider relevant work in philosophy and cultural history, as well as research in the social sciences: anthropology, behavioral economics, political science, sociology, and psychology. Working together, these fields can deepen our understanding of how morality works. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Attributions of Morality and Mind to Artificial Intelligence after Real-World Moral Violations. In: Computers in Human Behavior, S. 401-411. DOI: 10.1016/j.chb.2018.05.014
Abstract: Highlights: •AI’s real-world moral violations only reported 43.5% of the time •Knowledge of algorithm increases moral violation perception •AI not organization, programmer, or use is attributed wrongness •AI attributed mind, awareness, intentionality, justification, and responsibility
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(2018): Supplemental Material for Unethical and Inept?. The Influence of Moral Information on Perceptions of Competence. In: Journal of personality and social psychology, S. 195-210. DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000097.supp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000097.supp Abstract: While moral character heavily influences global evaluations of others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), its causal effect on perceptions of others’ competence (i.e., one’s knowledge, skills, and abilities) is less clear. We found that people readily use information about another’s morality when judging their competence, despite holding folk intuitions that these domains are independent. Across 6 studies (n = 1,567), including 2 preregistered experiments, participants judged targets who committed hypothetical transgressions (Studies 1 and 3), cheated on lab tasks (Study 2), acted selfishly in economic games (Study 4), and received low morality ratings from coworkers (Study 5 and 6) as less competent than control or moral targets. These findings were specific to morality and were not the result of incidentally manipulating impressions of warmth (Study 4), nor were they fully explained by a general halo effect (Studies 2 and 3). We hypothesized that immoral targets are seen as less competent because their immoral actions led them to be viewed as low in social intelligence. Studies 4 and 5 supported this prediction, demonstrating that social intelligence was a more reliable mediator than perceptions of self-control or general intelligence. An experimental test of this mediation argument found that presenting targets as highly socially intelligent eliminated the negative effect of immoral information on judgments of competence (Study 6). These results suggest that information about a person’s moral character readily influences perceptions of their competence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): The Influence of Media Exposure on the Accessibility of Moral Intuitions and Associated Affect. In: Journal of Media Psychology 30 (2), S. 79-90. DOI: 10.1027/1864-1105/a000183
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-1105/a000183 Abstract: The model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME) predicts that media content can increase the accessibility of preconscious moral intuitions, which shape subsequent moral decision making. To date, attempts to demonstrate evidence of this intuitive, preconscious process with self-report measures have met with little success. The current paper presents results from a study designed to test the MIME’s predictions, measuring the accessibility of moral intuitions with a moral foundations–affect misattribution procedure (MF-AMP) argued in the current paper to be more capable of detecting the aforementioned effect. An experiment manipulated exposure to media content that focused on care and fairness to test the proposition that media content can increase the accessibility of these moral intuitions. The findings offer preliminary evidence supporting the MIME’s proposition that media content featuring behaviors relevant to specific moral intuitions can increase (temporar ily at l east) the accessibility of those specific moral intuitions in the audiences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 6
Keywords: Intuition, Media Exposure, Medien, MODELS, Moral, Morality, Social Influences, Test Construction -
(2018): An architecture for ethical robots inspired by the simulation theory of cognition. In: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS RESEARCH 48, S. 56-66. DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2017.04.002 Abstract: The expanding ability of robots to take unsupervised decisions renders it imperative that mechanisms are in place to guarantee the safety of their behaviour. Moreover, intelligent autonomous robots should be more than safe; arguably they should also be explicitly ethical. In this paper, we put forward a method for implementing ethical behaviour in robots inspired by the simulation theory of cognition. In contrast to existing frameworks for robot ethics, our approach does not rely on the verification of logic statements. Rather, it utilises internal simulations which allow the robot to simulate actions and predict their consequences. Therefore, our method is a form of robotic imagery. To demonstrate the proposed architecture, we implement a version of this architecture on a humanoid NAO robot so that it behaves according to Asimov’s laws of robotics. In a series of four experiments, using a second NAO robot as a proxy for the human, we demonstrate that the Ethical Layer enables the robot to prevent the human from coming to harm in simple test scenarios. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2018): Moral cognition and its basis in social cognition and social regulation.. New York: Guilford Press, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
Abstract: What is the basis of moral cognition? Moral judgments are grounded in a number of cognitive and social cognitive processes, which guide the social regulation of behavior and are, in turn, constrained by such regulation to be fair and evidence-based. Human beings live complex social lives, composed of various types of relationships across nested social hierarchies, all structured by rights, rules, and obligations. However, selfish goals persist, and keeping individuals’ goals in line with community interests has become the primary challenge of modern morality. To meet this challenge, human societies have developed two major social-cultural tools: a vast network of rules, norms, and values and complex social practices of norm enforcement, such as blame, praise, apology, and reconciliation. This kind of social-cultural morality has to be taught, learned, and enforced by community members, even by the youngest among them. Acquiring norms likely benefits from early-appearing prefere nces for prosocial agents over antisocial agents, but socially mature moral capacities rely heavily on nonmoral capacities: those of social cognition. Social cognition encompasses a hierarchy of interdependent concepts, processes, and skills that allow individuals to perceive, understand, and—most important for the present topic—evaluate one another. For example, norm enforcers infer the mental processes that generated a transgressive behavior (e.g., motive, belief, intention) before blaming the transgressor. The transgressor must likewise infer the mental processes that generated the social act of blaming (e.g., the norm enforcer’s goals, knowledge, and power of enforcing sanctions) when deciding to deny or admit, maintain or correct the norm-violating behavior. These, then, are the phenomena this chapter aims to illuminate. We show how the elements of social cognition ground people’s moral cognition and how social and moral cognition together guide the social regul ation of behavior by moral norms. We aim to identify the concepts, mechanisms, and practices that go into making various kinds of moral judgments and the forms and functions of socially expressing those judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 4
2017
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(2017): Beyond Dominance and Competence. A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. In: Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 21 (3), S. 203-227. DOI: 10.1177/1088868316649297
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27225037 Abstract: Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 5
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(2017): Leader social accounts of subordinates' unethical behavior. Examining observer reactions to leader social accounts with moral disengagement language. In: The Journal of applied psychology 102 (10), S. 1448-1461. DOI: 10.1037/apl0000233
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28493747 Abstract: When providing social accounts (Sitkin & Bies, 1993) for the unethical conduct of subordinates, leaders may use language consistent with cognitive strategies described by Bandura (1991, 1999) in his work on moral disengagement. That is, leader's social accounts may reframe or reconstrue subordinates' unethical conduct such that it appears less reprehensible. We predict observers will respond negatively to leaders when they use moral disengagement language within social accounts and, specifically, observers will ostracize these leaders. In addition, we predict that observer moral disengagement propensity moderates this effect, such that the relationship between leaders' use of moral disengagement language within a social account and ostracism is stronger when observer moral disengagement propensity is lower versus higher. Finally, we predict that the reason why observers ostracize the leader is because observers perceive the leader's social account with moral disengagement language as unethical. Thus, perceived leader social account ethicality is predicted to mediate the interaction effect of leader's use of moral disengagement language within social accounts and observer moral disengagement propensity on ostracism. Results from an experiment and field study support our predictions. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record
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(2017): The social turn in moral psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035569.001.0001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035569.001.0001 Abstract: The Social Turn in Moral Psychology is a probing inquiry into the disconnect between moral philosophy and empirical approaches to ethics. Drawing on a refreshing range of examples— including student protest movements, racial oppression, education policy, and life expectancy outcomes—Fedyk offers a promising strategy for bringing normative theory into alignment with the social sciences. Fedyk argues that moral psychology should take a social turn, investigating the psychological processes that motivate patterns of social behavior defined as ethical using normative information extracted from the social sciences. He points out methodological problems in conventional moral psychology, particularly the increasing methodological and conceptual inconsilience with both philosophical ethics and evolutionary biology. Fedyk's 'causal theory of ethics' is designed to provide moral psychology with an ethical theory that can be used without creating tension between its scientific p ractice and the conceptual vocabulary of philosophical ethics. His account aims both to redirect moral psychology toward more socially realistic questions about human life and lo introduce philosophers to a new form of ethical naturalism—a way of thinking about how to use different fields of scientific research to answer some of the traditional questions that are at the heart of ethics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: causal theory of ethics, Ethics, Moral, Morality, Philosophies, social sciences, Sonstiges -
(2017): The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis.. In: Cognition (Vol.166), S. 314-327, zuletzt geprüft am 02.05.2018
Abstract: Experimental research suggests that people draw a moral distinction between bad outcomes brought about as a means versus a side effect (or byproduct). Such findings have informed multiple psychological and philosophical debates about moral cognition, including its computational structure, its sensitivity to the famous Doctrine of Double Effect, its reliability, and its status as a universal and innate mental module akin to universal grammar. But some studies have failed to replicate the means/byproduct effect especially in the absence of other factors, such as personal contact. So we aimed to determine how robust the means/byproduct effect is by conducting a meta-analysis of both published and unpublished studies (k = 101; 24,058 participants). We found that while there is an overall small difference between moral judgments of means and byproducts (standardized mean difference = 0.87, 95% CI 0.67–1.06; standardized mean change = 0.57, 95% CI 0.44–0.69; log odds ratio = 1.59, 95% CI 1.15–2.02), the mean effect size is primarily moderated by whether the outcome is brought about by personal contact, which typically involves the use of personal force. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
Keywords: Grammar, Kognitionswissenschaften, Linguistics, Moral, Metaanalyse, Morality, Social Cognition -
(2017): Moral foundations tell us why guilt induces unfair allocation in multi-party interactions. In: Asian Journal of Social Psychology 20 (3-4), S. 191-200. DOI: 10.1111/ajsp.12170
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12170 Abstract: Previous studies have demonstrated that a sense of guilt promotes and maintains social fairness in two‐party interactions (Psychological Bulletin, 115, 1994 and 243). However, the situation is much more complex in three‐party or multi‐party interactions. De Hooge et al. (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 2011 and 462) found that guilt could not only induce pro‐social behaviour towards the victim, but also have a disadvantageous impact on a third party. In the present study, we attempt to explain how guilt promotes unfair allocations from a moral foundations perspective. We conducted two experiments using a ‘three‐party dictator game’ paradigm. Firstly, it was repeatedly verified that guilt could induce unfair allocations in three‐party interactions. Secondly, five moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup, hierarchy and purity) were measured. Then the moderating and main effects of these five indices on how guilt affects the fair allocati on of re sources were explored using regression analysis. The results show that competition between harm and fairness in individual traits can explain the disadvantageous effect of guilt on fair allocations: the fairness foundation promoted equality in allocation, while the harm foundation promoted victim compensation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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(2017): Do We Gossip for Moral Reasons?. The Intersection of Moral Foundations and Gossip. In: Basic and Applied Social Psychology 39 (4), S. 218-230. DOI: 10.1080/01973533.2017.1336713
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2017.1336713 Abstract: Gossip is comprised of evaluative talk about absent others. Although such evaluations may be moral or non-moral, moral judgments often precede the transmission of gossip. This work explored the salience of moral and non-moral motivations to transmit gossip-like information. Two studies explored the relationships between the general tendency to gossip, transmission of, and interest in gossip, five moral foundations (Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, Purity/sanctity), their sacredness in relational contexts, and moral and non-moral motives to gossip. Results from Studies 1 (negative gossip—infidelity) and 2 (positive gossip—fidelity) indicated that moral motives to gossip were more important than non-moral motives. The contribution of morality in perpetuating gossip was discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Authority, Fairness, Gossip, Ingroup Outgroup, Moral, Loyalty, Morality, Reciprocity, respect, social psychology, Sozialpsychologie -
(2017): Supplemental Material for Consequences, Norms, and Generalized Inaction in Moral Dilemmas. The CNI Model of Moral Decision-Making. In: Journal of personality and social psychology, S. 343-376. DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000086.supp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000086.supp Abstract: Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinom ial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3