Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Self-Interest and the Design of Rules. In: Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) 28 (4), S. 457-480. DOI: 10.1007/s12110-017-9298-7
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-017-9298-7 Abstract: Rules regulating social behavior raise challenging questions about cultural evolution in part because they frequently confer group-level benefits. Current multilevel selection theories contend that between-group processes interact with within-group processes to produce norms and institutions, but within-group processes have remained underspecified, leading to a recent emphasis on cultural group selection as the primary driver of cultural design. Here we present the self-interested enforcement (SIE) hypothesis, which proposes that the design of rules importantly reflects the relative enforcement capacities of competing parties. We show that, in addition to explaining patterns in cultural change and stability, SIE can account for the emergence of much group-functional culture. We outline how this process can stifle or accelerate cultural group selection, depending on various social conditions. Self-interested enforcement has important bearings on the emergence, stability, and change of rules. zitiert von 5
2016
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(2016): Children’s Developing Understanding of the Conventionality of Rules. In: Journal of Cognition and Development 18 (2), S. 163-188. DOI: 10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2016.1255624 Abstract: Much research has investigated how children relate to norms taught to them by adult authorities. Very few studies have investigated norms that arise out of children’s own peer interactions. In two studies, we investigated how 5- and 7-year-old children teach, enforce, and understand rules that they either created themselves or were taught by an adult. Children (N = 240) were asked to either invent game rules on their own or were taught these exact same rules by an adult (yoked design). Children of both ages enforced and transmitted the rules in a normative way, regardless of whether they had invented them or were taught the rules by an adult, suggesting that they viewed even their own self-made rules as normatively binding. However, creating the rules led 5-year-old children to understand them as much more changeable as compared with adult-taught rules. Seven-year-olds, in contrast, regarded both kinds of rules as equally changeable, indeed allowing fewer changes to the ir self- created rules than 5-year-olds. While the process of creating rules seemed to enlighten preschoolers’ understanding of the conventionality of the rules, school-aged children regarded both self-created rules and adult-taught rules in a similar manner, suggesting a deeper understanding of rule normativity as arising from social agreement and commitment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 2
2013
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(2013): A Simulation of Rule-Breaking Behavior in Public Places. In: Social Science Computer Review 32 (4), S. 439-452. DOI: 10.1177/0894439313511186
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439313511186 Abstract: A computer simulation based on both game theory and the cellular automaton model was conducted to investigate the effects of individuals’ interactions and certain conditions on the spread of rule-breaking behavior in public places. Four decision matrices representing obedient, deviant, conforming, and contrary principles were prepared experimentally. The ratio of these principles ranged from 1:2:3:4 to 4:3:2:1 (obedient:deviant:conforming:contrary). There were a total of 24 data sets with each data set composed of 10 decision matrices. In addition to these 24 data sets, the ratio 1:1:1:1 was prepared. This data set was composed of four decision matrices. The results indicated that rule-breaking behavior spreads under the following conditions: (A) when people act according to both individual factors (e.g., their attitudes) and situational factors (e.g., their neighbors’ behavior); (B) when there are more deviant people than obedient people; (C) when the intensity of ru le-break ing behavior is higher than that of rule-obeying behavior. Condition A is an important factor. If conditions B or C are satisfied, the spread of rule-breaking behavior does not occur necessarily. At a certain probability threshold, rule-breaking behavior spreads sharply when people act based on individual factors (e.g., their attitudes); the spread of such behavior cannot be attributed solely to situational factors (e.g., neighbors' behavior). There is only a fine line between rule breaking and obeying near the probability threshold. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 6
1990
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(1990): Über Regeln der sprachlichen Kommunikation und die Schwierigkeiten, nichtberichtbares Wissen zu erfassen. In: Bulletin der Schweizer Psychologen 11 (4), S. 3-12
Abstract: Es wird erortert, wie verhaltenswirksame, aber nichtberichtbare Regeln erfasst und erlernt werden konnen. Als Losungsheuristiken werden zum einen die von Garfinkel vorgeschlagenen "Krisenexperimente" vorgeschlagen, zum anderen ein Verfahren, bei dem die invarianten Merkmale wiederholter Verhaltensablaufe als Basis fur Aussagen uber notwendige minimale Wissensvoraussetzungen dienen. Anschliessend werden Probleme im Zusammenhang mit dem Erlernen verhaltenswirksamer Regeln bzw. prozeduralen Wissens erortert. Da traditionelle Lernkonzepte nicht geeignet erscheinen, eine brauchbare Erklarung dafur zu liefern, wie sich dieser Wissenserwerb im Alltag vollziehen konnte, wird eine Konzeption des Lernprozesses vorgeschlagen, in der dem Wiedererkennen von Situationsaspekten eine zentrale Rolle zugeschrieben wird.
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