Alle Publikationen

  • Erweiterte Suche öffnen

Treffer: 3
  • <<
  • 1

  • 2017

  • Heiphetz, Larisa; Young, Liane L. (2017): Can only one person be right? The development of objectivism and social preferences regarding widely shared and controversial moral beliefs. In: Cognition 167, S. 78-90. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.014

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27260661 

    Abstract: Prior work has established that children and adults distinguish moral norms (e.g., hitting is wrong) from conventional norms (e.g., wearing pajamas to school is wrong). Specifically, moral norms are generally perceived as universal across time and space, similar to objective facts. We examined preschoolers’ and adults’ perceptions of moral beliefs alongside facts and opinions by asking whether only one person could be right in the case of disagreements. We also compared perceptions of widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is better to pull someone’s hair or share with someone) and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is better to help someone with a project or make cookies for someone). In Studies 1 and 2, preschoolers and adults were more likely to judge that only one person could be right in the case of widely shared versus controversial moral beliefs, treating the former as more objective or fact-like. Children were also more likely than adults t o say th at only one person could be right in a moral disagreement. Study 2 additionally revealed that adults were more likely than children to report preferring individuals who shared their controversial moral beliefs. Study 3 replicated these patterns using a different sample of widely shared beliefs (e.g., whether it is okay to mock a poor classmate) and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is okay to tell small, prosocial lies). While some aspects of moral cognition may depend on abundant social learning and cognitive development, the perception that disagreements about widely shared moral beliefs have only one right answer while disagreements about controversial moral beliefs do not emerges relatively early. We discuss implications for moral learning and social preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 10

    Keywords: Experimental philosophy, Kognitionswissenschaften, Moral, Moral cognition, Moral objectivism, Social cognitive development, Social preferences
  • Sauermann, Jan (2017): Do Individuals Value Distributional Fairness?. How Inequality Affects Majority Decisions. In: Political Behavior 85 (4). DOI: 10.1007/s11109-017-9424-6

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-017-9424-6 

    Abstract: The so-called chaos theorems imply that, under most preference configurations, majority voting in n-dimensional policy spaces is theoretically unrestricted. Empirical research, however, shows an apparent stability of democratic decisions. Recent theoretical developments have emphasized social preferences as a possible explanation for overcoming majority rule’s instability problem. Hence, it is assumed that individuals not only maximize their own well-being, but also value distributional fairness. However, there is little experimental research into the influence of social preferences on majority decisions. This article presents findings from laboratory experiments on majority decisions in two-dimensional policy spaces with a systematic variation of the fairness properties of the incentive structures. The results show that distributional fairness is an important motivational factor in democratic decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

    Keywords: Committee decision making, Committee decision making,Fairness,Laboratory experiment,Majority rule,Social choice,Social preferences, entscheiden, Fairness, Laboratory experiment, Majority rule, Social choice, Social preferences

  • 2015

  • Tricomi, E.; Sullivan-Toole, H. (2015) : Fairness and Inequity Aversion In: Toga, Arthur W.: Brain mapping: An encyclopedic reference: Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier, S. 3-8, zuletzt geprüft am 27.02.2018

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-397025-1.00142-1 

    Abstract: Brain Mapping: An Encyclopedic Reference, (2015) 3-8. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-397025-1.00142-1 Social preferences for fairness and the avoidance of inequity affect outcome valuation and decision-making. Neuroimaging studies suggest that fair outcomes and behaviors activate brain regions associated with reward processing, such as the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, whereas neural processing of unfair behavior involves the anterior insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex. The temporoparietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex are involved in processing information about others' intentions and reactions to fairness.

    Keywords: Anterior cingulate cortex, Behavioral economics, Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, entscheiden, Fairness, fMRI, INEQUALITY, Insula, Neuroeconomics, Neuroimaging, Neurowissenschaften, Reward, science direct, Social preferences, Striatum, Temporoparietal junction, Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
  • <<
  • 1