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2017
Spaulding, Shannon (2017): How we think and act together. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (3), S. 302-318. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1295640

Abstract: In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.

Keywords: Embedded cognition, situated cognition, social cognition, stereotypes, collective agency, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, JOINT ACTION, Joint Action / Collective Agency, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Observablen/Kriterien für sozial angemessenes Verhalten und dessen Bewertung, Philosophical Psychology, Situationsbedingter Kontext, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, soziale Kognition, Spezifika von Menschen
2009
Tuomela, Raimo (2009): The We-Mode Approach. A Response to John Wettersten’s Review of The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (3), S. 513-517. DOI: 10.1177/0048393109352830

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393109352830

Abstract: The paper is a response to some critical points and omissions in John Wettersten’s review of my recent book The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View (Oxford University Press, 2007). I point out in this short paper that the reviewer has not discussed the most central notions in the book relating to its “we-mode” approach, i.e. collective acceptance, group reasons, the collectivity condition, collective commitment and their role in accounting for e.g. cooperation, social institutions, cultural evolution. I also clarify the ontological commitments of my broadly naturalistic approach and show e.g. that we-mode social groups do exist as social systems but not a full-blown collective agents, although it is conceptually and instrumentally central to view them as collective agents. Also questions of we-mode versus I-mode explanations of collective action are considered in the paper.

Keywords: explanation, Gruppennorm, Gruppenverhalten / Joint Action, Joint Action / Collective Agency, kollektive Intentionalität, philosophy of the social sciences, social action, social ontology, Social Ontology, soziale Ontologie, Socially extended mind, Soziale Motivation kollektiven Handelns, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim), we-mode, We-Mode Approach

2017

2009

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