Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Collective intentionality and socially extended minds. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 251-268. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295629
Abstract: There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner.
2014
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(2014): Minds as social institutions. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), S. 121-143. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9324-0
Abstract: I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as "artifacts," tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of "scripts" and "roles"; when we play a role we wear a "mind." No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) "as if" we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these "as if" (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions.
Keywords: als ob, belief in beliefs, Coordination, coordination artifacts, Extended mind, Interaktion, Kooperation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konventionen, philosophy of mind, script, Social frames, Social institutions, social interaction, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Überzeugungen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten
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