Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): Li Zehou's notion of subjectality as a new conception of the human self. In: Philosophy Compass 13 (5). DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12484
Abstract: Li Zehou stands among the most influential Chinese philosophers in the post-Mao era. His notion of subjectality(zhutixing) is of paramount importance for current developments in contemporary Chinese philosophy. It belongs to the central concepts in Li's theoretical framework, around which his entire philosophical system is constructed. With his elaboration of this concept, Li expanded the problem of the self in post-revolutionary modernism. The present article analyzes the theoretical bases of this concept, exposes its importance in the scope of contemporary Chinese theory and shows why and how it represents a call for a new humanism. Through a multidimensional comparative perspective, the author also explains why the human subject, which is based upon Li's notion of subjectality, has the potential not only to transform (post-)modern alienation into a real human condition, that is, into spiritually fulfilled society of autonomous individuals but also to fill up the prevailing vacuum of values.
2017
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(2017): On recognition and self. A discussion based on Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhism. In: Asian Philosophy 27 (4), S. 292-308. DOI: 10.1080/09552367.2017.1389388
Abstract: The phenomenon of recognition is a point of contention in the debate between the orthodox Hindus and Buddhists on whether the self (tman) exists. The Hindus, including Naiyyikas and Mm?sakas, argue that recognition evidences the existence of the self, while Buddhist philosopher ntaraksita maintains that there is no self and recognition should be explained in another way. This article examined two disputes, focusing on the two subsidiary aspects of a recognition: memory and self-recognition. For Hindus, it is the existence of the self that makes memory and self-recognition possible. For Buddhists, it is due to the phenomena of memories and self-recognitions that people postulate the existence of the self. I argue that Buddhist explanation of memory is more acceptable, while their debates on self-recognition should be considered as a tie.
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