Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Semejanzas estructurales entre la tradición de la filosofía moral y la teoría social de Durkheim. In: Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica 72 (274). DOI: 10.14422/pen.v72.i274.y2016.007
Abstract: The first sociological theories are indebted to Enlightenment philosophy of history, which first appeared to provide a framework of meaning for moral action once moral theory had renounced the metaphysical commitments of early modern moral philosophy. While defending the autonomy of sociology from philosophy, Durkheim prescribed a specific task for sociological thought, namely: develop a moral science which, by keeping together the two features with which moral facts appear before conscience —solidarity and coercion— could account for the moral sense of the division of labour, a phenomenon previously considered almost a natural process. The purpose of this article is to show how Durkheim’s approach makes room for us to establish a structural similarity between sociological analysis and the perspective of mutual obligations characteristic of the moral philosophical tradition.
2016
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(2016): Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order. In: Sociological Theory 19 (3), S. 312-324. DOI: 10.1111/0735-2751.00143
Abstract: The article asserts that Goffman's concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is-in turn-predicated "on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints".
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Disziplin, Erwartungen, erwartungen und Erwartungserwartungen, familiarity, Frame theory, Frameanalysis Rahmenanalyse Framing, Goffman, Interaktion, kollektive Intentionalität, Natur & Genese von Normen, Soziale Ordnung, Soziologie, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), Theory of interaction (Goffman), Vertrauen 2012
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(2012): One’s a Crowd?. On Greenwood’s Delimitation of the Social. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4), S. 519-530. DOI: 10.1177/0048393112454335
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393112454335 Abstract: In an effort to carve a distinct place for social facts without lapsing into a holistic ontology, John Greenwood has sought to define social phenomena solely in terms of the attitudes held by the actor(s) in question. I argue that his proposal allows for the possibility of a “lone collectivity” that is (1) unpalatable in its own right and (2) incompatible with the claim that sociology is autonomous from psychology. As such, I conclude that the relevant beliefs need to be held by more than one person.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, Durkheim, Game Theory, Gilbert, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, individualism, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, kollektive Intentionalität, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Natur & Genese von Normen, Ontology, philosophy of the social sciences, Realtechnik, social psychology, Sociology, Technik, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 2009
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(2009): The We-Mode Approach. A Response to John Wettersten’s Review of The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3), S. 513-517. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109352830
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109352830 Abstract: The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.
Keywords: explanation, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, philosophy of the social sciences, social action, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), we-mode, We-Mode Approach 2008
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(2008): How Collective Representations Can Change the Structure of the Brain. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (10-11), S. 43-57
Abstract: Culture not only influences human psychology and perceptions of self, others and reality, it also, in certain contexts, influences the quality and degree of consciousness itself. If the brain gives shape to consciousness, then we would expect culture to have a corresponding impact on the functional anatomy and microstructure of the brain. The concept of ‘collective representations’, as developed by Durkheim, refers to the often crucial components of human life that have meaningful existence only because we agree that they do — such as customs, money, religion, cosmology, language, games, laws, power structures and artistic genres. We present recent imaging research which illuminates the feedback relationship between these two types of representation — the collective and the cortical — and which demonstrates that collective representations can have well-defined cortical representations.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Culture, Durkheim, Erkenntnistheorie, Gehirnstruktur, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Kultur, kulturspezifisch, microstructure of the brain, Neurologie, Neuroscience, Neurowissenschaften, Plastizität des Gehirns in Bezug auf Kulturvarianz, Psychologie, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 1989
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(1989): Social Norms and Economic Theory. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4), S. 99-117. DOI: 10.1257/jep.3.4.99
Abstract: Elster contrasts two distinct and frequently opposing social science traditions. One was fostered by Adam Smith and is carried forward today by neoclassical economists and rational-choice theorists in political science. It views humans as “economic men,” that is, as motivated by egoistic material concerns. The other tradition has its roots in the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim, provides the basis for much contemporary sociology and has adherents among political scientists, particularly political culture theorists such as Eckstein (1988). It views humans as social creatures, having duty-based and other obligations to their fellows. “Sociological man’s” activity is thus constrained by shared social (cultural) norms. Elster is skeptical that these cultural norms generally realize individual self-interest as this is understood in the rational-choice tradition. Indeed, elsewhere he distinguishes “economic man” rationality and “nonra-tional” cultural norms even more sharply than he does in this chapter (Elster 1989b). Overall, Elster holds that, for the most part, cultural norms neither arise from rationality, as neoclassical economists understand it, nor do they serve it.
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