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2016
Malle, B. F.; Scheutz, M.; Forlizzi, J.; Voiklis, J. (2016) : Which robot am I thinking about? The impact of action and appearance on people’s evaluations of a moral robot: 2016 11th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI): Christchurch, New Zealand: IEEE Press, S. 125-132

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2016.7451743

Abstract: In three studies we found further evidence for a previously discovered Human-Robot (HR) asymmetry in moral judgments: that people blame robots more for inaction than action in a moral dilemma but blame humans more for action than inaction in the identical dilemma (where inaction allows four persons to die and action sacrifices one to save the four). Importantly, we found that people’s representation of the “robot” making these moral decisions appears to be one of a mechanical robot. For when we manipulated the pictorial display of a verbally described robot, people showed the HR asymmetry only when making judgments about a mechanical-looking robot, not a humanoid robot. This is the first demonstration that robot appearance affects people’s moral judgments about robots.

Keywords: Anthropomorphism, Artificial intelligence, Context, Ethics, HR asymmetry, Human Factors, Humanoid Robots, human-robot asymmetry, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, Machine morality, mechanical robot, mechanical-looking robot, Moral & Ethik, moral decisions, Moral judgments, moral psychology, moral robot, pictorial display, PSYCHOLOGY, Rails, Robot Ethics, social aspects of automation, verbally described robot
2014
Johnson, A. M.; Axinn, S. (2014) : Acting vs. being moral: The limits of technological moral actors: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering: Chicago, IL, USA: IEEE, S. 1-4

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ETHICS.2014.6893396

Abstract: An autonomous robot (physical or digital artificial being) may be capable of producing actions that if performed by a human could be considered moral, by mimicking its creators actions or following their programmed instructions, but it cannot be moral. Morality cannot be fully judged by any behavioral test, as the answer to moral questions is less important than the process followed in arriving at the answer (as evidenced by disagreement among ethicists on the correct answer to many such questions based on the individual’s moral style). The distinction between acting and being moral was recently considered for lethal autonomous military robots [1], and in this paper is further clarified in the context of more broad applications. In addition such a distinction has implications for what types of tasks autonomous robots should not be allowed to do, based on what must be moral decisions. Here we draw a distinction between what might be illegal for an agent to do (which relates more to the agreed upon laws of the current political leadership), and what actions are so innately moral decisions that we cannot delegate them to a machine, no matter how advanced it appears.

Keywords: behavioral test, Buildings, Computers, Decision Making, digital artificial being, Educational institutions, Ethics, Humanoid Robots, ieee xplore, lethal autonomous military robots, military systems, Moral & Ethik, moral decisions, Morality, physical being, political leadership, programmed instructions, robot programming, Robot sensing systems, technological moral actors, Weapons

2016

2014

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