Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): The Mechanisms of Emergence. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 260-282. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262553
Abstract: This article focuses on emergence in social systems. The author begins by proposing a new tool to explore the mechanisms of social emergence: multi agent based computer simulation. He then draws on philosophy of mind to develop an account of social emergence that raises potential problems for the methodological individualism of both social mechanism and of multi agent simulation. He then draws on various complexity concepts to propose a set of criteria whereby one can determine whether a given social mechanism generates emergent properties, in the sense that their explanation cannot be reduced to a mechanistic account of individuals and their interactions. This combined account helps to resolve the competing claims of methodological individualists and social realists. The author's conclusion is that the scope of mechanistic explanation may be limited due to the extreme complexity of many social systems.
Keywords: complexity, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Emergenz in sozialen Systemen, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Interaktion, Komplexität, Komplexitätsforschung, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), multi agent based computer simulation, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, simulation, social realism, social systems, soziale Mechanismen, Soziale Systeme, Technik -
(2016): Theorizing the Mechanisms of Conceptual and Semiotic Space. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 283-299. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262554
Abstract: In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge's claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it what it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation.
Keywords: Bunge, cause, conceptualism, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Erklärung, Erklärung des Sozialen, explanation, Interaktion, Konzept, mechanisms, Ontologie, Philosophie, realism, Realismus, reductionism, Reduktionismus, semiotics, Semiotik, social, social realism, Sozialverhalten, structures, Strukturalismus, Strukturen, Systemtheorie, Theoriebegriffe, Überblick 2003
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(2003): Nonreductive Individualism Part II—Social Causation, S. 537-559
Abstract: In Part I, the author argued for nonreductive individualism (NRI), an account of the individual-collective relation that is ontologically individualist yet rejects methodological individualism. However, because NRI is ontologically individualist, social entities and properties would seem to be only analytic constructs, and if so, they would seem to be epiphenomenal, since only real things can have causal power. In general, a nonreductionist account is a relatively weak defense of sociological explanation if it cannot provide an account of how social properties can participate in causal relations. In this article, the author extends NRI to address this weakness and provides an account of social causation that he refers to as supervenient causation.
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