Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (1), S. 3-27. DOI: 10.1177/0048393116654869
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(2016): A New Societist Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2), S. 174-202. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103033002002
2015
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(2015): Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5), S. 442-461. DOI: 10.1177/0048393115580267
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393115580267 Abstract: In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.
Keywords: Anerkennung und kollektive Intentionalität, collective intentionality, collectivity-oriented vs. individual-oriented politeness, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intentionalität, JOINT ACTION, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, kollektive Intentionalität, mindreading, philosophy of the social sciences, plural subjects, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, (Theory of mind), We-Mode Approach 2011
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(2011): Collective Intentionality and the (Re)Production of Social Norms. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (3), S. 323-355. DOI: 10.1177/0048393111399100
2010
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(2010): The Causal Power of Social Structures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: This book offers a solution to the problem of structure and agency: a new solution, but one that draws on a number of existing traditions of thought, most significantly philosophical theories of emergence and causality, and the sociological debates around structuration theory. This introductory chapter sets the context by explaining the problem of structure and agency and its significance for sociology, and outlines some of the key points of my argument. It also offers the reader some hints on different ways to read the rest of the book and briefly locates it with respect to critical realism, the main philosophical tradition on which I draw. The problem of structure and agency Sociology is founded on the belief that our behaviour is causally influenced and in particular that there are social factors that influence our behaviour. Karl Marx, for example, famously wrote ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx 1978 [1859]: 4). Émile Durkheim, similarly, argued that ‘the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely, collective reality’ (Durkheim 1952 [1897]: 38). Conventionally, the social factors that are held to influence our behaviour are known as social structure, a concept that even today remains implicit in, and indeed essential to, much of the work done in the social sciences. Yet there is also widespread disagreement about what social structure really is and how it could affect us.
2009
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(2009): The We-Mode Approach. A Response to John Wettersten’s Review of The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3), S. 513-517. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109352830
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109352830 Abstract: The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.
Keywords: explanation, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, philosophy of the social sciences, social action, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), we-mode, We-Mode Approach
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