Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): The future of social cognition. Paradigms, concepts and experiments. In: Synthese 194 (3), S. 655-672. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1162-5
Abstract: Since the publication of Premack and Woodruff's classic paper introducing the notion of a 'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff in Behav Brain Sci 1(4):515-526, 1978), interdisciplinary research in social cognition has witnessed the development of theory-theory, simulation theory, hybrid approaches, and most recently interactionist and perceptual accounts of other minds. The challenges that these various approaches present for each other and for research in social cognition range from adequately defining central concepts to designing experimental paradigms for testing empirical hypotheses. But is there any approach that promises to dominate future interdisciplinary research in social cognition? Is social cognition witnessing a gradual paradigm shift where hitherto grounding notions such as theory of mind are no longer viewed as explanatorily necessary? Or have we simply lost our way in attempting to devise adequate experimental setups that could sway the debate in favour of one of the contending accounts? This special issue addresses these questions in an attempt to discover what the future holds for interdisciplinary research in social cognition.
Keywords: adequate social interaction, deutsche Community, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, Überblick, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2016
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(2016): The Mechanisms of Emergence. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (2), S. 260-282. DOI: 10.1177/0048393103262553
Abstract: This article focuses on emergence in social systems. The author begins by proposing a new tool to explore the mechanisms of social emergence: multi agent based computer simulation. He then draws on philosophy of mind to develop an account of social emergence that raises potential problems for the methodological individualism of both social mechanism and of multi agent simulation. He then draws on various complexity concepts to propose a set of criteria whereby one can determine whether a given social mechanism generates emergent properties, in the sense that their explanation cannot be reduced to a mechanistic account of individuals and their interactions. This combined account helps to resolve the competing claims of methodological individualists and social realists. The author's conclusion is that the scope of mechanistic explanation may be limited due to the extreme complexity of many social systems.
Keywords: complexity, Disziplin, emergence, Emergenz, Emergenz in sozialen Systemen, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Interaktion, Komplexität, Komplexitätsforschung, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), multi agent based computer simulation, multi-agent systems, Multi-Agenten-Systeme, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Realtechnik, Reflexionen über MTR, simulation, social realism, social systems, soziale Mechanismen, Soziale Systeme, Technik -
Valsiner, Jaan; Marsico, Giuseppina; Chaudhary, Nandita; Sato, Tatsuya; Dazzani, Maria Virgínia Machado (Hg.) (2016): Psychology as the science of human being. The Yokohama Manifesto. Cham: Springer (Annals of theoretical psychology)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21094-0 Abstract: This book brings together a group of scholars from around the world who view psychology as the science of human ways of being. Being refers to the process of existing - through construction of the human world ℓ́ℓ here, rather than to an ontological state. This collection includes work that has the goal to establish the newly developed area of cultural psychology as the science of specifically human ways of existence. It comes as a next step after the ℓ́ℓbehaviorist turnℓ́ℓ that has dominated psychology over most of the 20th century, and like its successor in the form of ℓ́ℓcognitivismℓ́ℓ, kept psychology away from addressing issues of specifically human ways of relating with their worlds. Such linking takes place through intentional human actions: through the creation of complex tools for living, entertainment, and work. Human beings construct tools to make other tools. Human beings invent religious systems, notions of economic rationality and legal systems; they enter into aesthetic enjoyment of various aspects of life in art, music, and literature; they have the capability of inventing national identities that can be summoned to legitimate oneℓ́ℓs killing of oneℓ́ℓs neighbors, or being killed oneself. The contributions to this volume focus on the central goal of demonstrating that psychology as a science needs to start from the phenomena of higher psychological functions, and then look at how their lower counterparts are re-organized from above. That kind of investigation is inevitably interdisciplinary - it links psychology with anthropology, philosophy, sociology, history, and developmental biology. Various contributions to this volume are based on the work of Lev Vygotsky, George Herbert Mead, Henri Bergson, and on traditions of Ganzheitspsychologie and Gestalt psychology. Psychology as the Science of Human Being is a valuable resource to psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, biologists, and anthropologists alike.
2015
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Misselhorn, Catrin (2015): Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Explanation, Implementation and Simulation. 1st ed. 2015. New York; London: Springer. Online verfügbar unter http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1059245
DOI: http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1059245 Abstract: This book brings together philosophical approaches to cooperation and collective agency with research into human-machine interaction and cooperation from engineering, robotics, computer science and AI. Bringing these so far largely unrelated fields of study together leads to a better understanding of collective agency in natural and artificial systems and will help to improve the design and performance of hybrid systems involving human and artificial agents. Modeling collective agency with the help of computer simulations promises also philosophical insights into the emergence of collective agency. The volume consists of four sections. The first section is dedicated to the concept of agency. The second section of the book turns to human-machine cooperation. The focus of the third section is the transition from cooperation to collective agency. The last section concerns the explanatory value of social simulations of collective agency in the broader framework of cultural evolution
2014
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(2014): Minds as social institutions. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), S. 121-143. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9324-0
Abstract: I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as "artifacts," tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of "scripts" and "roles"; when we play a role we wear a "mind." No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) "as if" we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these "as if" (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions.
Keywords: als ob, belief in beliefs, Coordination, coordination artifacts, Extended mind, Interaktion, Kooperation, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Konventionen, philosophy of mind, script, Social frames, Social institutions, social interaction, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Überzeugungen, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 2012
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(2012): Feeling robots and human zombies. Mind perception and the uncanny valley. In: Cognition 125 (1), S. 125-130. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.06.007
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22784682 Abstract: The uncanny valley-the unnerving nature of humanlike robots-is an intriguing idea, but both its existence and its underlying cause are debated. We propose that humanlike robots are not only unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, we suggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience (the capacity to feel and sense), rather than agency (the capacity to act and do). Experiment 1 examined whether a machine's humanlike appearance prompts both ascriptions of experience and feelings of unease. Experiment 2 tested whether a machine capable of experience remains unnerving, even without a humanlike appearance. Experiment 3 investigated whether the perceived lack of experience can also help explain the creepiness of unfeeling humans and philosophical zombies. These experiments demonstrate that feelings of uncanniness are tied to perceptions of experience, and also suggest that experience-but not agency-is seen as fundamental to humans, and fundamentally lacking in machines.
Keywords: Emotions, Favoriten, Female, humanlike, humanlike robots, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intellectual Disability/psychology, Male, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), nervende Roboter, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, Reflexionen über MTR, Robotics, Simulation von Menschlichkeit, theory of mind 2010
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(2010): Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness. Does anyone care about functional zombies?. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1), S. 133-155. DOI: 10.1007/s11097-009-9126-6
Abstract: It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of 'phenomenal consciousness' are misguided-they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between 'mere things' and 'subjects of moral concern' rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have.
Keywords: Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), mental states, mentale Zustände, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, phenomenal consciousness, philosophical zombie, philosophy of mind, qualia, Reflexionen über MTR, Zur Frage: Schreiben wir Assistenzsystemen mentale Zustände zu? Bzw.: durch simulierte Menschlichkeit/soziale Angemessenheit neige wir eher dazu, mentale Zustände zuzuschreiben 2008
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(2008): Cultural Neuroscience of Consciousness. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (10-11), S. 58-69
Abstract: Philosophical inquiries into the nature of consciousness have long been intrinsically tied to questions regarding the nature of the self. Although philosophers of mind seldom make reference to the role of cultural context in shaping consciousness, since antiquity culture has played a notable role in philosophical conceptions of the self. Western philosophers, from Plato to Locke, have emphasized an individualistic view of the self that is autonomous and consistent across situations, while Eastern philosophers, such as Lao Tzu and Confucius, have argued for a collectivistic view of the self, one that is interconnected to others and embedded within specific social contexts and situations. Here we argue that a comprehensive theory of consciousness needs to account for the role of cultural context and its bidirectional interaction with neural and genetic mechanisms in shaping a variety of conscious phenomena, from visual perception to self-awareness. We review recent evidence of cultural variation in neurobiological mechanisms underlying these phenomena and discuss the implications of these cultural neuroscience findings for the study of consciousness.
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2007
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(2007): Social Systems. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (5), S. 557-578. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701545981
Abstract: It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building on the view that folk psychological knowledge is knowledge of theoretical models, I argue that social knowledge is best understood as lying on a continuum between behavioral and full-blown psychological models. Between the two extremes, we have what I call social models. Social models represent social structures in terms of their overall purpose and circumscribe individuals' roles within them. These models help us predict what others will do or plan what we should do without providing information about what agents think or want. Thinking about social knowledge this way gives us a more nuanced picture of what capacities are engaged in social planning and interaction, and gives us a better tool with which to think about the social knowledge of animals and young children.
Keywords: Agenten-Überzeugung, BELIEFS, Beliefs in beliefs, Disziplin, Entwicklungspsychologie, Erwartungen, Erwartungserwartung, folk psychology, INFANTS, Intellektualtechnik, INTENTIONS, Interaktion, KNOWLEDGE, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), MIND, Modelle/Theorien, ORIGINS, OTHERS, PERCEPTION, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Psychologie, REPRESENTATION, social knowledge, RHESUS-MONKEYS, social systems, ethics, soziale Kognition, Sozialverhalten, Sozialverstehen, Technik, theoretical models, theory of mind, Überzeugung 2004
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(2004): From Sounds To Music. The Contextualizations of Pitch. In: Music Perception 21 (3), S. 431-456. DOI: 10.1525/mp.2004.21.3.431
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/mp.2004.21.3.431 Abstract: In this chapter we present a new approach to research in music perception allowing one to investigate how musical sound representations are formed in the human brain. By studying subjects' brain responses to unattended stimuli we can determine, for instance, whether neural circuits are more readily activated by musical sounds implicitly learned than by unfamiliar sounds even in non-musicians. Indeed, neuronal populations seem to respond more efficiently to pitch deviations within sound patterns following the rules of Western scale structure, rather than to deviations inside patterns artificially created. Moreover, neural circuits are selectively activated by mistunings inside tonal melodies or by out-of-key chords inside harmonic cadences even when attention is not directed towards the sounds. These data together suggest that incoming sounds are more efficiently processed when they match the neural templates derived from our musical culture. The existence of 'musical memories' in the auditory cortex that are effortlessly activated enabling us, e.g., to identify and recognize speech vs. music sounds can thus be postulated.
2001
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(2001): Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and The Development of the Theory of Mind. In: Mind and Language 16 (5), S. 494-541. DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00180
Abstract: Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive achievement that enables us to report our propositional attitudes, to attribute such attitudes to others, and to use such postulated or observed mental states in the prediction and explanation of behavior. Most normally developing children acquire ToM between the ages of 3 and 5 years, but serious delays beyond this chronological and mental age have been observed in children with autism, as well is in those with severe sensory impairments. We examine data from Studies of ToM in normally developing children and those with deafness, blindness, autism and Williams syndrome, as well as data from lower primates, in a search for answers to key theoretical questions concerning the origins, nature and representation of knowledge about the mind. In answer to these, we offer a framework according to which ToM is jointly dependent upon language and social experience, and is produced by a conjunction of language acquisition with children's growing social understanding, acquired through conversation and interaction with others. We argue that adequate language and adequate social skills are jointly causally sufficient, and individually causally necessary, for producing ToM. Thus our account supports a social developmental theory of the genesis of human cognition, inspired by the work of Sellars and Vygotsky.
Keywords: adequate social interaction, AUTISTIC-CHILD, Communication, DEAF-CHILDREN, DEFICIT, Disziplin, Erkenntnistheorie, FALSE BELIEF, INDIVIDUALS, KNOWLEDGE, Kognitive Skills/Social Cognition, Linguistik, MODULARITY, performance, Philosophie, philosophy of mind, Postkasten, Psychologie, Social Cognition, Social Skills, Soziale Angemessenheit, soziale Kognition, theory of mind, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten, WILLIAMS-SYNDROME
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