Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): The moral psychology of anger. London; New York: Rowman & Littlefield International (Moral psychology of the emotions)
Abstract: The Moral Psychology of Anger is the first comprehensive study of the moral psychology of anger from a philosophical perspective. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in philosophy and the current social and political interest in anger, the editors explain its resilience in our emotional lives and normative frameworks, and examine what inhibits and encourages thoughts, feelings, and expressions of anger. This volume also examines the ways in which rage--anger's cousin--is a moral emotion, what black rage is and how it is policed in our society and how berserker rage is limited and problematic for the contemporary military. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: Anger, Emotions, Emotionsforschung, Moral, Morality, Philosophies, social psychology, Sozialpsychologie -
(2018) : Moral robots In: Johnson, L. Syd M.; Rommelfanger, Karen S. (Hg.): The Routledge handbook of neuroethics: New York, NY: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group (Routledge handbooks in applied ethics), S. 363-377
Abstract: The main reason for raising the question about the ethical behavior of robots is the rapid progress in the development of autonomous social robots that are specifically created to be deployed in sensitive human environments, from elder and health care settings to law enforcement and military contexts. Clearly, such tasks and environments are very different from traditional factory environments (for example, for welding robots). Hence, these new social robots will require higher degrees of autonomy (i.e., a capacity for independent, self-directed action) and decision-making than any previously developed machine, given that they will face a much more complex, open world. They might be required to acquire new knowledge on the fly to accomplish a never-before-encountered task. Moreover, they will likely face humans who are not specifically trained to interact with them, and robots thus need to be responsive to instructions by novices and feel ’natural’ to humans even in unstructured interactions. At these levels of autonomy and flexibility in near-future robots, there will be countless ways in which robots might make mistakes, violate a user’s expectations and moral norms, or threaten the user’s physical or psychological safety. These social robots must therefore also be moral robots. Thus, for autonomous social robots deployed in human societies, three key questions arise: (1) What moral expectations do humans have for social robots? (2) What moral competence can and should such robots realize? (3) What should be the moral standing of these machines (if any)? The first question, about moral expectations, follows from the well-established fact that autonomous social robots, especially those with natural-language abilities, are treated in many ways like humans, regardless of whether such treatment was intended or anticipated by the robot designers. In fact, there is mounting evidence that humans have very clear expectations of robot capacities based on the robot’s appearance and people’s perceptions of the robot behaviors. We will review some of this work in the third section. The second question, about moral competence, arises from the need to endow robots with sufficient capacities to operate safely in human societies. Answers to this question would ideally build on answers to the first question and provide mechanisms for robots to process social and moral norms in ways that humans expect. In addition, the design of the robots’ control systems should ensure that robots behave ethically according to the norms of the society in which they are deployed. In this chapter, we will focus on the first two questions, discussing both human expectations and computational architectural mechanisms that will allow robots to live up to those expectations while leaving a detailed discussion of the third question to legal experts and philosophers We will not focus on the philosophical debate about agency and personhood. Rather, we will assume an operational behavioral definition of a ’moral robot’. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2017
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(2017): The social turn in moral psychology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Online verfügbar unter http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035569.001.0001
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262035569.001.0001 Abstract: The Social Turn in Moral Psychology is a probing inquiry into the disconnect between moral philosophy and empirical approaches to ethics. Drawing on a refreshing range of examples— including student protest movements, racial oppression, education policy, and life expectancy outcomes—Fedyk offers a promising strategy for bringing normative theory into alignment with the social sciences. Fedyk argues that moral psychology should take a social turn, investigating the psychological processes that motivate patterns of social behavior defined as ethical using normative information extracted from the social sciences. He points out methodological problems in conventional moral psychology, particularly the increasing methodological and conceptual inconsilience with both philosophical ethics and evolutionary biology. Fedyk's 'causal theory of ethics' is designed to provide moral psychology with an ethical theory that can be used without creating tension between its scientific p ractice and the conceptual vocabulary of philosophical ethics. His account aims both to redirect moral psychology toward more socially realistic questions about human life and lo introduce philosophers to a new form of ethical naturalism—a way of thinking about how to use different fields of scientific research to answer some of the traditional questions that are at the heart of ethics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords: causal theory of ethics, Ethics, Moral, Morality, Philosophies, social sciences, Sonstiges 2016
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(2016): Moral objectivism across the lifespan. In: Philosophical Psychology 29 (6), S. 912-929. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1174843
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1174843 Abstract: We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found important interactions between attributions of objectivity and other factors, such as how strong participants’ moral opinions were and how much disagreement about the issue they perceived to exist within society. We believe our results have significant implications for debates about the nature of folk morality and about the nature of morality in general. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved ) zitiert von 21
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(2016): Denken, Kultur und Universum. In: Zeitschrift fur Padagogik 62 (4), S. 494-501
Abstract: Der Zusammenhang der drei Begriffe "Universum", "Kultur" und "Denken" wird als Form der Reflexion auf den Menschen entfaltet. "Universum" halt das evolutionare Kontinuum von Natur und Gesellschaft fest; "Kultur" bezeichnet die symbolische Struktur menschlichen Zusammenlebens; "Denken" markiert den Selbstbezug von Natur aus reflexiver, weil symbolisch verfasster Lebewesen. Nietzsche, Peirce, Cassirer und Whitehead werden mit ihren Uberlegungen herangezogen, um die Verschrankung von Denken, Kultur und Universum auszuarbeiten und bildungsphilosophisch zu artikulieren.
2015
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(2015): Understanding social norms and constitutive rules. Perspectives from developmental psychology and philosophy. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4), S. 699-718. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9426-y
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-015-9426-y Abstract: An experimental paradigm that purports to test young children’s understanding of social norms is examined. The paradigm models norms on Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence about the development of social norms and that the concepts of a social norm and constitutive rule are distinct. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present criticism are presented that do not require abandoning the paradigm as such. Then the conception of normativity that underlies the experimental paradigm is rejected and an alternative view is put forward. It is argued that normativity emerges from interaction and engagement, and that learning to comply with social norms involves understanding the distinction between their content, enforcement, and acceptance. As opposed to rule-based accounts that picture the developm ent of an understanding of social norms as one-directional and based in enforcement, the present view emphasizes that normativity is situated, reciprocal, and interactive. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 4
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(2015): Culture-Inclusive Theories of Self and Social Interaction. The Approach of Multiple Philosophical Paradigms. In: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 45 (1), S. 40-63. DOI: 10.1111/jtsb.12050
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12050 Abstract: In view of the fact that culture‐inclusive psychology has been eluded or relatively ignored by mainstream psychology, the movement of indigenous psychology is destined to develop a new model of man that incorporates both causal psychology and intentional psychology as suggested by Vygotsky (1927). Following the principle of cultural psychology: 'one mind, many mentalities' (Shweder et al., 1998), the Mandala Model of Self (Hwang, 2011a,b) and Face and Favor Model (Hwang, 1987, 2012) were constructed to represent the universal mechanisms of self and social interaction that can be applied to any culture; both models can be used as conceptual frameworks for analyzing mentalities of people in any given culture. Taking research works from Foundations of Chinese Psychology: Confucian Social Relation as exemplars (Hwang, 2012), this article illustrates how to construct culture‐inclusive theories of Confucianism by multiple philosophical paradigms. The mechanism of culture‐ inclusiv e theory can be applied to explain qualitative research findings on lifeworld events of people in a particular society. It can also be utilized to predict results of quantitative research conducted to verify theoretical propositions in the scientific microworld by empirical methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 33
2012
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(2012): Amoralisch sein. Psychopathie und moralisches Unvermogen. In: Journal fur Philosophie & Psychiatrie 1. Online verfügbar unter http://www.jfpp.org/100.html
Abstract: It is argued that amoralists, i.e. people who do not care about morality, do not exist in reality. Real cases of psychopathy imply moral incapacity, which is not something that amoralists suffer from. Hence amoralists and psychopaths are not identical. I then discuss an argument by Gilbert Ryle and conclude that psychopaths lack the capacities that let other people care about morality. Empathy is the main moral capacity; in healthy people moral education results in their caring about morality, which cannot simply cease. I conclude that there are no amoralists in the philosophical sense of the term. Vorgestellt wird die These, dass die in der Moralphilosophie diskutierte Figur des Amoralisten, die Moral nicht gelten lasst, in Wirklichkeit nicht existiert. Im Vergleich zu realen Fallen der Psychopathie wird deutlich, dass diese an einem moralischen Unvermogen leiden und der Amoralist diese Symptomatik nicht aufweist. Es wird festgestellt, dass der Amoralist und der Psychopath nicht identisch sind. Unter Berufung auf Gilbert Ryle wird argumentiert, dass den Psychopathen die Fahigkeit zur Empathie fehlt und sie deshalb die Moral nicht ernstnehmen konnen. Dieser Aspekt wird kontrastiert mit der Ausbildung der Fahigkeiten bei Gesunden, bei denen die moralische Erziehung zu einem Ernstnehmen der Moral fuhrt, das nicht einfach aufgegeben werden kann. Abschliessend wird darauf hingewiesen, dass es vor diesem Hintergrund keine echten Amoralisten im moralphilosophischen Sinne geben wird.
2009
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(2009): Was ist Moral?. In: Zeitschrift fur Individualpsychologie 34 (2), S. 145-157
Abstract: Mit Moral wird die Gesamtheit der Regeln verstanden, mit deren Befolgung zur Realisierung gemeinsamer Werte beigetragen wird. Damit wird die Frage aufgeworfen und diskutiert, ob jeder seine eigenen Werte hat, ein Werteverfall zu beklagen ist und ob es individuell verschiedene moralische Regeln gibt. Es wird argumentiert, dass es fur die Funktion und die Erhaltung sozialen Lebens notwendig ist, dass es objektive und universelle Werte und moralische Normen gibt. Die Theorien, die dies nicht nur in funktionaler, sondern auch in substanzieller Hinsicht zeigen, moralischer Realismus und moralischer Kognitivismus, werden vorgestellt und sie werden anhand sozialphilosophischer Uberlegungen fundiert. Eingegangen wird dabei die Nonkognitivisten A. Ayer, Ch. L. Stevenson und N. Hoerster sowie auf den Kognitivisten H. Putman. zitiert von: 23
2003
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(2003) : Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis. In: Reynolds, Larry T.: Handbook of symbolic interactionism: Lanham, Md.: AltaMira Press, S. 173-202
Abstract: Over the past thirty years, symbolic interactionists have proposed, on one hand, a synthesis between symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, or, on the other hand, that these two forms of sociology are philosophically, conceptually, and methodologically incompatible. In reply, ethnomethodologists argue that neither the synthetic version nor the incompatibility hypothesis accurately understands ethnomethodology. Conversation analysis, which is related to ethnomethodology, no doubt gets painted by the same brushstrokes, and conversation analysts would raise similar objections to arguments about either synthesis or incompatibility. We agree that a synthesis between symbolic interactionism (SI) and ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation analysis (CA) is not possible. However, we do view SI and EM/CA as at least partly congruent. A chapter on EM and CA, accordingly, has a place in a book that is mainly about SI, and we aim to describe EM and CA and their approaches to th e study of everyday life and interaction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 110
2000
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(2000): Wissenschaftstheoretische Richtungen. Landau: Empirische Pädagogik e.V (Forschung, Statistik & Methoden)
Abstract: Zentrale Grundlagen unterschiedlicher wissenschaftstheoretischer und methodologischer Richtungen werden in knapper Form dargestellt. - Inhalt: (1) Hermeneutik. (2) Kritischer Rationalismus. (3) Logischer Positivismus. (4) Phänomenologie. (5) Theorie der symbolischen Interaktion. (6) Ethnomethodologie. (7) Handlungsforschung. (8) Radikaler Konstruktivismus. (9) Kritische Theorie der Frankfurter Schule. (10) Quantitative und qualitative Sozialforschung. (11) Ökologische Perspektive in den Sozialwissenschaften. zitiert von 4
1994
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(1994): Wirtschaftsethik in der Moderne. Zur okonomischen Theorie der Moral. In: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften 5 (1), S. 3-12
Abstract: Uberlegungen zur Grundlegung einer modernen Wirtschaftsethik werden angestellt. Eine solche Ethik hat dem Umstand Rechnung zu tragen, dass in einer modernen Gesellschaft die Moglichkeiten moralischen Handelns durch Wettbewerb signifikant eingeschrankt sind. Daher lautet ihre systematische Fragestellung, wie moralische Normen und Ideale unter den Bedingungen einer modernen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft zur Geltung gebracht werden konnen. In den fur die Moderne so kennzeichnenden Dilemmasituationen hangt die Geltung einer Norm von ihrer Realisierbarkeit ab. Um der Moral zur Geltung zu verhelfen, ist daher ein differenzierter Umgang mit Dilemmasituationen und folglich eine entsprechende institutionelle Gestaltung strategischen Handelns erforderlich. Aufbauend auf einer okonomischen Insitutionenanalyse kann eine moderne Wirtschaftsethik zur kollektiven Entwicklung individueller Freiheit beitragen. - Dem Hauptartikel folgen 39 kritische Stellungnahmen (Seiten 13-93) und eine Replik der Autoren (Seiten 94-108). zitiert von: 201
Keywords: business ethics, Economy, Ethics, Gesellschaft, Moral, Philosophies, Social Values, society, Wirtschaft 1989
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(1989): No Good Manners. In: Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews 34 (5), S. 498-499. DOI: 10.1037/028057
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/028057 Abstract: Reviews the book, Philosophy of Psychology by Mario Bunge and Ruben Ardila (1987). Bunge and Ardila's book, although it has nothing to do with resemblances between ants and bees, deals with such central, even crucial matters that are often hidden in psychology. It starts by listing an impressive set of usually tacit philosophical principles involved in psychological research. Bunge does not handle psychologists with excessive tact. After discussing their hidden prejudices, he expands on irrelevant approaches such as mentalism and behaviorism, and then undertakes a defense and illustration of biopsychology, which is bound to please only the few psychologists who are engaged in such direction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)
1983
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Lind, Georg (1983): Moralisches Urteilen und soziale Umwelt. Theoretische methodologische und empirische Untersuchungen. Gedr. nach Typoskript. Weinheim [u.a.]: Beltz (Beltz-Monographien)
Abstract: Es wird ein ideen- und theoriengeschichtlicher Überblick über die Kategorien Moral, Ethik und Moralität im Rahmen der Sozialwissenschaften gegeben. Einleitend werden einige philosophische Konzepte, die von den Sozialwissenschaften rezipiert wurden, skizziert (Kant, Comte, Nicolai Hartmann, Durkheim). Anschließend werden die Theorien von Piaget und Kohlberg umrissen. Kohlbergs Stufenmodell der Entwicklung des moralischen Urteilens wird dargestellt und diskutiert. Die Rezeption dieses Modells in Habermas' Konzeption einer Entwicklungslogik wird rekonstruiert. Anschließend wird erörtert, dass die individuelle Entwicklung des moralischen Urteilens um die soziale und historische Dimension erweitert werden muss. Als Modell einer solchen Erweiterung wird Habermas' Konzeption der gesellschaftlichen Evolution der Moral sowie der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Deutungsmuster analysiert. Abschließend werden einige allgemeine Anmerkungen zum gegenwärtigen Stand der sozialwissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung in diesem Bereich gemacht. zitiert von: 11
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Abstract: Unter Bezugnahme auf K. Foppas Konzept des rezeptiven Gedächtnisses, das er in seinem Beitrag "Über Lernen" (in Psychology Science 2003, 45, Supplement III) beschreibt, werden einige Recherchen und Reflexionen zum Thema "Gewohnheit" angestellt. Gewohnheit wird als ein Grundlagenphänomen des Verhaltens aufgefasst, das in der Psychologie nicht unbedingt adäquat behandelt wird und das mit dem rezeptiven Gedächtnis zusammenhängt. Kurze Betrachtungen unterschiedlicher Zugänge zu diesem Phänomen in ausgewählten Gebieten der Psychologie (Behaviorismus, Entwicklungspsychologie und kognitive Psychologie) und in der Philosophie lassen Bezüge zum rezeptiven Gedächtnis erkennen, die in der Zukunft theoretisch und empirisch vertieft werden müssen. - Der Beitrag ist mit einem Kommentar von K. Foppa versehen.
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