Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): SEAI. Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence Based on Damasio’s Theory of Mind. In: Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5. DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00006
Abstract: A socially intelligent robot must be capable to extract meaningful information in real time from the social environment and react accordingly with coherent human-like behavior. Moreover, it should be able to internalize this information, to reason on it at a higher level, build its own opinions independently, and then automatically bias the decision-making according to its unique experience. In the last decades, neuroscience research highlighted the link between the evolution of such complex behavior and the evolution of a certain level of consciousness, which cannot leave out of a body that feels emotions as discriminants and prompters. In order to develop cognitive systems for social robotics with greater human-likeliness, we used an “understanding by building” approach to model and implement a well-known theory of mind in the form of an artificial intelligence, and we tested it on a sophisticated robotic platform. The name of the presented system is SEAI (Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence), a cognitive system specifically conceived for social and emotional robots. It is designed as a bio-inspired, highly modular, hybrid system with emotion modeling and high-level reasoning capabilities. It follows the deliberative/reactive paradigm where a knowledge-based expert system is aimed at dealing with the high-level symbolic reasoning, while a more conventional reactive paradigm is deputed to the low-level processing and control. The SEAI system is also enriched by a model that simulates the Damasio’s theory of consciousness and the theory of Somatic Markers. After a review of similar bio-inspired cognitive systems, we present the scientific foundations and their computational formalization at the basis of the SEAI framework. Then, a deeper technical description of the architecture is disclosed underlining the numerous parallelisms with the human cognitive system. Finally, the influence of artificial emotions and feelings, and their link with the robot’s beliefs and decisions have been tested in a physical humanoid involved in Human–Robot Interaction (HRI).
Keywords: Abstraktionsfähigkeit, Bewusstsein, Damasio's theory of consciousness, emotion, Fähigkeit, sich eine eigene Meinung zu bilden, Intelligenz, Interaktionspartner, Mensch oder Maschine, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Schnelligkeit der Informationsverarbeitung (real time), theory of mind, Theory of Somatic Markers 2008
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness -
(2008): How Collective Representations Can Change the Structure of the Brain. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (10-11), S. 43-57
Abstract: Culture not only influences human psychology and perceptions of self, others and reality, it also, in certain contexts, influences the quality and degree of consciousness itself. If the brain gives shape to consciousness, then we would expect culture to have a corresponding impact on the functional anatomy and microstructure of the brain. The concept of ‘collective representations’, as developed by Durkheim, refers to the often crucial components of human life that have meaningful existence only because we agree that they do — such as customs, money, religion, cosmology, language, games, laws, power structures and artistic genres. We present recent imaging research which illuminates the feedback relationship between these two types of representation — the collective and the cortical — and which demonstrates that collective representations can have well-defined cortical representations.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Culture, Durkheim, Erkenntnistheorie, Gehirnstruktur, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Kultur, kulturspezifisch, microstructure of the brain, Neurologie, Neuroscience, Neurowissenschaften, Plastizität des Gehirns in Bezug auf Kulturvarianz, Psychologie, Theorie der Normen und Kollektive Repräsentationen (Durkheim) 2005
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(2005): Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game. In: Minds and Machines 15 (3-4), S. 415-444. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-005-9005-z
Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?”.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Dretske, Favoriten, human versus robots, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, knowledge game, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten
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