Alle Publikationen
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2016
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(2016): On Technological Rationality and the Lack of Authenticity in the Modern Age. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 20 (1), S. 34-50. DOI: 10.5840/techne201632445
Abstract: I will argue in this paper that Andrew Feenberg has erred in his claim on technological adaptability. Adapting to modern technology may not always be liberating. Drawing from his reflections on Heidegger and Marcuse, I will explain why Feenberg thinks that adaptability has a redemptive role in the midst of technological domination. I will also show why technological domination still characterizes human relations in the modern age. Advanced technologies including social media, have continued to manipulate people and as such, diminish rather than deepen the authenticity of human life. For instance, two people in a café sometimes spend more time on their smartphones rather than valuing their face-to-face encounter; here, one can point out the lack of authenticity in human relations. This clearly manifests how consumer culture has taken over human life. In addition, it can be said that the notion of adaptability also fails to account for the hegemonic social relations created by modern technological innovations, since these gadgets remain beyond the reach of the masses, thus broadening the divide between classes of people in society. In order to address this, I propose that people should use technology in a socially sensitive way in order to truly give meaning to their lives and to effectively resist the totalitarian tendency of the modern age.
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(2016): "Before you even know ..." - Big Data und die Erkennbarkeit des Selbst. In: IRIE - International Review of Information Ethics 24 (5), S. 44-54
Abstract: Der Big Data - Technologie wird das Potenzial zugeschrieben, durch Mustererkennung in aggregierten Daten Verhaltensweisen von Personen zu prognostizieren, noch bevor diese intendiert und reflektiert würden. Zumeist widmet sich die Big Data Debatte daher den Befürchtungen möglicher Einbußen von Privatheit und Freiheit. In unserem Beitrag wählen wir jedoch einen anderen Zugriff und fragen, inwiefern die Big Data Visionen das Selbstsein betreffen, also das Konzept davon, wer ich selbst eigentlich bin. Wenn Selbstsein, Martin Heidegger zufolge, eigentlich bedeutet, in kritischer Distanz zu vorgegebenen Möglichkeiten zu leben, stellt sich die Frage, welches Kriterium hier eine klare Unterscheidbarkeit gewährleistet: Wie kann ich wissen, echt ich selbst zu sein, ohne nur wiederum andere Üblichkeiten nachzuahmen? Wir fragen daher, ob die Big Data Technologie subjektive Verzerrungen und Täuschungen über das Selbst ausschalten könnte. Hierfür wird der Begriff „Selbstsein“ bei Heidegger erarbeitet. Dabei lässt sich allerdings zeigen, dass dieser letztlich ohne Trennschärfe bleibt, da die nur negative Charakterisierung von eigentlichem Selbstsein, Heidegger zufolge, echt oder unecht ausgestaltet sein kann – der aus der Möglichkeit echter oder unechter Selbsterzählung resultierende Relativismus wurde bisher nicht hinreichend beachtet. Big Data k ann zwar uneigentliche Erzählmuster vermeiden, nicht aber uneigentliches oder eigentliches Verhalten differenzieren; ob ich z.B. manches – unecht eigentlich – aus Trotz oder Kalkül gegen mein eigenes Selbstverständnis tat, bleibt verborgen. Fazit: Es muss entweder ein Kriterium für echtes Eigentlichsein entwickelt oder der Anspruch, darüber Auskunft zu geben, verworfen werden – bei Heidegger und Big Data. Verzichtet man jedoch auf die Idee einer (echten) Eigentlichkeit verzichtet man auf den Begriff des Sel bst.
Keywords: Anerkennung, Big Data, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Favoriten, Heidegger, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Ontologie, Realtechnik, Philosophie, recognition and self, Reflexionen über MTR, Selbst, Selbst und Eigentlichkeit (Heidegger), Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, Technik -
(2016): A New Societist Social Ontology. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (2), S. 174-202. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103033002002
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(2016): The 'Conversation Partner' Phenomenon in the Dialogical I-Other Relationship. In: SSRN Electronic Journal. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2884743
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2884743 Abstract: Authors develop a new approach to the study of one's relationships with others, which focuses on the conditions and the effects of the dialogical nature of a person. Theoretical modeling, hermeneutics, qualitative and quantitative methods have been applied. The solution for identifying prerequisites of self-development and social positioning of a person that are rooted in dialogical I-Other relationships has been suggested. The originality of the paper is associated with describing the relation to the other as a reflexive I-Other relationship; with an elaborated model that highlights the variety of dimensions of I-Other relationships (between I and Other, I-in-Other, Other-in-Me, I-in-Myself) results in a truly dialogical mode of being; with revealing the potentials of a Conversation Partner in dialogical I-Other relationships (subjective interrelations and significance of Conversation Partners, their activity, fullness of the reflection of significant Conversation Partners); with a description of different hypostases of Conversation Partners (Real, Ideal, Secret, I as Myself) by the means of hermeneutics. The method called "My Conversation Partner" should also be mentioned, as well as the empirical study of existential and social resources of Conversation Partners. Theoretical background of the study was formed by the works of M.M. Bakhtin, M. Buber, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre. E. Levinas, as well as by the works of modern psychologists such as G.M. Kuchinsky, A.V. Rossokhin, E.B. Starovoytenko, C.T. Brown & P.W. Keller, Hubert Hermans, F. Rivetti Barbo, etc. Results of the current research have shown that the potential of social adaptivity, affiliation, dominance, positive solitude, joy of solitude, freedom, self-transcendence, existential fulfillment is associated with the richness of one's Conversation Partners.
Keywords: adaptivity, Bakhtin, Barbo, Buber, C.T. Brown, Conversation Partner, dialogue, dimensions, Disziplin, existential resources, Heidegger, Hermans, hermeneutics, I - Other / Conversation Partner, Interaktion, interdisziplinär, I-Other relationship, Keller, Kuchinsky, Levinas, model, Personality, Philosophie, Psychologie, reflection, Rossokhin, Sartre, social adaptivity, social resources, Starovoytenko 2015
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(2015): Adorno's View of Life. In: FRONTIERS OF PHILOSOPHY IN CHINA (10/3), S. 444-456
Abstract: The aim of this article is to reflect on the dialectic of the individual's life and death in terms of Adorno's moral philosophy, specifically through a thorough reading of his Negative Dialectics and other key works on the subject. I hold that there are two aspects of the dialectic of life within the context of Adorno's "nonidentity": one involves exploring the false identification, due to the reification of modern society, of the individual's life experience with her or his death experience, while the other involves preserving the dialectical and irreducible tension between the theoretical contemplation of life and of historical conditions, as well as specific social systems. Heidegger's ontological philosophy concerning Dasein and Kant's categorical imperative will also be discussed in order to fully understand Adorno's moral philosophy and his idea of nonidentity. From my point of view, Adorno's moral philosophy is the prime motivator of his unique concept of nonidentity, and has influenced contemporary political philosophical concepts such as biopolitics (cf. G. Agamben).
2014
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(2014): The Machine That Therefore I Am. In: Philosophy & Rhetoric 47 (4). DOI: 10.5325/philrhet.47.4.0494
Abstract: This article follows Jacques Derrida, who follows the animal-machine. In his lecture The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida could easily have swapped “the animal” for “the machine” . In fact, throughout his readings of René Descartes, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Lacan, and Emmanuel Levinas, the machine emerges right alongside the animal. In defining the limits of the human, these thinkers present the animal and the machine together in order to elevate the human. Unlike the human, who responds, the animal-machine merely reacts. The animal-machine may approximate certain human actions, but it can never, according to Descartes, in Derrida’s words, “respond to our questions” and will always suffer from a “lack ..
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