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  • 2013

  • Strijbos, Derek W.; Bruin, Leon C. de (2013): Universal belief-desire psychology?. A dilemma for theory theory and simulation theory. In: Philosophical Psychology 26 (5), S. 744-764. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2012.711034

    Abstract: In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up AU in light of the cross-cultural evidence; or (ii) defend AU with respect to core capacities underlying different culture-specific folk psychologies, and explain why the BD-model will be genuinely explanatory at this level.

  • 2008

  • Bickhard, Mark H. (2008): Social Ontology as Convention. In: Topoi 27 (1-2), S. 139-149. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9036-1

    Abstract: I will argue that social ontology is constituted as hierarchical and interlocking conventions of multifarious kinds. Convention, in turn, is modeled in a manner derived from that of David K. Lewis. Convention is usually held to be inadequate for models of social ontologies, with one primary reason being that there seems to be no place for normativity. I argue that two related changes are required in the basic modeling framework in order to address this (and other) issue( s): (1) a shift to an intentional model - among other reasons, in order to account for normativity - and (2) moving away from the belief- desire, propositional attitude, framework for understanding the intentional realm toward an interactive, pragmatic model of intentionality. These shifts provide natural approaches to: (1) understanding the normativities of social realities; (2) the sense in which social ontology is often constituted in implicit relations among the participants rather than elaborated and iterated explicit beliefs and desires; (3) and language.

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