Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation. In: Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 11 (2), S. 313-343. DOI: 10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
Abstract: Both laboratory and field evidence suggest that people tend to voluntarily incur costs to punish non-cooperators. While costly punishment typically reduces the average payoff as well as promotes cooperation. Why does the costly punishment evolve? We study the role of punishment in cooperation promotion within a two-level evolution framework of individual strategies and social norms. In a population with certain social norm, players update their strategies according to the payoff differences among different strategies. In a longer horizon, the evolution of social norm may be driven by the average payoffs of of all members of the society. Norms differ in whether they allow or do not allow for the punishment action as part of strategies, and, for the former, they further differ in whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of cooperative evolutionary stable state (CESS) become larger, but also the convergence speed to CESS is faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm. This model can be used to explain the widespread existence of costly punishment in human society.
Keywords: Bestrafung, Disziplin, economics, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Kooperation, Modelle/Theorien, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Ökonomische Theorie sozialer Normen, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, Wandel von Normen 2005
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(2005): Evolution of indirect reciprocity. In: Nature 437 (7063), S. 1291-1298. DOI: 10.1038/nature04131
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16251955 Abstract: Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.
Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Biologie, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Humans, Indirekte Reziprozität, Kooperation, Models, Biological, Morals, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Reziprozität, Soziale Angemessenheit, Trust, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2001
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Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.) (2001): Social norms. New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation
Abstract: Social norms are rules that prescribe what people should and should not do given their social surroundings and circumstances. Norms instruct people to keep their promises, to drive on the right, or to abide by the golden rule. They are useful explanatory tools, employed to analyze phenomena as grand as international diplomacy and as mundane as the rules of the road. But our knowledge of norms is scattered across disciplines and research traditions, with no clear consensus on how the term should be used. Research on norms has focused on the content and the consequences of norms, without paying enough attention to their causes. Social Norms reaches across the disciplines of sociology, economics, game theory, and legal studies to provide a well-integrated theoretical and empirical account of how norms emerge, change, persist, or die out. Social Norms opens with a critical review of the many outstanding issues in the research on norms: When are norms simply devices to ease cooperation, and when do they carry intrinsic moral weight? Do norms evolve gradually over time or spring up spontaneously as circumstances change? The volume then turns to case studies on the birth and death of norms in a variety of contexts, from protest movements, to marriage, to mushroom collecting. The authors detail the concrete social processes, such as repeated interactions, social learning, threats and sanctions, that produce, sustain, and enforce norms. One case study explains how it can become normative for citizens to participate in political protests in times of social upheaval. Another case study examines how the norm of objectivity in American journalism emerged: Did it arise by consensus as the professional creed of the press corps, or was it imposed upon journalists by their employers? A third case study examines the emergence of the norm of national self-determination: has it diffused as an element of global culture, or was it imposed by the actions of powerful states? The book concludes with an examination of what we know of norm emergence, highlighting areas of agreement and points of contradiction between the disciplines. Norms may be useful in explaining other phenomena in society, but until we have a coherent theory of their origins we have not truly explained norms themselves. Social Norms moves us closer to a true understanding of this ubiquitous feature of social life.
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(2001) : Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social Norms In: Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.): Social norms: New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, S. 3-34
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(2001) : Game theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms In: Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.): Social norms: New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, S. 105-138
Abstract: Rational choice theory argues that soci al norms emerge because the norms' content yields benefits for some agents. Game theory is that branch of rational choice theory that d eals with soci al interactions among rational actors. The subject of game theory is therefore social action and social relations among rational agents (in Max Weber's sense). The emergence of social norms is closely related to the Hobbesi an problem of social order, and i ts explanation is among the most important issues of social theory. In this chapter I discuss game theoretical approaches to social norms.
Keywords: Disziplin, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Modelle/Theorien, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Rational Choice Theory, Sanktionierung, Social Norms, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Soziologie, Spieltheorie 2000
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(2000): Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3), S. 137-158. DOI: 10.1257/jep.14.3.137
Abstract: I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
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