Alle Publikationen
- <<
- <
- 1
2017
-
(2017): Supplemental Material for Consequences, Norms, and Generalized Inaction in Moral Dilemmas. The CNI Model of Moral Decision-Making. In: Journal of personality and social psychology, S. 343-376. DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000086.supp
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000086.supp Abstract: Research on moral dilemma judgments has been fundamentally shaped by the distinction between utilitarianism and deontology. According to the principle of utilitarianism, the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consequences; the principle of deontology states that the moral status of behavioral options depends on their consistency with moral norms. To identify the processes underlying utilitarian and deontological judgments, researchers have investigated responses to moral dilemmas that pit one principle against the other (e.g., trolley problem). However, the conceptual meaning of responses in this paradigm is ambiguous, because the central aspects of utilitarianism and deontology—consequences and norms—are not manipulated. We illustrate how this shortcoming undermines theoretical interpretations of empirical findings and describe an alternative approach that resolves the ambiguities of the traditional paradigm. Expanding on this approach, we present a multinom ial model that allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms (I) in responses to moral dilemmas. We present 8 studies that used this model to investigate the effects of gender, cognitive load, question framing, and psychopathy on moral dilemma judgments. The findings obtained with the proposed CNI model offer more nuanced insights into the determinants of moral dilemma judgments, calling for a reassessment of dominant theoretical assumptions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 3
2012
-
(2012): Amoralisch sein. Psychopathie und moralisches Unvermogen. In: Journal fur Philosophie & Psychiatrie 1. Online verfügbar unter http://www.jfpp.org/100.html
Abstract: It is argued that amoralists, i.e. people who do not care about morality, do not exist in reality. Real cases of psychopathy imply moral incapacity, which is not something that amoralists suffer from. Hence amoralists and psychopaths are not identical. I then discuss an argument by Gilbert Ryle and conclude that psychopaths lack the capacities that let other people care about morality. Empathy is the main moral capacity; in healthy people moral education results in their caring about morality, which cannot simply cease. I conclude that there are no amoralists in the philosophical sense of the term. Vorgestellt wird die These, dass die in der Moralphilosophie diskutierte Figur des Amoralisten, die Moral nicht gelten lasst, in Wirklichkeit nicht existiert. Im Vergleich zu realen Fallen der Psychopathie wird deutlich, dass diese an einem moralischen Unvermogen leiden und der Amoralist diese Symptomatik nicht aufweist. Es wird festgestellt, dass der Amoralist und der Psychopath nicht identisch sind. Unter Berufung auf Gilbert Ryle wird argumentiert, dass den Psychopathen die Fahigkeit zur Empathie fehlt und sie deshalb die Moral nicht ernstnehmen konnen. Dieser Aspekt wird kontrastiert mit der Ausbildung der Fahigkeiten bei Gesunden, bei denen die moralische Erziehung zu einem Ernstnehmen der Moral fuhrt, das nicht einfach aufgegeben werden kann. Abschliessend wird darauf hingewiesen, dass es vor diesem Hintergrund keine echten Amoralisten im moralphilosophischen Sinne geben wird.
- <<
- <
- 1