Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): People are averse to machines making moral decisions. In: Cognition 181, S. 21-34. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 Abstract: Do people want autonomous machines making moral decisions? Nine studies suggest that that the answer is ‘no’—in part because machines lack a complete mind. Studies 1–6 find that people are averse to machines making morally-relevant driving, legal, medical, and military decisions, and that this aversion is mediated by the perception that machines can neither fully think nor feel. Studies 5–6 find that this aversion exists even when moral decisions have positive outcomes. Studies 7–9 briefly investigate three potential routes to increasing the acceptability of machine moral decision-making: limiting the machine to an advisory role (Study 7), increasing machines’ perceived experience (Study 8), and increasing machines’ perceived expertise (Study 9). Although some of these routes show promise, the aversion to machine moral decision-making is difficult to eliminate. This aversion may prove challenging for the integration of autonomous technology in moral domains including medicine, the law, the military, and self-driving vehicles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2014
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(2014): Generating Task-Oriented Interactions of Service Robots. In: IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems 44 (8), S. 981-994. DOI: 10.1109/TSMC.2014.2298214
Abstract: Human-robot interaction (HRI) may play a key role in enhancing a robot's capability in practical service tasks, allowing productive human-robot collaboration. To obtain appropriate human aid for conducting tasks, a robot should be capable of generating meaningful questions regarding the task procedures in real time and applying the results to modify its task plans or behaviors. However, few studies on integrating robot task management and HRI in such high-level task planning exist. In this paper, we propose a new scheme of script-based task planning and HRI that supports the planning and is generated by it. The planning operates on a set of plain and easily writable task procedures, or scripts. The approach produces robust, practical, and easy-to-manipulate robot behavior. Based on the scripts, the system identifies plan ambiguities that require interaction with humans, and resolves them using the human response. The interaction thus generated is highly relevant and task-oriented. The robot learns from the interaction history to improve its subsequent planning in general, or personalize it. Two simulation cases, of a home service and a museum-guide robot, are presented to show how the robots lead appropriate interaction and smoothly adjust their task plans to user commands or responses. Such close integration of HRI and robot task planning is expected to advance the practicality of service robots.
Keywords: ALIGNMENT, Communication, CONTROL ARCHITECTURE, Design, human-robot interaction, INTEGRATION, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, PROGRAMS, Realtechnik, Science and Technology Studies (STS), script, script-based task planning, service robot, Serviceroboter, Soziale Robotik, task-oriented interaction, Technik 2013
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(2013): Promise and Challenges Surrounding Culture–Gene Coevolution and Gene–Culture Interactions. In: Psychological Inquiry 24 (1), S. 64-70. DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2013.764814
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2013.764814 Abstract: Comments on an article by Joan Y. Chiao et al. (see record 2013-09968-001). Advances in neuroscience have heavily influenced many areas of psychological research in recent years, and cultural psychology is no exception. In fact, as Joan Y. Chiao et al. emphasize in the target article, cultural psychology and neuroscience may have formed a particularly strong partnership in the business of explaining human diversity. Cultural psychology provides an explanatory framework for understanding meaningful variation in thought and behavior across cultures, and neuroscience offers explanations of how the brain and genes underlie psychological processes. By combining these two perspectives into a new field, cultural neuroscience may be well equipped to investigate the mind more completely, as arising from multiple, interacting forces from within and beyond the individual. Chiao et al. put forth an important and impressive model of cultural neuroscience, the center of which is cultur e–gene coevolution theory, or the dual inheritance theory of human behavior. The promise of cultural neuroscience, and of the study of genes and culture in particular, is great. This culture–gene research may help scientists better understand population health disparities, as Chiao et al. point out, and achieve a more nuanced, and ultimately more accurate, view of the human mind. The target article also highlights the gene–culture interaction framework, in addition to culture–gene coevolution theory, as playing an important role in understanding variation in psychological outcomes. Yet for culture–gene research more broadly to continue to make an impact, there are some important challenges that should be addressed. Chiao et al. understanding of how human diversity may be impacted by both genetic and cultural selection with an ambitious theory of culture– gene coevolution, and I commend the authors for bringing these very important issues to the forefront. Although some k ey chall enges remain to be addressed in future research—such as which cultural traits are adaptive, whether culture–gene relationships are causal, and when genetic variants should correlate and/or interact with the cultural environment—the promise of cultural neuroscience is evident. The integration of biological and neuroscientific perspectives with cultural psychology will continue to be crucial for advancing understandings of the mind, brain, and behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 8
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(2013): Screened Conversations. In: Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 17 (3), S. 333-349. DOI: 10.5840/techne20141308
Abstract: Social scientists have documented some recent, dramatic changes in the nature of our social lives. Many scholars have thought that our reliance on technology to communicate with others is in large part responsible for that loss. However, there is also data to support the opposite conclusion—it might be the case that social networking technologies have helped, rather than hindered our social interactions. What I would like to propose is a philosophical argument, which I hope will offer a different sort of answer to the questions about whether we know people in the same ways, or perhaps more or less well, than we once did, in the days before Facebook, email, and such. Whether or not technology has enhanced our social lives, it is worth considering whether coming to know another person is a different sort of exercise than it used to be, when face-to-face interactions with others were the preferred way to find out what was going on in someone else’s life. What is different in sharing my thoughts, beliefs, feelings, desires, and such with another over the Internet versus in person? Is there any kind of knowledge that is available only in a face-to-face context? If so, what is the nature of that knowledge? In philosophical terms, what I want to examine is how our knowledge of others’ minds changes with various technologies that we use to communicate the contents of our mental states.
Keywords: Art des Kommunikationsmediums, digitale Kommunikation, Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Informations- & Kommunikationstechnik, Interaktion, knowledge of other mind states, Kommunikation, Kommunikationstechnik, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Philosophie, Realtechnik, Soziale Angemessenheit, Technik, Technikphilosophie, Wissen um Anderen, Zeitschrift: techne 2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung 1980
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(1980): Minds, brains, and programs. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3), S. 417-424. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00005756
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756 Abstract: Minds, brains, and programs - Volume 3 Issue 3
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