Alle Publikationen
2020
-
(2020): Kant's notion of a transcendental schema. The constitution of objective cognition between epistemology and psychology. Berlin: Peter Lang AG (Studia philosophica et historica)Keywords: Kant, Philosophie, Philosophy, Psychologie, schema, Schemata, Schematheorie, Schematism, Schematismus
2018
-
(2018): Exceptional technologies. A continental philosophy of technology. London: Bloomsbury Academic
Abstract: "A discussion of the rapidly growing field, from a thinker at the forefront of research at the interface of technology and the humanities, this is a must-read for anyone interested in contemporary developments in Continental philosophy and philosophy of technology. Philosophy of technology regularly draws on key thinkers in the Continental tradition, including Husserl, Heidegger, and Foucault. Yet because of the problematic legacy of the 'empirical turn', it often criticizes 'bad' continental tendencies - lyricism, pessimism, and an outdated view of technology as an autonomous, transcendental force. This misconception is based on a faulty image of Continental thought, and in addressing it Smith productively redefines our concept of technology. By closely engaging key texts, and by examining 'exceptional technologies' such as imagined, failed, and impossible technologies that fall outside philosophy of technology's current focus, this book offers a practical guide to thinking about and using continental philosophy and philosophy of technology. It outlines and enacts three key characteristics of philosophy as practiced in the continental tradition: close reading of the history of philosophy; focus on critique; and openness to other disciplinary fields. Smith deploys the concept of exceptional technologies to provide a novel way of widening discussion in philosophy of technology, navigating the relationship between philosophy of technology and Continental philosophy; the history of both these fields; the role of imagination in relation to technologies; and the social function of technologies themselves."--Bloomsbury Publishing
-
(2018): How We Understand Others. Philosophy and Social Cognition. Milton: Routledge (Routledge Focus on Philosophy Ser). Online verfügbar unter https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gbv/detail.action?docID=5394145
Abstract: Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 In defense of mindreading -- 2.1 Introduction to mindreading -- 2.2 The embodied and enactive cognition challenge -- 2.3 The pluralistic folk psychology challenge -- 2.4 Assessment -- 3 Expanding the scope of mindreading: social categorization, stereotypes, social bias, and situational context -- 3.1 The narrow focus of standard mindreading theories -- 3.2 Social categorization -- 3.3 Stereotypes -- 3.4 Social biases -- 3.5 Situational context -- 3.6 Assessment -- 4 The goals of mindreading -- 4.1 Why we mindread -- 4.2 The various goals of mindreading -- 4.3 Approaches to mindreading -- 4.4 Mindreading products -- 4.5 Assessment -- 5 Model theory -- 5.1 The function of theories -- 5.2 General theories of mindreading -- 5.3 Model theory -- 5.4 Assessment -- 6 Epistemic and ethical applications -- 6.1 The isolation of the mindreading literature -- 6.2 Judging others' knowledge and competence -- 6.3 Application to the epistemology of peer disagreement -- 6.4 Application to epistemic justice -- 6.5 Assessment -- 7 Concluding thoughts -- Index
2017
-
(2017): Beyond Dominance and Competence. A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment. In: Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc 21 (3), S. 203-227. DOI: 10.1177/1088868316649297
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27225037 Abstract: Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 5
-
(2017): Moral learning. Psychological and philosophical perspectives. In: Cognition 167, S. 1-10. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.008
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28629599 Abstract: The past 15years occasioned an extraordinary blossoming of research into the cognitive and affective mechanisms that support moral judgment and behavior. This growth in our understanding of moral mechanisms overshadowed a crucial and complementary question, however: How are they learned? As this special issue of the journal Cognition attests, a new crop of research into moral learning has now firmly taken root. This new literature draws on recent advances in formal methods developed in other domains, such as Bayesian inference, reinforcement learning and other machine learning techniques. Meanwhile, it also demonstrates how learning and deciding in a social domain-and especially in the moral domain-sometimes involves specialized cognitive systems. We review the contributions to this special issue and situate them within the broader contemporary literature. Our review focuses on how we learn moral values and moral rules, how we learn about personal moral character and relationships, and the philosophical implications of these emerging models.
Keywords: Cognition, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Lerntheorien, Moral, Morals, Philosophy, PSYCHOLOGY, science direct -
(2017): Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Philosophical Inquiries into Human-Robot Interactions. Cham: Springer International Publishing (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality). Online verfügbar unter https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gbv/detail.action?docID=4867905
Abstract: This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our futurerelations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage andconnect with human beings.The contributors present cutting edge research thatexamines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members ofhuman societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be 'social'?Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? Howwill human social relations change when we interact with robots atwork and at home?The authors of this volume explore these questions from theperspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, androbotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classificationof simulated social interactions, investigate whether human socialinteractions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significanceof social relations for the formation of human individuality.Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actuallyfollow social norms, whether they could live up to the socialmeaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need toprogram robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of humansocial space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform jointactions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, andhow will such new commitments and practices change our regionalcultures?The authors connect research in social robotics andempirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates insocial ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy oftechnology.The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presentsfor our traditional conceptions of social interaction, whichpresuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality,agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightfulanswers along new interdisciplinarypathways in 'robophilosophy,' a new research area that will help us toshape the 'robot revolution,' the distinctive technological change ofthe beginning 21st century. Raul Hakli (PhD) studied philosophy and computer science at theUniversity of Helsinki, Finland. He received his PhD in theoreticalphilosophy in 2010. While editing the book he was Associate Professorat the Aarhus University, Denmark. Currently he works as a researcherat the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests includesocial ontology, collective intentionality, epistemology, philosophyof social robotics, and philosophy of the social sciences. Johanna Seibt (PhD. at the Univ of Pittsburg, USA; Dr. phil. habil. atthe Univ of Konstanz, Germany) is Professor for Applied ProcessOntology and Integrative Social Robotics, Aarhus University, Denmark;previously she taught at the Univ of Texas at Austin, USA. Her mainresearch area is in analytical ontology and metaphysics. More recentlyshe works also in philosophy of social robotics. She is head of theResearch Unit for Robophilosophy at the School for Culture and Society, Aarhus University, which conducts interdisciplinaryHumanities research of and in social robotics and coordinates theinternational Research Network for Transdisciplinary Studies in SocialRobotics (TRANSOR).
-
(2017): Moral vindications. In: Cognition 167, S. 124-134. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.05.005
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28545629 Abstract: Psychologists and neuroscientists have recently been unearthing the unconscious processes that give rise to moral intuitions and emotions. According to skeptics like Joshua Greene, what has been found casts doubt on many of our moral beliefs. However, a new approach in moral psychology develops a learning-theoretic framework that has been successfully applied in a number of other domains. This framework suggests that model-based learning shapes intuitions and emotions. Model-based learning explains how moral thought and feeling are attuned to local material and social conditions. Philosophers can draw on these explanations, in some cases, in order to vindicate episodes of moral change. Explanations can support justifications by showing that they are not mere rationalizations. In addition, philosophical justifications are a fertile source for empirical hypotheses about the rational learning mechanisms that shape moral intuitions and emotions.
-
Rauh, Andreas (2017): Fremdheit und Interkulturalität. Aspekte kultureller Pluralität. Bielefeld: Transcript (Edition Kulturwissenschaft)
Abstract: Welche Bedeutung hat das Fremde für die eigene Kultur und wie lässt es sich übersetzen? Wo liegen Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines erkennenden Zugangs und auf welchen kulturellen Deutungsmustern basieren Heterogenität und Homogenität? Welche Rolle hat die eigene Normalitätserwartung und was wäre eine interkulturelle Kompetenz?0Dieser Band versammelt Beiträge aus Philosophiegeschichte, Bildungsethnologie, Erziehungswissenschaft, Entwicklungspsychologie und -soziologie, die Fremdheit und Interkulturalität als grundlegende Dimensionen gegenwärtiger Kulturerfahrung analysieren.
-
(2017): On the mode of existence of technical objects. Washington: Univocal Publishing
2016
-
(2016): Sozialisation. Über die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum und die Bedingungen von Identität. 2. Aufl. 2016. Wiesbaden: Springer VS (Studientexte zur Soziologie)
Abstract: Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? -- Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? -- Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? -- Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Sozialisation ist eine Antwort auf die soziologische Grundfrage nach der Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum. Die drei Fragen, wie wir werden, was wir sind, wie wir durch unser Denken und Handeln gesellschaftliche Ordnung reproduzieren, aber auch gestalten, und wie wir unsere Identität in der Interaktion mit Anderen herstellen und wahren, standen schon am Anfang der Soziologie. Sie sind in der fortgeschrittenen Moderne noch drängender geworden. Das Lehrbuch stellt die breite soziologische Diskussion von ihren Anfängen bis in die allerjüngste Zeit vor. Für die zweite Auflage wurden alle Kapitel überarbeitet und aktualisiert und die theoretische Diskussion erheblich erweitert. Der Inhalt Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich und wie kommt sie zustande? Wie erfolgt die Vermittlung von Gesellschaft und Individuum? Wie werden wir, was wir sind, und wie gewinnen wir Identität? Welcher Kompetenzen bedarf es, um uns in den Interaktionen des Alltags zu behaupten? Die Zielgruppen Studierende der Soziologie, der Pädagogik, der Psychologie und der Sozialarbeit Studierende aus Studiengängen für das Lehramt und für erziehende Berufe Alle, die schon immer an Antworten auf die oben genannten Fragen interessiert waren Die Autoren Dr. Dr. Heinz Abels, em. Univ.-Prof. am Institut für Soziologie der FernUniversität in Hagen. Dr. Alexandra König, Akademische Rätin in der Fachgruppe Soziologie der Bergischen Universität Wuppertal
-
(2016): Sociological theory in the contemporary era. Text and readings. 3 edition. New york; London: Sage
-
(2016): Die epistemologischen Jahre. Dissertation. Zürich, Schweiz: Chronos Verlag (Interferenzen)
-
Jaeggi, Rahel; Wesche, Tilo (Hg.) (2016): Was ist Kritik?. Symposion "Immanenz und Transzendenz - Konstellationen philosophischer Kritik". 4. Aufl.. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft)
2015
-
Misselhorn, Catrin (2015): Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. 1st ed. 2015. New York; London: Springer. Online verfügbar unter http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1059245
DOI: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1059245 Abstract: This book brings together philosophical approaches to cooperation and collective agency with research into human-machine interaction and cooperation from engineering, robotics, computer science and AI. Bringing these so far largely unrelated fields of study together leads to a better understanding of collective agency in natural and artificial systems and will help to improve the design and performance of hybrid systems involving human and artificial agents. Modeling collective agency with the help of computer simulations promises also philosophical insights into the emergence of collective agency. The volume consists of four sections. The first section is dedicated to the concept of agency. The second section of the book turns to human-machine cooperation. The focus of the third section is the transition from cooperation to collective agency. The last section concerns the explanatory value of social simulations of collective agency in the broader framework of cultural evolution
-
(2015): Wie kommt die Moral in den Kopf?. Von der Werteerziehung zur Persönlichkeitsförderung. Berlin: Springer Spektrum
Abstract: Ausgehend von einer skeptischen Haltung hinsichtlich der Bedeutung von Werten als steuernden Faktoren menschlichen Handelns werden andere, meist unbewusste Motive menschlichen Tuns und Lassens in den Blick genommen. Basierend auf Erkenntnissen aus Gehirnforschung, Psychologie und Soziologie werden Antworten auf folgende Fragen gegeben: Haben schon Tiere Vorformen von Moral? Was passiert im Gehirn, wenn Menschen moralische Entscheidungen treffen? Welche Rolle spielen die Gene und frühkindliche Erfahrungen? Wie werden Kinder zu moralischen Persönlichkeiten? Was tragen Eltern, Kindertagesstätten und Schulen dazu bei? Welche Persönlichkeitsaspekte, Fähigkeiten und Verhaltensneigungen von Kindern begünstigen moralisches Handeln und ein gutes Leben und Zusammenleben? Welche Kompetenzen helfen zur Verwirklichung von Werten wie Gesundheit, Gerechtigkeit, Freiheit oder Solidarität? - Inhalt: (1) Der trügerische Ruf nach Werten: Bestimmen Werte unser Verhalten? (2) Was treibt unser Verhalten wirklich an? (3) Warum lohnt sich der Blick ins Gehirn? (4) Die Persönlichkeit und ihre Werte: Gut für Überraschungen? (5) Wie kultiviert die Gesellschaft Werte und Normen? (6) Kardinaltugenden und Werte: Fälle für das Forschungslabor? (7) Die politischen Werte der Französischen Revolution: Noch aktuell? (8) Und wo bleiben die Werte? (9) Was fördert moralisches Verhalten? (10) Werte und Moral über die Kellertreppe? zitiert von: 3
2014
-
(2014): Spuren der Anerkennung. Studien zu einer sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftlichen Kategorie. Wiesbaden: Springer. Online verfügbar unter http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1731325
DOI: http://gbv.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1731325 Abstract: Der Anerkennungsbegriff ist heute zum Schlusselbegriff der Ethik geworden und hat als ein solcher zunehmend auch im sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftlichen Diskurs an Bedeutung gewonnen. Dabei gilt Anerkennung vielfach als normative Richtschnur, mit der sich (padagogische) Beziehungen und Praxen bewerten lassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund unternimmt die Arbeit eine Spurensuche zur Anerkennungskategorie. Mittels Rekonstruktion verschiedener Anerkennungskonzepte werden Bedeutungsgehalte und Dimensionen der ?Anerkennung' herausgearbeitet und auf sozial- und erziehungswissenschaftliche Problemstellun
-
Dahms, Harry F. (2014): Mediations of social life in the 21st century. First edition. Bingle, UK: Emerald Group Publishing (Current Perspectives in Social Theory)
Keywords: Anerkennung, Critical Theory of Technology, Emerald eBook Collection, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophy, recognition and subjectivity, Reflexionen über MTR, Research, Sammelband, social action, Social Change, social sciences, Sociology, Soziale Angemessenheit, Übersicht -
(2014): Kritik von Lebensformen. 1. Aufl., Orig.-Ausg. Berlin: SuhrkampKeywords: Anerkennung, Criticism (Philosophy), Disziplin, Ethik, Favoriten, Honneth und aktuelle Kritische Theorie, Kritik, Kultur- und Geisteswissenschaften / Philosophie, Lebensform, Modelle/Theorien, Moralkritik, Normen, Philosophie, Philosophische Anthropologie, Philosophy, Politik, Politische Ethik, social sciences, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Normen, Sozialphilosophie, Spielregeltheoretische Ansätze, Spielregeltheoretische Anstätze
-
Seibt, Johanna; Hakli, Raul; Nørskov, Marco (Hg.) (2014): Sociable robots and the future of social relations. Proceedings of Robo-Philosophy 2014. Conference Robo-Philosophy 2014 - Sociable robots and the future of social relations. Amsterdam: IOS Press (Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications)
Abstract: The robotics industry is growing rapidly, and to a large extent the development of this market sector is due to the area of social robotics – the production of robots that are designed to enter the space of human social interaction, both physically and semantically. Since social robots present a new type of social agent, they have been aptly classified as a disruptive technology, i.e. the sort of technology which affects the core of our current social practices and might lead to profound cultural and social change. Due to its disruptive and innovative potential, social robotics raises not only questions about utility, ethics, and legal aspects, but calls for “robo-philosophy” – the comprehensive philosophical reflection from the perspectives of all philosophical disciplines. This book presents the proceedings of the first conference in this new area, “Robo-Philosophy 2014 – Sociable Robots and the Future of Social Relations, held in Aarhus, Denmark, in August 2014. The short papers and abstracts collected here address questions of social robotics from the perspectives of philosophy of mind, social ontology, ethics, meta-ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics, intercultural philosophy, and metaphilosophy. Social robotics is still in its early stages, but it is precisely now that we need to reflect its possible cultural repercussions. This book is accessible to a wide readership and will be of interest to everyone involved in the development and use of social robotics applications, from social roboticists to policy makers.
2012
-
(2012): Philosophy of science. A contemporary introduction. Third edition. New York, NY; London: Routledge (Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy)
Abstract: "Any serious student attempting to better understand the nature, methods, and justification of science will value Alex Rosenberg's updated and substantially revised Third Edition of Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. Weaving lucid explanations with clear analyses, the volume is as a much-used, thematically oriented introduction to the field. New features of the Third Edition include more coverage of the history of the philosophy of science, more fully developed material on the metaphysics of causal and physical necessity, more background on the contrast between empiricism and rationalism in science, and new material on the structure of theoretical science (with expanded coverage of Newtonian and Darwinian theories and models) and the realism/antirealism controversy. Rosenberg also divides the Third Edition into fourteen chapters, aligning each chapter with a week in a standard semester-long course. Updated Discussion Questions, Glossary, Bibliography and Suggested Readings lists at the end of each chapter will make the Third Edition indispensable, either as a comprehensive stand-alone text or alongside the many wide ranging collections of articles and book excerpts currently available. "--
2011
-
(2011): Convention. A philosophical study. [Nachdr.]. Oxford: Blackwell
-
(2011): The explanation of social action. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Abstract: Conventional understanding of what it means to "explain" something in the social sciences provokes unnecessary confusion and conflict, and indeed is often based more on analysts' imaginations than actors' realities. The Explanation of Social Action lays out a sustained critique of this understanding, pointing out that the root of the problem is an attempt to counterpose two radically different types of answers to the question of why someone did a certain thing—first person responses and third person ones. John Levi Martin illustrates how this tendency is epitomized in attempts to explain human action in "causal" terms. He shows how this causality has little to do with the real world, but instead involves the creation of imaginary worlds, stemming from an intellectual history whereby social scientists began to distrust the self-understanding of actors and accepted fundamentally anti-democratic epistemologies, due to an epistemic hiatus in social knowledge and the adoption of practices in the intensely hierarchic setting of forced incarceral institutions for the insane. Martin moves on to highlight other traditions that do not assume that the cognitive schemes of actors are fundamentally arbitrary. These traditions in turn suggest that the analytic problems that now arise require attention to the nature of judgment, implying the need for an understanding of the process whereby actors intuit intersubjectively valid qualities of complex social objects. Tackling the very way in which social scientists analyze why people do things, The Explanation of Social Action is a novel and essential take on the evidence on which their explanations are based.
-
Schutz, Alfred; Embree, Lester E. (Hg.) (2011): Phenomenology and the social sciences. Dordrecht: Springer (Phaenomenologica)
2008
-
(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2004
-
(2004): Regel und Interpretation. Eine Untersuchung zur sozialen Struktur sprachlicher Praxis. Zugl.: Gießen, Univ., Diss., 2001. 1. Aufl.. Weilerswist: Velbrück Wissenschaft
Abstract: Dass sprachliche Praxis eine soziale Praxis ist, gilt der Sprachphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts als selbstverständlich. Aber wie genau sollen wir das Verhältnis der einzelnen Sprecherinnen und Sprecher zueinander und zu der Gemeinschaft, die sie als Sprecherinnen und Sprecher einer Sprache bilden, im Rahmen einer philosophischen Theorie sprachlicher Bedeutung konzipieren? Sind Sprecher als solche notwendig auf die Existenz anderer Sprecher oder einer Sprachgemeinschaft, der sie angehören, angewiesen? In welcher Weise sind sie von den sprachlichen Normen einer Gemeinschaft bestimmt? In welcher Weise bestimmen sie diese Normen? Und in welcher Weise bestimmen sie einander?