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  • 2002

  • Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon (2002): Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. In: Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) 13 (1), S. 1-25. DOI: 10.1007/s12110-002-1012-7

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26192593 

    Abstract: This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity "strong reciprocity" and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.

    Keywords: Bestrafung, Fairness, Kooperation, Strong reciprocity model, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten

  • 2000

  • Gintis, H. (2000): Strong reciprocity and human sociality. In: Journal of theoretical biology 206 (2), S. 169-179. DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2111

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10966755 

    Abstract: Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call "strong reciprocity", that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple model, stylized but plausible, of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity.

    Keywords: Altruism, Biological Evolution, Cooperative Behavior, Evolutionsbiologie, Favoriten, Good manners, Humans, Interaktion, Kooperation, Models, Biological, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Reziprozität, Soziale Angemessenheit, Starke Reziprozität, Strong reciprocity model
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