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2002
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(2002): Social Moral Epistemology. In: Social Philosophy and Policy 19 (2), S. 126-152. DOI: 10.1017/S0265052502192065
Abstract: The distinctive aim of applied ethics is to provide guidance as to how we ought to act, as individuals and as shapers of social policies. In this essay, I argue that applied ethics as currently practiced is inadequate and ought to be transformed to incorporate what I shall call social moral epistemology. This is a branch of social epistemology, the study of the social practices and institutions that promote (or impede) the formation, preservation, and transmission of true beliefs. For example, social epistemologists critically evaluate the comparative advantages of adversarial versus inquisitorial criminal proceedings as mechanisms for the discovery of truth. 2 Social moral epistemology, at its most inclusive, is the study of the social practices and institutions that promote (or impede) the formation, preservation, and transmission of true beliefs so far as true beliefs facilitate right action or reduce the incidence of wrong action. A special department of social moral epistemology is the study of the social practices and institutions that promote (or impede) the functioning of moral virtues so far as their functioning depends upon true beliefs. For example, the virtue of respect does not function properly in an individual if he believes that blacks or Jews are not truly human and are hence unworthy of the respect owed to human beings. (Whether one calls what this person has a truncated form of respect or denies that it is the virtue of respect at all is irrelevant for present purposes.) Without social moral epistemology, I shall argue, applied ethics cannot provide sufficient guidance for right action.
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