Alle Publikationen
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2005
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(2005): Opinion. The neural basis of human moral cognition. In: Nature reviews. Neuroscience 6 (10), S. 799-809. DOI: 10.1038/nrn1768
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16276356 Abstract: Moral cognitive neuroscience is an emerging field of research that focuses on the neural basis of uniquely human forms of social cognition and behaviour. Recent functional imaging and clinical evidence indicates that a remarkably consistent network of brain regions is involved in moral cognition. These findings are fostering new interpretations of social behavioural impairments in patients with brain dysfunction, and require new approaches to enable us to understand the complex links between individuals and society. Here, we propose a cognitive neuroscience view of how cultural and context-dependent knowledge, semantic social knowledge and motivational states can be integrated to explain complex aspects of human moral cognition.
Keywords: Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Brain/physiology, chemisch / neurologisch / medikamentös / durch Substanzen, Cognition/physiology, Disziplin, Good manners, Humans, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, Kultursensibilität, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Moral und Kognition, moralisches Wissen, Morals, Neural Pathways/physiology, Neurosciences/methods, Neurowissenschaften, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Postkasten, Psychologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik -
(2005): Universal Moral Values for Corporate Codes of Ethics. In: Journal of Business Ethics 59 (1-2), S. 27-44. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-005-3403-2
Abstract: How can one establish if a corporate code of ethics is ethical in terms of its content? One important first step might be the establishment of core universal moral values by which corporate codes of ethics can be ethically constructed and evaluated. Following a review of normative research on corporate codes of ethics, a set of universal moral values is generated by considering three sources: (1) corporate codes of ethics; (2) global codes of ethics; and (3) the business ethics literature. Based on the convergence of the three sources of standards, six universal moral values for corporate codes of ethics are proposed including: (1) trustworthiness; (2) respect; (3) responsibility; (4) fairness; (5) caring; and (6) citizenship. Relying on the proposed set of universal moral values, implications are discussed as to what the content of corporate codes of ethics should consist of. The paper concludes with its limitations.
2003
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(2003): Persecutors or victims? The moral logic at the heart of eating disorders. In: Health care analysis : HCA : journal of health philosophy and policy 11 (3), S. 219-228. DOI: 10.1023/B:HCAN.0000005494.66782.4e
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/14708934 Abstract: Eating Disorders, particularly anorexia and bulimia, are of immense contemporary importance and interest. News stories depicting the tragic effects of eating disorders command wide attention. Almost everybody in society has been touched by eating disorders in one way or another, and contemporary obsession with body image and diet fuels fascination with this problem. It is unclear why people develop eating disorders. Clinical and sociological studies have provided important information relating to the relational systems in which eating disorders are mainly found. This paper shows that their explanations are not conclusive and points out that the reasons why people develop eating disorders should not be found in the dysfunctional interactions occurring in both familial and social systems, but in the moral beliefs that underlie these interactions. Eating disorders are impossible to understand or explain, unless they are viewed in the light of these beliefs. A moral logic, that is a way of thinking of interpersonal relations in moral terms, gives shape to and justifies the clinical condition, and finds consistent expression in abnormal eating behaviour. The analysis offered here is not mainstream either in philosophy (eating disorders are in fact seldom the subject of philosophical investigation) or in clinical psychology (the methods of philosophical analysis are in fact seldom utilised in clinical psychology). However, this paper offers an important contribution to the understanding of such a dramatic and widespread condition, bringing to light the deepest reasons, which are moral in nature, that contribute to the explanation of this complex phenomenon.
Keywords: Beeinflussung der Bewertung moralischer Urteile, Bewertung von sozialem Verhalten (/sozialer Angemessenheit), Culture, Disziplin, Ethnographie, Feeding and Eating Disorders/ethnology/psychology, Health Behavior/ethnology, Humans, Internal-External Control, Interpersonal Relations, Moral, Moral und Kognition, Morals, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pathologie, Philosophie, Philosophie in der Psychologie, Psychologie, Social Environment, Sozialverhalten -
(2003): Responsible psychopaths. In: Philosophical Psychology 16 (3), S. 417-429. DOI: 10.1080/0951508032000121797
Abstract: Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, as a question of our appropriate reactive attitudes toward an agent for what she does, and as distinct from the question of the agent's own motivating attitudes, which lead him to do what he does. The latter is the question more directly relevant to free will, though moral motivation normally depends on the capacity in early childhood to pick up motivating attitudes from others' reactive attitudes. Reactive attitudes based on hatred rather than anger (e.g. disgust or contempt) count as alternative forms of blame that may be appropriately directed toward agents manifesting bad qualities of will, even as a matter of motivational impairment. So psychopaths may still be said to deserve blame, even if they are incapable of modifying their behavior in response to blame.
Keywords: Beeinflussung sozial angemessenen Verhaltens, Fehlverhalten, Moral emotions, Moral und Kognition, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Moralpsychologie, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pathologie, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie der Psychologie, Psychopathie, Schuld 2000
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(2000): Empathy. In: American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1), S. 65-78
Abstract: Empathy, or roughly, "feeling with" another person, has fascinated philosophers as well as psychologists. Since empathy is frequently linked with altruistic motives and prosocial helping behavior, it seems to have implications for the quality of social life, as well as moral significance. What exactly is empathy, and how is it produced? Part I of this essay deals with the task of defining empathy. Part II addresses the separate question of explaining how it is generated. Part III concludes with a preliminary sketch of one way of thinking about empath's moral significance.
Keywords: Beeinflussung der Bewertung moralischer Urteile, Bewertung von sozialem Verhalten (/sozialer Angemessenheit), Disziplin, Empathie, Empathie als Spezifikum des Menschseins, Empathy, Moral, Moral und Kognition, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pathologie, Philosophie 1995
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(1995): Emotion as a natural kind. Towards a computational foundation for emotion theory. In: Philosophical Psychology 8 (1), S. 59-84. DOI: 10.1080/09515089508573145
Abstract: In this paper I link two hitherto disconnected sets of results in the philosophy of emotions and explore their implications for the computational theory of mind. The argument of the paper is that, for just the same reasons that some computationalists have thought that cognition may be a natural kind, so the same can plausibly be argued of emotion. The core of the argument is that emotions are a representation‐governed phenomenon and that the explanation of how they figure in behaviour must as such be undertaken in those terms. I conclude with some interdisciplinary reflections in defence of the hypothesis that emotions might be more fundamental in the organization of behaviour than cognition; that, in effect, we may be emoters before we are cognizers. The aim of the paper is: (1) to introduce a number of promising results in philosophical and empirical emotion theory to a wider audience; and (2) to begin the task of organizing those results into a computational theoretical framework.
1982
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(1982): Moral Cognition, Behaviorism, and Social Learning Theory. In: Ethics 92 (3), S. 459-467. DOI: 10.1086/292355
Abstract: Dennis Krebs, a social psychologist, and Thomas Wren, a moral philosopher, have provided critiques of the social learning theory (SLT) approach to morality. Kreb's perspective derives from cognitive-developmental theory (CDT) which he views as the main alternative to SLT, whereas Wren's is "somewhat more psychodynamic than Harré's and yet more socially interactive than Freud`s." Krebs and Wren make numerous specific criticisms (Krebs of particulars of my own earlier article on alruism; Wren of the different SLT approaches), and both offer alternative suggestions for future directions (Krebs of the importance of intentional reasoning preparatory to behaving; Wren of a hierarchical system in which an executive agency mediates affectice structures).
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