Alle Publikationen

  • Erweiterte Suche öffnen

Treffer: 1
  • <<
  • 1

  • 1999

  • Tiberius, Valerie (1999): Justifying Reasons for Valuing. An Argument Against the Social Account. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1), S. 141-158. DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00861.x

    Abstract: We value many things: friendships, careers, hobbies, character traits, and moral ideals. In at least some cases, we take ourselves to have reasons for valuing what we do. We believe, for example, that there are considerations that justify our devotion to teaching, or our admiration of a person with integrity. I might justify valuing one friendship rather than another because the one friend is sympathetic and fun, while the other is someone with whom I have very little in common. One philosopher might take her devotion to her career to be justified because she finds philosophy stimulating and fulfilling, while another may decide that she no longer has a reason to devote herself to philosophy because she has begun to find her research meaningless and boring. Most of us take the fact that Martin Luther King Jr. devoted his life to improving his community as a reason to admire him. But we do not take the fact that Bill Gates devotes his life to amassing wealth as a reason for admiration. It is intuitively plausible that there are some constraints on what reasons we can sensibly offer to justify these attitudes we have. It does not make sense, one might think, to admire someone’s greed or vanity. That a certain career is unfulfilling and tedious is a reason not to care about it. Not just any consideration counts as a reason that can justify the evaluative attitudes we have. But if there are such constraints on reasons for valuing, what are they? What standards are there for what we can rationally value?

    Keywords: Berechtigung von Wertannahmen, Disziplin, Philosophie, Überblick, values AND social, Werte
  • <<
  • 1