Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Theorizing animal–computer interaction as machinations. In: International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 98, S. 135-149. DOI: 10.1016/j.ijhcs.2016.05.005
Abstract: The increased involvement of animals in digital technology and user-computer research opens up for new possibilities and forms of interaction. It also suggests that the emerging field of Animal-Computer Interaction (ACI) needs to reconsider what should be counted as interaction. The most common already established forms of interaction are direct and dyadic, and limited to domesticated animals such as working dogs and pets. Drawing on an ethnography of the use of mobile proximity sensor cameras in ordinary wild boar hunting we emphasize a more complex, diffuse, and not directly observable form of interaction, which involves wild animals in a technological and naturalistic setting. Investigating human and boar activities related to the use of these cameras in the light of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Goffman's notion of strategic interaction reveals a gamelike interaction that is prolonged, networked and heterogeneous, in which members of each species is opposed the other in a mutual assessment acted out through a set of strategies and counter-strategies. We stress the role of theory for the field of ACI and how conceptualizations of interaction can be used to excite the imagination and be generative for design. Seeing interaction as strategies and acknowledging the existence of complex interdependencies could potentially inspire the design of more indirect and non-dyadic interactions where a priori simplifications of design challenges as either human or animal can be avoided. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Actor-network theory, Animal-computer interaction, Animal-Computer-Interaction, ANT und ANT mit Esserschem Modell, Ethnography, Goffman, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Interaktion, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontological symmetry, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Reflexionen über MTR, Strategic interaction, Theory of interaction (Goffman), Tier und Maschine -
(2017): On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 319-337. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295648
Abstract: Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality.
Keywords: deutsche Community, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intentionalität, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, Kooperation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophical Psychology, Reflexionen über MTR, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2016
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(2016): Towards a Computational Comparative Neuroprimatology. Framing the language-ready brain. In: PHYSICS OF LIFE REVIEWS 16, S. 1-54. DOI: 10.1016/j.plrev.2015.09.003
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26482863 Abstract: We make the case for developing a Computational Comparative Neuroprimatology to inform the analysis of the function and evolution of the human brain. First, we update the mirror system hypothesis on the evolution of the language-ready brain by (i) modeling action and action recognition and opportunistic scheduling of macaque brains to hypothesize the nature of the last common ancestor of macaque and human (LCA-m); and then we (ii) introduce dynamic brain modeling to show how apes could acquire gesture through ontogenetic ritualization, hypothesizing the nature of evolution from LCA-m to the last common ancestor of chimpanzee and human (LCA-c). We then (iii) hypothesize the role of imitation, pantomime, protosign and protospeech in biological and cultural evolution from LCA-c to Homo sapiens with a language-ready brain. Second, we suggest how cultural evolution in Homo sapiens led from protolanguages to full languages with grammar and compositional semantics. Third, we assess the similarities and differences between the dorsal and ventral streams in audition and vision as the basis for presenting and comparing two models of language processing in the human brain: A model of (i) the auditory dorsal and ventral streams in sentence comprehension; and (ii) the visual dorsal and ventral streams in defining "what language is about" in both production and perception of utterances related to visual scenes provide the basis for (iii) a first step towards a synthesis and a look at challenges for further research.
Keywords: Animals, Ape gesture, Auditive Faktoren, Biological Evolution, Computational Biology, Cultural evolution, Dorsal and ventral stream, dorsale und ventrale Ströme, Dyadic brain modeling, dynamic brain modelling, Evolution, Gehirnfunktion, Grammatik, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Imitation, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Kompositionale Semantik, Künstliche Intelligenz, Language, Language evolution, language-ready brain, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Neurological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Pantomime, Primates, Protosprachen, Psychomotor Performance, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, sprachbereites Gehirn, Sprache, Sprachevolution, Sprachfähigkeit, Sprachverstehen, Technik, Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Tier-Mensch-Vergleich, Vollsprachigkeit (vs. Protosprachigkeit) -
(2016): The Mechanisms of Emergence. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 260-282. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262553
Abstract: This article focuses on emergence in social systems. The author begins by proposing a new tool to explore the mechanisms of social emergence: multi agent based computer simulation. He then draws on philosophy of mind to develop an account of social emergence that raises potential problems for the methodological individualism of both social mechanism and of multi agent simulation. He then draws on various complexity concepts to propose a set of criteria whereby one can determine whether a given social mechanism generates emergent properties, in the sense that their explanation cannot be reduced to a mechanistic account of individuals and their interactions. This combined account helps to resolve the competing claims of methodological individualists and social realists. The author's conclusion is that the scope of mechanistic explanation may be limited due to the extreme complexity of many social systems.
Keywords: complexity, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Emergenz in sozialen Systemen, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Interaktion, Komplexität, Komplexitätsforschung, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), multi agent based computer simulation, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, simulation, social realism, social systems, soziale Mechanismen, Soziale Systeme, Technik 2014
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(2014): The Machine That Therefore I Am. In: Philosophy & Rhetoric 47 (4). DOI: 10.5325/philrhet.47.4.0494
Abstract: This article follows Jacques Derrida, who follows the animal-machine. In his lecture The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida could easily have swapped “the animal” for “the machine” . In fact, throughout his readings of René Descartes, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas, the machine emerges right alongside the animal. In defining the limits of the human, these thinkers present the animal and the machine together in order to elevate the human. Unlike the human, who responds, the animal-machine merely reacts. The animal-machine may approximate certain human actions, but it can never, according to Descartes, in Derrida’s words, “respond to our questions” and will always suffer from a “lack ..
2013
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(2013): Cyborgs and the future of the human spirit. In: Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe (53.4), S. 546-557
Abstract: This article reports on the influence of an important project of our time, the creation of thinking machines or cyborgs, on the essence of human spirituality. The popular work of Kurzweil was used as a starting point. Kurzweil believes that the cyborgs or man-machine hybrids will not only be a simulation of human cognition but also of consciousness and spirituality. In fact, they will be more than a simulation; they will enhance and alter consciousness and spirituality in a radical, unfathomable way. The basis of Kurzweil's argument is his law of accelerating returns, which predicts such a progress in technology that, if an algorithm for the working of the brain can be formulated, it will be possible to develop software emulating the conscious brain. In this way, current limitations experienced by human beings, including mortality, will be overcome. This assumption was investigated from an anthropological view using Janicaud's concepts. The cyborg is seen as an illustration of people's innate desire to overcome the human condition. Humanity is characterised by a constant struggle to find a balance between the superhuman and the inhuman as the extreme states of human spirituality. This also characterises human liberty humans are free to choose. Given this characterisation of humanity, the nature of the cyborg as superhuman is then considered. Different possibilities are sketched: the superhuman who will exercise the pure will to power (awakening the inhuman) or a person with a complete naive freedom. The future is not easy to predict. Janicaud considers the view of the cyborg as superhuman to be a myth. The real danger facing humanity is the inhuman. The growth and progress of technology do not guarantee moral progress. Currently, technology seems to create a sharp divide between a privileged few and the rest. The two world wars in the previous century illustrated ways in which technology could be used to commit cold-blooded barbaric acts on a mass scale. In addition, biotechnology and other technological innovations could give rise to new forms of violence which can effectively be spread by new media. The inhuman is a place from where it is difficult to return. The challenge of our time is to carry the responsibility of our freedom in such a way that we can defend ourselves against our inhumanity; but in a manner that would enable us also to open up to the radical creativity and strangeness of superhumans lying dormant in us. It is clear that now, more than ever before, human spirituality needs to be as alive and rich as possible to rise to the challenge. However, the belief in technology as utopia enslaves the human spirit. We forget that we are the creators of technology and fabricate excuses for moral and intellectual abdications. Furthermore, the assumption that cognition can be mechanised or formalised leads to the disembodiment of intelligence and thought. Humans are placed outside of the world to which they belong. We become estranged from ourselves and each other. The human spirit seems to be wounded by the prevailing metaphors of disembodiment and mechanisation accompanying technological dominance. This article contributes to the call for the struggle for the re-enchantment of the human spirit. It is imperative that thinkers and innovators - leaders - create new metaphors to provide richer descriptions of humanity. Social sciences, having studied the human condition for centuries, might contribute valuable ideas. Technology can be used in this struggle, but only if human beings understand their own paradoxical nature as well as that of technology. The fortified spirit is one that accepts its mortality and fragility but takes responsibility for its freedom. In this way, meaning is re-introduced in the lives of human beings.
Keywords: Artificial intelligence, cyborg, Cyborgs, human condition, human spirit, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, man-machine, mechanisation, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, post-humanism, Posthumanismus, re-enchantment of the spirit, Reflexionen über MTR, superhuman, technology, the inhuman 2012
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(2012): Feeling robots and human zombies. Mind perception and the uncanny valley. In: Cognition 125 (1), S. 125-130. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22784682 Abstract: The uncanny valley-the unnerving nature of humanlike robots-is an intriguing idea, but both its existence and its underlying cause are debated. We propose that humanlike robots are not only unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, we suggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience (the capacity to feel and sense), rather than agency (the capacity to act and do). Experiment 1 examined whether a machine's humanlike appearance prompts both ascriptions of experience and feelings of unease. Experiment 2 tested whether a machine capable of experience remains unnerving, even without a humanlike appearance. Experiment 3 investigated whether the perceived lack of experience can also help explain the creepiness of unfeeling humans and philosophical zombies. These experiments demonstrate that feelings of uncanniness are tied to perceptions of experience, and also suggest that experience-but not agency-is seen as fundamental to humans, and fundamentally lacking in machines.
Keywords: Emotions, Favoriten, Female, humanlike, humanlike robots, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intellectual Disability/psychology, Male, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), nervende Roboter, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, Reflexionen über MTR, Robotics, Simulation von Menschlichkeit, theory of mind 2010
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(2010): Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness. Does anyone care about functional zombies?. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1), S. 133-155. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6
Abstract: It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.
Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mental states, mentale Zustände, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, phenomenal consciousness, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, qualia, Reflexionen über MTR, Zur Frage: Schreiben wir Assistenzsystemen mentale Zustände zu? Bzw.: durch simulierte Menschlichkeit/soziale Angemessenheit neige wir eher dazu, mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben -
(2010): Technicity of the Body as Part of the Socio-technical System. The Contributions of Mauss and Bourdieu. In: Theoria 76 (2), S. 167-187. DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01067.x
Abstract: The aim of this article is to contribute to a philosophy of technics by proposing an answer to the following question: what is the nature of the human body as an element of technical systems? The argument focuses on an examination of the phenomenon of bodily technics. This examination is guided by the conviction that Pierre Bourdieu's social theory can be read as contributing significantly to an answer to the above question. However, since Bourdieu's project is not directly aimed at enhancing our understanding of the technicity of the human body, a reading of Marcel Mauss's seminal essay on bodily technics is also discussed to set the stage for an examination of the technicity of the body and to justify the manner in which Bourdieu's theory is read here. Through a careful study of the key notions of habitus, field, practice, time and rule, Bourdieu's social theory is systematically presented and explored for its contribution to an understanding of the question raised in this article. In conclusion, a number of remarks are made on how the relation between Mauss and Bourdieu is to be understood and on the argumentative strength of Bourdieu's work.
Keywords: Bourdieu, Bourdieu and theory of practice, deutsche Community, Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Ernst Wolff, Favoriten, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intellektualtechnik, Körper, Körpertechnik, Marcel Mauss, Mauss, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, Praxis, Reflexionen über MTR, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziotechnische Systeme, Technik, Technikphilosophen aktuell, Technikphilosophie, Techno-Anthropologie 2008
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2006
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(2006): Theory of mind--evolution, ontogeny, brain mechanisms and psychopathology. In: Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews 30 (4), S. 437-455. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.08.001
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16239031 Abstract: The ability to infer other persons' mental states and emotions has been termed 'theory of mind'. It represents an evolved psychological capacity most highly developed in humans. The evolutionary origins of theory of mind can be traced back in extant non-human primates; theory of mind probably emerged as an adaptive response to increasingly complex primate social interaction. This sophisticated 'metacognitive' ability comes, however, at an evolutionary cost, reflected in a broad spectrum of psychopathological conditions. Extensive research into autistic spectrum disorders has revealed that theory of mind may be selectively impaired, leaving other cognitive faculties intact. Recent studies have shown that observed deficits in theory of mind task performance are part of a broad range of symptoms in schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, some forms of dementia, 'psychopathy' and in other psychiatric disorders. This article reviews the evolutionary psychology of theory of mind including its ontogeny and representation in the central nervous system, and studies of theory of mind in psychopathological conditions.
Keywords: Animals, Biological Evolution, Brain/physiology, Disziplin, Emotions/physiology, Gefühle, Good manners, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Mental Disorders/etiology, Mental Processes, mental states, Native Theorie, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Personal Construct Theory, Postkasten, Psychologie, Psychopathology, Reflexionen über MTR, Social Behavior, Social Mind, theory of mind, (Theory of mind), Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2005
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(2005): Nonlinearity, chaos, and complexity. The dynamics of natural and social systems. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. Online verfügbar unter http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=177022
Abstract: Covering a broad range of topics, this text provides a comprehensive survey of the modelling of chaotic dynamics and complexity in the natural and social sciences. Its attention to models in both the physical and social sciences and the detailed philosophical approach make this an unique text in the midst of many current books on chaos and complexity. Part 1 deals with the mathematical model as an instrument of investigation. The general meaning of modelling and, more specifically, questions concerning linear modelling are discussed. Part 2 deals with the theme of chaos and the origin of chaotic dynamics. Part 3 deals with the theme of complexity: a property of the systems and of their models which is intermediate between stability and chaos. Including an extensive index and bibliography along with numerous examples and simplified models, this is an ideal course text.
Keywords: Adaptive Systeme, Chaos, Chaotic behavior in systems, Dynamics, Dynamique, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Komplexitätsforschung, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mathematical models, Mathematik, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modèles mathématiques, Modell, Modellierung, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Nonlinear theories, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, social systems, Soziale Ordnung, Soziale Systeme, Systemtheorie, Technik, Théories non linéaires, Überblick -
(2005): Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game. In: Minds and Machines 15 (3-4), S. 415-444. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-005-9005-z
Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?”.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Dretske, Favoriten, human versus robots, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, knowledge game, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2004
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(2004): On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other ?. Behaviourally Indistinguishable?Creatures. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1), S. 173-186. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00389.x
Abstract: Zombies are presently generating much discussion in the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies.2 For if a creature could be physically, functionally and behaviourally indistinguishable from humans (in the rich sense implied) yet lack conscious experience, then the theories of mind that tie the nature of the mental too closely to physical, functional, or behavioural conditions will seem to have left something crucially mental out of their theories. If having conscious experiences is necessary for being conscious – as these discussions assume – then the theories that cannot accommodate it will fail as theories of mind.
2002
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(2002): Love-Hate for Man-Machine Metaphors in Soviet Physiology. From Pavlov to “Physiological Cybernetics”. In: Science in Context 15 (02), S. 339-374. DOI: 10.1017/S0269889702000479
Abstract: This article reinterprets the debate between orthodox followers of the Pavlovian reflex theory and Soviet "cybernetic physiologists" in the 1950s and 60s as a clash of opposing man-machine metaphors. While both sides accused each other of "mechanistic," reductionist methodology, they did not see anything "mechanistic" about their own central metaphors: the telephone switchboard metaphor for nervous activity (the Pavlovians), and the analogies between the human body and a servomechanism and between the human brain and a computer (the cyberneticians). I argue that the scientific utility of machine analogies was closely intertwined with their philosophical and political meanings and that new interpretations of these metaphors emerged as a result of political conflicts and a realignment of forces within the scientific community and in society at large. I suggest that the constant travel of man-machine analogies back and forth between physiology and technology has blurred the traditional categories of the "mechanistic" and the "organic" in Soviet neurophysiology, as perhaps in the history of physiology in general.
Keywords: American Cybernetics, Cold War, cybernetic physiologists, History and Philosophy of Science, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, machine analogy, man-machine, mechanistic vs. organic, mechanistisches Weltbild, Mechanizismus, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Metapher, metaphor, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Pavlov, Reflexionen über MTR, technische Metaphern 1999
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(1999): Man Machine and Other Writings Julien Offray De La Mettrie Ann Thomson, translator and editor New York. Cambridge University Press, 1996, xxx + 179 pp., $54.95, $18.95 paper. In: Dialogue 38 (03). DOI: 10.1017/S001221730004703X
1998
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(1998): Computationalism is dead; now what?. In: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4), S. 393-402. DOI: 10.1080/095281398146662
Abstract: In this paper I put Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of ‘zombie’), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. Firstly, persons process information at a ‘super’-Turing level; secondly, people enjoy certain properties (e.g. intentionality) beyond the reach of any mere information-processing object. Accordingly, computationalism ought to be supplanted with the engineering of ‘subperson’ artifacts and the irreducibly philosophical investigation of personhood. I end with nascent appraisal of Fetzer's interesting semiotic/connectionist replacement for computationalism.
1996
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(1996): Machine man and other writings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University PressKeywords: Aufsatzsammlung, Disziplin, Französischer Materialismus, Grundlegendes und umfassende Theorien, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, LaMettrie, man-machine, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch/Maschine (Maschinetheorie des Lebens), Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie
1988
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(1988): The Man-Machine Dialog from the Viewpoint of Ethics. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (36.9), S. 797-806
1984
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(1984): Innovative Advance in the man-machine relationship. In: Impact of Science on Society (34.4), S. 399-401
1977
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(1977): Blake and the Artistic Machine. An Essay in Decorum and Technology. In: PMLA 92 (5). DOI: 10.2307/461845Keywords: Aufklärung, Blake, decorum, geschriebene Sprache, gesprochene Sprache, Ideengeschichte, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Kunst als Technik, Kunstgeschichte, Kunstmaschinen, Literaturwissenschaft, Maschinenkunst, Mechanismus, Mechanismus und Organismus, mechanistisches Weltbild, Mechanizismus, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch/Maschine (Maschinetheorie des Lebens), Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Reflexionen über MTR, Schrift, Schriftkultur, Sprache, Sprachtheorie, Technikgeschichte, Technologie, Verschriftlichung
1920
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(1920): Theoretische Biologie. Berlin: Paetel
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: Men, Machine, and Modern Times. 50th Anniversary Edition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press
Abstract: Men, Machines, and Modern Times, though ultimately concerned with a positive alternative to an Orwellian 1984, offers an entertaining series of historical accounts taken from the nineteenth century to highlight a main theme: the nature of technological change, the fission brought about in society by such change, and society's reaction to that change. Beginning with a remarkable illustration of resistance to innovation in the U.S. Navy following an officer's discovery of a more accurate way to fire a gun at sea, Elting Morison goes on to narrate the strange history of the new model steamship, the Wapanoag, in the 1860s. He then continues with the difficulties confronting the introduction of the pasteurization process for milk; he traces the development of the Bessemer process; and finally, he considers the computer. While the discussions are liberally sprinkled with amusing examples and anecdotes, all are related to the more profound and current problem of how to organize and manage system of ideas, energies, and machinery so that it will conform to the human dimension. People have had trouble adapting to new technology ever since (perhaps) the inventor of the wheel had to explain that a wheelbarrow could carry more than a person. This little book by a celebrated MIT professor—the fiftieth anniversary edition of a classic—describes how we learn to live and work with innovation. Elting Morison considers, among other things, the three stages of users' resistance to change: ignoring it; rational rebuttal; and name-calling. He recounts the illustrative anecdote of the World War II artillerymen who stood still to hold the horses despite the fact that the guns were now hitched to trucks—reassuring those of us who have trouble with a new interface or a software upgrade that we are not the first to encounter such problems. Morison offers an entertaining series of historical accounts to highlight his major theme: the nature of technological change and society's reaction to that change. He begins with resistance to innovation in the U.S. Navy following an officer's discovery of a more accurate way to fire a gun at sea; continues with thoughts about bureaucracy, paperwork, and card files; touches on rumble seats, the ghost in Hamlet, and computers; tells the strange history of a new model steamship in the 1860s; and describes the development of the Bessemer steel process. Each instance teaches a lesson about the more profound and current problem of how to organize and manage systems of ideas, energies, and machinery so that it will conform to the human dimension.
Keywords: Disziplin, Grundlegendes und umfassende Theorien, History and Philosophy of Science, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch und Maschine, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Neuheit (vs. Etabliertheit) einer technologischen Innovation, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, Reflexionen über MTR, Reluctancy against technonogical innovations theory, Technikphilosophie
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