Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): From dictators to avatars. Furthering social and personality psychology through game methods. In: Social and Personality Psychology Compass 11 (12). DOI: 10.1111/spc3.12368
Abstract: From football to the ultimatum game to chess to World of Warcraft, games have been used in social and personality psychology research for decades. Games are a unique and powerful method: They are engaging and have the potential to both manipulate and measure psychological constructs. In fact, researchers have used physical games, board games, behavioral economics games, and digital games to study a range of individual differences, interpersonal processes, and social cognitive processes. Furthermore, researchers have the opportunity to create their own games that can be targeted directly toward their topic of interest. Our review provides a primer for social and personality psychologists interested in using existing games or creating new games for their research as a method for understanding attitudes, behaviors, emotions, cognitions, and perceptions.
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(2017): Culture-specific models of negotiation for virtual characters. Multi-attribute decision-making based on culture-specific values. In: AI & Society 32 (1), S. 51-63. DOI: 10.1007/s00146-014-0570-7
Abstract: We posit that observed differences in negotiation performance across cultures can be explained by participants trying to optimize across multiple values, where the relative importance of values differs across cultures. We look at two ways for specifying weights on values for different cultures: one in which the weights of the model are hand-crafted, based on intuition interpreting Hofstede dimensions for the cultures, and one in which the weights of the model are learned from data using inverse reinforcement learning (IRL). We apply this model to the Ultimatum Game and integrate it into a virtual human dialog system. We show that weights learned from IRL surpass both a weak baseline with random weights and a strong baseline considering only one factor for maximizing gain in own wealth in accounting for the behavior of human players from four different cultures. We also show that the weights learned with our model for one culture outperform weights learned for other cultures when playing against opponents of the first culture.
Keywords: Cultural decision-making, culture specific, Disziplin, entscheiden, Inverse reinforcement learning: Hofstede, Kulturtheorie, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), NEGOTIATION, Realtechnik, Science and Technology Studies (STS), social importance dynamics, Sozial Intelligente Agenten, Soziale Robotik, Spieltheorie, Technik, Ultimatum Game, virtual agents -
(2017): Individual Differences in Good Manners Rather Than Compassion Predict Fair Allocations of Wealth in the Dictator Game. In: Journal of personality 85 (2), S. 244-256. DOI: 10.1111/jopy.12237
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26691600 Abstract: One of the most common tools for studying pro-sociality is the dictator game, in which allocations to one's partner are often described in terms of altruism. However, the motivations driving these allocations may represent either emotional concern for others (compassion), adherence to social norms regarding fairness (politeness), or both. In this article, we apply personality psychology to the study of behavior in the dictator game, in which we examine the discriminant validity of distinct pro-social constructs from the Big Five and HEXACO models in relation to allocations of wealth. Across four studies (Study 1: N = 192; Study 2: N = 212; Study 3: N = 304; Study 4: N = 90) utilizing both hypothetical and incentivized designs, we found that the politeness-but not compassion-aspect of Big Five Agreeableness, as well as HEXACO Honesty-Humility, uniquely predicted dictator allocations within their respective personality models. These findings contribute to a growing literature indicating that the standard dictator game measures "good manners" or adherence to norms concerning fairness, rather than pure emotional concern or compassionate motives, and have important implications for how this paradigm is used and interpreted in psychological research.
Keywords: Adolescent, Adult, Dictator Game, Disziplin, Empathy/physiology, Entwicklungspsychologie, Female, Games, Experimental, Good manners, HEXACO, Humans, Individuality, Male, Middle Aged, Personality/physiology, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Behavior, Social Conformity, Soziale Angemessenheit, Spieltheorie, Umgangsformen, Young Adult -
(2017): Politeness and Compassion Differentially Predict Adherence to Fairness Norms and Interventions to Norm Violations in Economic Games. In: Scientific reports 7 (1). DOI: 10.1038/s41598-017-02952-1
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28611410 Abstract: Adherence to norms and interventions to norm violations are two important forms of social behaviour modelled in economic games. While both appear to serve a prosocial function, they may represent separate mechanisms corresponding with distinct emotional and psychological antecedents, and thus may be predicted by different personality traits. In this study, we compared adherence to fairness norms in the dictator game with responses to violations of the same norms in third-party punishment and recompensation games with respect to prosocial traits from the Big Five and HEXACO models of personality. The results revealed a pattern of differential relations between prosocial traits and game behaviours. While norm adherence in the dictator game was driven by traits reflecting good manners and non-aggression (the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness and HEXACO honesty-humility), third-party recompensation of victims-and to a lesser extent, punishment of offenders-was uniquely driven by traits reflecting emotional concern for others (the compassion aspect of Big Five agreeableness). These findings demonstrate the discriminant validity between similar prosocial constructs and highlight the different prosocial motivations underlying economic game behaviours.
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(2017): When Fair Is Not Equal. In: Social Psychological and Personality Science 8 (8), S. 847-857. DOI: 10.1177/1948550616683018
Abstract: Growing evidence has highlighted the importance of social norms in promoting prosocial behaviors in economic games. Specifically, individual differences in norm adherence—captured by the politeness aspect of Big Five agreeableness—have been found to predict fair allocations of wealth to one’s partner in the dictator game. Yet, most studies have used neutrally framed paradigms, where players may default to norms of equality in the absence of contextual cues. In this study (N = 707), we examined prosocial personality traits and dictator allocations under salient real-world norms of equity and need. Extending on the previous research, we found that—in addition to politeness—the compassion aspect of agreeableness predicted greater allocations of wealth when they were embedded in real-world norms. These results represent an important step in understanding the real-world implications of laboratory-based research, demonstrating the importance of both normative context and prosocial traits.
2016
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(2016): Gene-culture interaction and the evolution of the human sense of fairness. In: Scientific reports 6. DOI: 10.1038/srep32483
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27562008 Abstract: How Darwinian evolution would produce creatures with the proclivity of Darwinian generosity, most of them voluntarily giving up the immediate benefit for themselves or their genes, remains a puzzle. This study targets a problem, the origin of human sense of fairness, and uses fairness-related genes and the social manipulation of Darwinian generosity as the key variables underlying the human sense of fairness, inequity aversion, as well as their relationships within cooperation, and the anticipation foresight of the way relationships are affected by resource division, given the assumption of randomly matched partners. Here we suggest a model in which phenotype will gradually converge towards the perfect sense of fairness along with the prospect of cooperation. Later, the sense of fairness will decrease but it is never extinct. Where social manipulation of Darwinian generosity overshadows genetics, the sense of fairness could be acute to the degree of social manipulation. Above all, there still exists a threshold in the degree of social manipulation, beyond which altruism dominates selfishness in human cooperation. Finally, we propose three new directions toward more realistic scenarios stimulated by recent development of the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory.
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(2016): Rawlsian altruism with perfect discrimination leads to social efficiency. In: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology 40 (1), S. 53-69. DOI: 10.1080/0022250X.2015.1118098
Abstract: Recent studies draw attention on the highly specialized capacity of human beings in recognizing altruists versus cheaters in social interactions. These results hint at the existence of specialized abilities that support discriminating behavior in strategic interactions. In this paper, we explore the implications of discriminating behavior in the study of the indirect evolutionary selection of selfish versus altruistic motivations in the context of generic 2x2 base games, and in particular for coordination and cooperation scenarios. We find that inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism can enforce under rather general conditions socially optimal outcomes, including cases where selfishness cannot, such as in prisoner's dilemmas. Inequality seeking (Nietzschian) altruism in no case improves upon Rawlsian altruism in terms of social optimality of outcomes, and often does worse. In the cooperation scenario in particular, Nietzschean altruism never manages to implement the cooperative outcome. Under perfect discrimination, moreover, inequality averse (Rawlsian) altruism often evolves at the expense of selfishness. These results suggest that the development of sophisticated discrimination abilities may be strongly adaptive in supporting fairness-oriented forms of pro-sociality in humans in the context of social dilemmas and coordination problems.
2012
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(2012): Decision making and equilibria. In: Synthese 187 (1), S. 293-304. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0029-z
Abstract: In economics and in the social sciences, the study of decision making of the single individual is an important preliminary step to provide a sound foundation for the analysis of equilibria in economic and social systems. Neuroeconomic analysis of the process has been a recent fruitful development in this direction. In the more recent past a new direction of research has emerged, studying the interplay of the decision making of the single individual with the economic and social environment that surrounds him. We review some of the results in this field, both theoretical and experimental, and suggest that a closer development of these two methods of research will be necessary in the future.
2011
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(2011): Beyond the Carrot and Stick Approach to Enforcement: An Agent-Based Model. In: European Conference on Cognitive Science
Abstract: As specified by Axelrod in his seminal work An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (Axelrod, 1986), punishment is a key mechanism to achieve the necessary social control and to enforce social norms in a self-regulated society. In this paper, we distinguish between two enforcing mechanisms, punishment and sanction, focusing on the specific ways in which they favour the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, by punishment we refer to a practice that works only by imposing a cost, while by sanction we indicate a practice that also signals the existence of a norm and that its violation is not condoned. To achieve this, we have developed a normative agent able both to punish and sanction offenders and to be affected by these enforcing mechanisms itself.The results obtained through agent-based simulation show that sanction is more effective and makes the population more resilient to sudden changes than mere punishment.
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(2011): Moral enhancement and pro-social behaviour. In: Journal of medical ethics 37 (3), S. 130-131. DOI: 10.1136/jme.2010.041434
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21325675 Abstract: Moral enhancement is a topic that has sparked much current interest in the world of bioethics. The possibility of making people ‘better,’ not just in the conventional enhancement sense of improving health and other desirable (and desired) qualities and capacities, but by making them somehow more moral, more decent, altogether better people, has attracted attention from both advocates1 2 and sceptics3 alike. The concept of moral enhancement, however, is fraught with difficult questions, theoretical and practical. What does it actually mean to be ‘more moral’? How would moral enhancement be defined and would it necessarily, as some have claimed, make the world a better or safer place? How would or could such enhancement be achieved safely and without undue constraint on personal liberty and autonomy? On this subject, a recent paper by Crockett et al4 investigating the effects of the neurotransmitter serotonin on moral decisionmaking provides an intriguing scientific basis for examining what might or might not constitute moral enhancement. The study involved treatment with citalopram, a drug that increases the action of serotonin in the brain, and subsequent analysis of participants' decisionmaking behaviour in two different situations involving moral dilemmas: the well known ‘Trolley Problem’5 and the ‘Ultimatum Game’.6 The researchers found that citalopram promoted what they call ‘prosocial behaviour’, increasing the participants' aversion to causing direct harm to others: in the first scenario, they were less likely to select the option that required killing one in order to save five, and in the secod, less likely to reject unfair offers at the expense of others.
Keywords: Bioethics,, chemisch / neurologisch / medikamentös / durch Substanzen, Disziplin, entscheiden, Humans, Moral, moral enhancement, moralische Dimension, Moralphilosophie, Morals, Philosophie, pro-social behaviour, Prosocial Behaviour, Serotonin, Serotonin/physiology, Social Behavior, Spieltheorie, Status / biologische Marker -
(2011) : Please do not disturb! Minimum interference coverage for social robots In: Staff, IEEE: 2011 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems: 2011 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS 2011): San Francisco, CA: 9/25/2011 - 9/30/2011. IEEE Staff: [Place of publication not identified]: IEEE, S. 1968-1973
Abstract: In this paper we address the problem of human-aware coverage planning. We first present an approach to learn and model human activity events in a probabilistic spatio-temporal map using spatial Poisson processes. We then propose a coverage planner for paths that minimize the interference probability with people. To this end, we pose the coverage problem as an asymmetric traveling salesman problem with time-dependent costs (ATDTSP) derived from the information in the map. The approach enables a noisy robotic vacuum in a home scenario, for instance, to learn to avoid busy places at certain times of the day such as the kitchen at lunch time. We evaluate the planner using a simulator of people in a home environment to generate typical weekday activity patterns. In the experiments with a regular TSP planner and two modified TSP heuristics, the proposed coverage planner significantly reduces interference with people in terms of number of disturbed persons and overall disturbance time.
2010
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(2010): Disgust selectively modulates reciprocal fairness in economic interactions. In: Emotion (Washington, D.C.) 10 (2), S. 169-180. DOI: 10.1037/a0017826
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20364893 Abstract: We report two studies aimed at investigating the effects of distinct negative emotions on pairwise economic interactions. In the ultimatum game, a proposer offers a division of a sum of money to a responder who decides whether to accept the split, or reject and leave both players with nothing. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether induced disgust, as compared to sadness and neutral emotion, specifically influences responders' decisions to reject unfair proposals. In Experiment 2, we assessed whether the effects of disgust were selectively related to social contexts by contrasting interactions with a human partner with those involving a computer. Results showed that relative to being in a sad or neutral mood, induced feelings of disgust significantly increased rejection rates of unfair offers. Moreover, we found that when the partner was not responsible for the fairness violation, such as in the computer-offer condition, the disgust induction failed to affect participants' choices. We conclude by focusing on the hypothesis that disgust and social norm violations may share common computational components, both at a psychological and a neural level.
2008
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(2008): A Path Toward Fairness. In: Rationality and Society 20 (2), S. 173-201. DOI: 10.1177/1043463108089544
Abstract: Recent experimental findings on behavioral games show that subjects do not behave in a self-interest-maximizing manner as would be predicted by game theory. An evolutionary approach attempts to explain why 'irrational' strategies can be dominant in the long run. The article presents an evolutionary model of the Ultimatum game by considering the impact of interaction structure. The question of interest is: will the dominant strategy in evolution be different from the Nash-equilibrium strategy if players are allowed to choose partners they prefer based on the reinforcements (payoffs) from past interactions? Numerical simulation shows that the strategies of fairness could evolve to be dominant. Conditions of the emergence and its properties are discussed. The model offers a supplementary theoretical account for recent field work that indicates a positive association between market integration and the likelihood of making fair offers in the Ultimatum game (Henrich et al. 2004).
2006
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(2006): Breaking the rules of the game. Ethical implications for nursing practice and education. In: Nursing Science Quarterly 19 (3), S. 207-210
Abstract: Rules in games are fundamental to the ethics of practice. Rules provide a context or space where a game is defined and played. Throughout human life, games may be formalized with written and unwritten rules. Imaginations may be sparked in the creative structuring of new, informal games. Formal and informal rules can serve to provide direction for what may be viewed as decorum and appropriate behavior with professional groups. In this column, the author illuminates possible ethical meanings for rule-making and breaking with implications for nursing practice and education from a nursing theoretical perspective.
Keywords: Berufstechnik, decorum, Fehlverhalten, Gesellschaftsprofit, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intellektualtechnik, Interaktion, Medizin, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Pflege, Regel, Regelwerk, Regelwerke, Soziale Rolle, Spiel, Spieltheorie, Technik, Umgangsformen, Verhalten am Arbeitsplatz, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2001
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(2001) : Game theoretical perspectives on the emergence of social norms In: Hechter, Michael; Opp, Karl-Dieter (Hg.): Social norms: New York N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, S. 105-138
Abstract: Rational choice theory argues that soci al norms emerge because the norms' content yields benefits for some agents. Game theory is that branch of rational choice theory that d eals with soci al interactions among rational actors. The subject of game theory is therefore social action and social relations among rational agents (in Max Weber's sense). The emergence of social norms is closely related to the Hobbesi an problem of social order, and i ts explanation is among the most important issues of social theory. In this chapter I discuss game theoretical approaches to social norms.
Keywords: Disziplin, Favoriten, Genese von Normen, Good manners, Modelle/Theorien, Nash-Gleichgewicht, Natur & Genese von Normen, Normen, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Rational Choice Theory, Sanktionierung, Social Norms, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Soziologie, Spieltheorie 1998
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(1998): Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. In: Nature 393 (6685), S. 573-577. DOI: 10.1038/31225
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9634232 Abstract: Darwinian evolution has to provide an explanation for cooperative behaviour. Theories of cooperation are based on kin selection (dependent on genetic relatedness), group selection and reciprocal altruism. The idea of reciprocal altruism usually involves direct reciprocity: repeated encounters between the same individuals allow for the return of an altruistic act by the recipient. Here we present a new theoretical framework, which is based on indirect reciprocity and does not require the same two individuals ever to meet again. Individual selection can nevertheless favour cooperative strategies directed towards recipients that have helped others in the past. Cooperation pays because it confers the image of a valuable community member to the cooperating individual. We present computer simulations and analytic models that specify the conditions required for evolutionary stability of indirect reciprocity. We show that the probability of knowing the 'image' of the recipient must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. We propose that the emergence of indirect reciprocity was a decisive step for the evolution of human societies.
Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Computer Simulation, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Good manners, Helping Behavior, Humans, Indirect reciprocity model, Indirekte Reziprozität, Interaktion, Kooperation, Mutation, Reziprozität, Selection, Genetic, Soziale Angemessenheit, Spieltheorie -
(1998): Individual strategy and social structure. An evolutionary theory of institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
Abstract: Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
1996
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(1996): Fair division. From cake-cutting to dispute resolution. First published.. Cambridge; New York, NY; Oakleigh, Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. Online verfügbar unter http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam027/95016488.html
Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
1995
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(1995): Anomalies. Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (2), S. 209-219. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.2.209
Abstract: Economics can be distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that most (all?) behavior can be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and make rational choices consistent with those preferences in markets that (eventually) clear. An empirical result qualifies as an anomaly if it is difficult to "rationalize" or if implausible assumptions are necessary to explain it within the paradigm. This column will resume, after a long rest, the investigation of such anomalies.
1988
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(1988): Decision theory and decision behaviour. London: Macmillan
Abstract: The book treats two approaches to decision theory: (1) the normative, purporting to determine how a 'perfectly rational' actor ought to choose among available alternatives; (2) the descriptive, based on observations of how people actually choose in real life and in laboratory experiments. The mathematical tools used in the normative approach range from elementary algebra to matrix and differential equations. Sections on different levels can be studied independently. Special emphasis is made on 'offshoots' of both theories to cognitive psychology, theoretical biology, and philosophy.
1986
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(1986): An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. In: American Political Science Review 80 (04), S. 1095-1111. DOI: 10.2307/1960858
Abstract: Norms provide a powerful mechanism for regulating conflict in groups, even when there are more than two people and no central authority. This paper investigates the emergence and stability of behavioral norms in the context of a game played by people of limited rationality. The dynamics of this new norms game are analyzed with a computer simulation based upon the evolutionary principle that strate- gies shown to be relatively effective will be used more in the future than less effective strategies. The results show the conditions under which norms can evolve and prove stable. One interesting possibility is the employment of metanorms, the willingness to punish someone who did not enforce a norm. Many historical examples of domestic and international norms are used to illustrate the wide variety of mechanisms that can support norms, including metanorms, dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership in groups, law, and reputation.
1966
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(1966): Rationality and Social Value in Game-Theoretical Analyses. In: Ethics 76 (3), S. 215-220. DOI: 10.1086/291588
1964
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(1964): Game Theory and "Social Value" States. In: Ethics 75 (1), S. 36-39. DOI: 10.1086/291518
Abstract: N HIS article, "Reflections on Game Theory and the Nature of Value" (Ethics, Vol. LXXII [April, 1962]), Rob- ert Paul Wolff takes the position that "'game theory is capable of providing a formal analysis only of those situations in which egoistic values are to be maximized." He further believes that "the game- theoretic concept of strategy, with its postulation of value-maximizing monads, cannot helpfully be applied to the prob- lems of realizing social values." It is my contention that Wolff's position involves a misunderstanding about the use of strategy -s a criterion of value. As a result, his taper shows that the application of game theory to "'social values" cannot be denied .or the reasons that he gives. Wolff takes "social values" to refer to those "valued states and experience" where the value in question depends upon the existence of some form of social inter- action. He gives as examples of social values "freedom of speech," "love," and "economic co-operation." These, he says, belong to that class of values "quite dis- tinct from the egoistic values" to which he thinks the application of game theory is limited. Game theory, as Wolff explains it in a footnote, is a way of understanding that, when parties are engaged in a problem, each has before him branching sets of alternatives
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