Alle Publikationen
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2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2014
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(2014): Inference or Familiarity? The Embodied Roots of Social Cognition. In: SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA 29 (2), S. 253-272
Abstract: I consider two distinct deflationary theories in social cognition that aim to explain action understanding without demanding meta-representational or mindreading processes: the first one is the 'teleological stance hypothesis' (TSH), claiming that we infer the intended goal of a certain observed action based on the mere perception of its effects and of its situational constraints; I decided to dub the second one 'the embodied familiarity hypothesis' (EFH) to comprise all the theories claiming that we recognize the intended goal of a certain action based on the perceptual or motoric expertise developed within the sensorimotor contingencies associated to that action's context. TSH's main requirement is that the observer could ascribe efficiency, and therefore rationality, to the observed agent's movement, while EFH's main requirement is that the observer were somehow exposed to the perceptual or motoric details of the observed agent's action. I argue that EFH describes a more primitive and fundamental form of action understanding, i.e. one that is necessarily presupposed by TSH: in fact, while recognizing efficiency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for detecting goal-relatedness, some kind of perceptual or motoric familiarity with the details of the observed action's context is always necessary for any ascription of efficiency, and therefore of rationality, to the observed agent. I conclude that, while TSH might certainly be effective in describing certain rational forms of action understanding, it implicitly requires EFH to be true, as its inferential system would be groundless without an assumed familiar background of embodied expertise.
2008
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(2008): The Effects of Theory-of-Mind and Social Skill Training on the Social Competence of a Sixth-Grade Student With Autism. In: Journal of Positive Behavior Interventions 10 (4), S. 228-242. DOI: 10.1177/1098300708319906
Abstract: The authors investigated the effects of a theory-of-mind (ToM) and social skill training program on the ToM assessments and social interactions of a sixth-grade high-functioning student with autism. A multiple probe design across behaviors and settings was conducted to evaluate the training program on the participant's learning outcomes. The results showed a functional relationship between the intervention and the participant's skill mastery. Specifically, the participant's appropriate social interactions increased substantially across time and settings with similar improvements in the ToM test scores. The participant's teachers, mother, and peers responded positively to the intervention, indicating their acceptance of the training procedures and outcomes.
2006
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(2006): Theory of mind--evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. In: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 30 (4), S. 437-455. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.08.001
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16239031 Abstract: The ability to infer other persons' mental states and emotions has been termed 'theory of mind'. It represents an evolved psychological capacity most highly developed in humans. The evolutionary origins of theory of mind can be traced back in extant non-human primates; theory of mind probably emerged as an adaptive response to increasingly complex primate social interaction. This sophisticated 'metacognitive' ability comes, however, at an evolutionary cost, reflected in a broad spectrum of psychopathological conditions. Extensive research into autistic spectrum disorders has revealed that theory of mind may be selectively impaired, leaving other cognitive faculties intact. Recent studies have shown that observed deficits in theory of mind task performance are part of a broad range of symptoms in schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, some forms of dementia, 'psychopathy' and in other psychiatric disorders. This article reviews the evolutionary psychology of theory of mind including its ontogeny and representation in the central nervous system, and studies of theory of mind in psychopathological conditions.
Keywords: Animals, Biological Evolution, Brain/physiology, Disziplin, Emotions/physiology, Gefühle, Good manners, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Mental Disorders/etiology, Mental Processes, mental states, Native Theorie, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Personal Construct Theory, Postkasten, Psychologie, Psychopathology, Reflexionen über MTR, Social Behavior, Social Mind, theory of mind, (Theory of mind), Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten
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