Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Towards a framework for computational persuasion with applications in behaviour change1. In: Argument & Computation 9 (1), S. 15-40. DOI: 10.3233/AAC-170032
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3233/AAC-170032 Abstract: Persuasion is an activity that involves one party trying to induce another party to believe something or to do something. It is an important and multifaceted human facility. Obviously, sales and marketing is heavily dependent on persuasion. But many other activities involve persuasion such as a doctor persuading a patient to drink less alcohol, a road safety expert persuading drivers to not text while driving, or an online safety expert persuading users of social media sites to not reveal too much personal information online. As computing becomes involved in every sphere of life, so too is persuasion a target for applying computer-based solutions. An automated persuasion system (APS) is a system that can engage in a dialogue with a user (the persuadee) in order to persuade the persuadee to do (or not do) some action or to believe (or not believe) something. To do this, an APS aims to use convincing arguments in order to persuade the persuadee. Computational persuasion is the study of formal models of dialogues involving arguments and counterarguments, of user models, and strategies, for APSs. A promising application area for computational persuasion is in behaviour change. Within healthcare organizations, government agencies, and non-governmental agencies, there is much interest in changing behaviour of particular groups of people away from actions that are harmful to themselves and/or to others around them.
Keywords: Argumentation, argumentation strategies, Argumentationsstrategie, Argumentationstheorie, automated persuasion system (APS), Automated Persuasion Systems (APS), computational models of argument, Computational persuasion, Computerbasierte Persuasion, dialogical argumentation, doppelter Treffer, Eliminierung von Fehlverhalten, Fehlverhalten, frame semantics, Gesellschaftsprofit, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Intellektualtechnik, Kognitionstheorie, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Persuasion, persuasion dialogues, persuasive arguments, Politik, probabilistic argumentation, Realtechnik, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialer Raum / Kultureller Kontext, Sprachroboter, Sprachverarbeitung, Technik, Überreden, Überzeugung, Umgangsformen, Verführung 2014
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(2014): Believing on trust. In: Synthese 191 (9), S. 2009-2028. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0376-z
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to propose a way in which believing on trust can ground doxastic justification and knowledge. My focus will be the notion of trust that plays the role depicted by such cases as concerned Hardwig (J Philos 82:335-49, 1985; J Philos 88:693-708, 1991) in his early papers, papers that are often referenced in recent debates in social epistemology. My primary aim is not exegetical, but since it sometimes not so clear what Hardwig's claims are, I offer some remarks of interpretation that might be of interest. The main purpose of the paper, however, is this: following various cues in Hardwig's writing, I specify certain epistemic properties of agents in social systems, such that, roughly speaking, for agents to know (or be justified in believing) what the 'system knows', social relations of epistemic trust between agents in the system are necessary. I will suggest that we can view this social form of epistemic trust as non-inferential dispositions to believe what some individual or other source of information asserts or transmits. When this disposition is discriminating and defeater-sensitive, it can ground knowledge and justification. Or, more cautiously, we should be sympathetic to this view if we are inclined to accept the core insight of process reliabilism. Finally, I will offer some remarks about how epistemic trust and epistemic reasons may relate on this picture.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, Annahmen, Disziplin, Epistemische Logik/Modallogik/Doxastische Logik/Wissenslogik, Intellektualtechnik, Kogn. Architektur, kognitive Architekturen, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophie, Realtechnik, social systems, Sozialverstehen, Technik, Trust, Überzeugung, Vertrauen 2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung 1999
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(1999) : The Belief-Desire-Intention Model of Agency In: Goos, Gerhard; Hartmanis, Juris; van Leeuwen, Jan; Müller, Jörg P.; Rao, Anand S.; Singh, Munindar P. (Hg.): Intelligents agents V: Agent theories, architectures, and languages : 5th International Workshop, ATAL'98 : Paris, France, July 1998 : proceedings, 1555: New York: Springer (Lecture notes in computer science Lecture notes in artificial intelligence), S. 1-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49057-4_1 Abstract: Within the ATAL community, the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model has come to be possibly the best known and best studied model of practical reasoning agents. There are several reasons for its success, but perhaps the most compelling are that the BDI model combines a respectable philosophical model of human practical reasoning, (originally developed by Michael Bratman [1]), a number of implementations (in the IRMA architecture [2] and the various PRS-like systems currently available [7]), several successful applications (including the now-famous fault diagnosis system for the space shuttle, as well as factory process control systems and business process management [8]), and finally, an elegant abstract logical semantics, which have been taken up and elaborated upon widely within the agent research community [14, 16].
1995
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(1995): BDI Agents: From Theory to Practice. AAAI. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multiagent SystemsKeywords: Agenten, Agenten-Überzeugung, agents, Architekturen, BDI, belief, belief-desire, desire, Überzeugung, Überzeugungen
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