Alle Publikationen
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2014
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(2014): Minds as social institutions. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), S. 121-143. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9324-0
Abstract: I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as "artifacts," tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of "scripts" and "roles"; when we play a role we wear a "mind." No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) "as if" we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these "as if" (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions.
Keywords: als ob, belief in beliefs, Coordination, coordination artifacts, Extended mind, Interaktion, Kooperation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konventionen, philosophy of mind, script, Social frames, Social institutions, social interaction, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Überzeugungen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 1999
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(1999) : The Belief-Desire-Intention Model of Agency In: Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.): Intelligents agents V: Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings, 1555: New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence), S. 1-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49057-4_1 Abstract: Within the ATAL community, the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model has come to be possibly the best known and best studied model of practical reasoning agents. There are several reasons for its success, but perhaps the most compelling are that the BDI model combines a respectable philosophical model of human practical reasoning, (originally developed by Michael Bratman [1]), a number of implementations (in the IRMA architecture [2] and the various PRS-like systems currently available [7]), several successful applications (including the now-famous fault diagnosis system for the space shuttle, as well as factory process control systems and business process management [8]), and finally, an elegant abstract logical semantics, which have been taken up and elaborated upon widely within the agent research community [14, 16].
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Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.) (1999): Intelligents agents V. Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings. Atal'98. New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence)
1995
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(1995): BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice. AAAI. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent SystemsKeywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, agents, Architekturen, BDI, belief, belief-desire, desire, Überzeugung, Überzeugungen
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