Alle Publikationen
1936
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(1936): Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. In: Psychological monographs 47 (1)
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(1936): Principles of topological psychology. 1. ed., 6. impr. New York: McGraw-HillKeywords: Gestalt psychology
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(1936): The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. In: American Sociological Review 1 (6). DOI: 10.2307/2084615
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(1936): La naissance de l'intellingence chez l'enfant. Paris: Delachaux & NiestléKeywords: Psychologie
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(1936): Principles of Gestalt Psychology. In: The Philosophical Review 45 (4). DOI: 10.2307/2180493
1935
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(1935): A Dynamic Theory Of Personality. New York; London: McGraw-HillKeywords: Sozialverhalten
1932
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(1932): Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: Cambridge University Press
1931
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(1931): The correlation of direct suggestibility with certain character traits. In: Journal of Applied Psychology 15 (1), S. 1-15. DOI: 10.1037/h0072934
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/h0072934 Abstract: Hull's test of suggestibility used on 56 subjects showed consistently low correlations with rankings of the subjects on the traits of honesty, sympathy, 'sweet temper,' tactfulness, and suggestibility. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 25
1930
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(1930): Appreciation as a Test of Social Progress. In: Journal of Educational Sociology 4 (3). DOI: 10.2307/2961117
Abstract: The advocate of wealth (under whatever variant form it may be proposed) proves that wealth indicates progress by showing that the percentage of dependents is greatly diminished; that moderate luxuries are enjoyed by the masses; that even the suffering of the few who are dependent is greatly ameliorated. In each of these arguments, as in the whole extensive catalogue of similar contentions, the proof lies not in the criterion named, but in the larger enjoyment of life, the wider range of satisfaction. Happiness, under one definition or another …
Keywords: Pädagogische Psychologie, Soziale Anerkennung 1927
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(1927): Zum Problem der Regulation. In: Wilhelm Roux' Archiv für Entwicklungsmechanik der Organismen 112 (1), S. 315-332. DOI: 10.1007/bf02253767
1926
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: Vorsatz Wille und Bedürfnis. Berlin Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, S. 40-92. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50826-4
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(1926): Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis: Mit Vorbemerkungen über die psychischen Kräfte und Energien und die Struktur der Seele. Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer
1925
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(1925): Group Organization and Social Behavior. In: The International Journal of Ethics 35 (4), S. 346-367. DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.35.4.2377443
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(1925): The Genesis of the Self and Social Control. In: The International Journal of Ethics 35 (3), S. 251-277. DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.35.3.2377274
1923
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(1923): The Unadjusted Girl: With Cases and Standpoint for Behavior Analysis. Issue 4 of Criminal science monograph. Boston: Little, Brown
1922
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(1922): Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt. In: Psychologische Forschung 1 (1), S. 47-58. DOI: 10.1007/bf00410385
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(1922): Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt. In: Psychologische Forschung 1 (1), S. 47-58. DOI: 10.1007/bf00410385
1920
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(1920): Theoretische Biologie. Berlin: Paetel
1919
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(1919): XV.—The correlation between relatives on the supposition of Mendelian inheritance. In: Earth and Environmental Science Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh 52 (2), S. 399-433
1918
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: Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes. Bühler, K. (1918). Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes. Jena: Verlag Gustav Fischer. Stuttgart, Germany: Gustav Fischer VerlagKeywords: schema
1917
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(1917): How to teach. New York: MacMillan Co, zuletzt geprüft am 25.04.2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/14866-000 Abstract: Morality is not a matter primarily of mere conduct. It involves conduct, but the essence of morality lies deeper than the act itself; motive, choice, are involved as well. Mere law-abiding is not morality in the strict sense of the word. One may keep the laws merely as a matter of blind habit. A prisoner in jail keeps the laws. A baby of four keeps the laws, but in neither case could such conduct be called moral. In neither of these cases do we find 'control' by the individual of impulses, nor 'conscious choice' of conduct. In the former compulsion was the controlling force, and in the second blind habit based on personal satisfaction. Conduct which outwardly conforms to social law and social progress is unmoral rather than moral. There is no instinct or inborn tendency that is primarily and distinctly moral as over against those that are social. That is the commonly accepted belief to-day. There is no moral instinct. Morality finds its root in the original nature of man, but not in a single moral instinct. Morality was much more susceptible to environmental influences than intellectual achievement, because it was much more a direction and guidance of capacities and tendencies possessed by every one. One's character is largely a product of one's environment. In proof of this, read the reports of reform schools, and the like. Children of criminal parents, removed from the environment of crime, grow up into moral persons. The pair of Jukes who left the Juke clan lost their criminal habits and brought up a family of children who were not immoral. Education cannot produce geniuses, but it can produce men and women whose chief concern is the wellbeing of the group. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 24
1915
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(1915): Triebe und Triebschicksale. GW X. In: Frankfurt/M.: S. Fischer, S. 209-232
1913
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(1913) : Kritik der Urteilskraft In: König Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften: Berlin, S. 341-386
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König Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (1913): Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften. Berlin
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(1913): Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufes. Eine experimentelle Untersuchung. Stuttgart: Spemann