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  • 2014

  • Marti, Sébastien; Thibault, Louis; Dehaene, Stanislas (2014): How does the extraction of local and global auditory regularities vary with context?. In: PLoS one 9 (9). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0107227

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25197987 

    Abstract: How does the human brain extract regularities from its environment? There is evidence that short range or 'local' regularities (within seconds) are automatically detected by the brain while long range or 'global' regularities (over tens of seconds or more) require conscious awareness. In the present experiment, we asked whether participants' attention was needed to acquire such auditory regularities, to detect their violation or both. We designed a paradigm in which participants listened to predictable sounds. Subjects could be distracted by a visual task at two moments: when they were first exposed to a regularity or when they detected violations of this regularity. MEG recordings revealed that early brain responses (100-130 ms) to violations of short range regularities were unaffected by visual distraction and driven essentially by local transitional probabilities. Based on global workspace theory and prior results, we expected that visual distraction would eliminate the long range global effect, but unexpectedly, we found the contrary, i.e. late brain responses (300-600 ms) to violations of long range regularities on audio-visual trials but not on auditory only trials. Further analyses showed that, in fact, visual distraction was incomplete and that auditory and visual stimuli interfered in both directions. Our results show that conscious, attentive subjects can learn the long range dependencies present in auditory stimuli even while performing a visual task on synchronous visual stimuli. Furthermore, they acquire a complex regularity and end up making different predictions for the very same stimulus depending on the context (i.e. absence or presence of visual stimuli). These results suggest that while short-range regularity detection is driven by local transitional probabilities between stimuli, the human brain detects and stores long-range regularities in a highly flexible, context dependent manner.

  • 2008

  • Frith, Chris D.; Frith, Uta (2008): Implicit and explicit processes in social cognition. In: Neuron 60 (3), S. 503-510. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.10.032

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18995826 

    Abstract: In this review we consider research on social cognition in which implicit processes can be compared and contrasted with explicit, conscious processes. In each case, their function is distinct, sometimes complementary and sometimes oppositional. We argue that implicit processes in social interaction are automatic and are often opposed to conscious strategies. While we are aware of explicit processes in social interaction, we cannot always use them to override implicit processes. Many studies show that implicit processes facilitate the sharing of knowledge, feelings, and actions, and hence, perhaps surprisingly, serve altruism rather than selfishness. On the other hand, higher-level conscious processes are as likely to be selfish as prosocial.

  • Han, Shihui; Northoff, Georg (2008): Culture-sensitive neural substrates of human cognition. A transcultural neuroimaging approach. In: Nature reviews. Neuroscience 9 (8), S. 646-654. DOI: 10.1038/nrn2456

    DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18641669 

    Abstract: Our brains and minds are shaped by our experiences, which mainly occur in the context of the culture in which we develop and live. Although psychologists have provided abundant evidence for diversity of human cognition and behaviour across cultures, the question of whether the neural correlates of human cognition are also culture-dependent is often not considered by neuroscientists. However, recent transcultural neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that one's cultural background can influence the neural activity that underlies both high- and low-level cognitive functions. The findings provide a novel approach by which to distinguish culture-sensitive from culture-invariant neural mechanisms of human cognition.

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