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2018
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(2018) : Social groups. In: Ludwig, Kirk; Janković, Marija (Hg.): The Routledge handbook of collective intentionality: London; New York: Routledge (Routledge handbooks in philosophy), S. 277-289
Abstract: In this chapter, I outline rival positions on the ontology of social groups, ontological individualism and realism (or holism). Ontological individualism maintains that ultimately we need only refer to individual persons and their relations when describing the social world (i.e. the domain of human interaction), offering explanations of social phenomena, forming judgments or developing theories. Realism or holism by contrast is the thesis that reference to social groups is ineliminable from such discourse and that they are entities in their own right. A social group is a type of object over which we quantify in our folk and formal social scientific discourses. Next I explain two key points of dispute between individualism and holism. First, can groups be identified with sets of individuals? Second, can talk of social groups be wholly analyzed in terms of reference to individuals and their relations? If the answer to either of these questions is 'yes,' then it is possible for individuals (in relations) to enjoy the kind of explanatory priority which eviscerates holism of substance or interest. I sketch reasons why the answer to each is 'no' and propose there is at least a prima facie case to prefer holism. Third, I consider whether shared or collective intentions are necessary for individuals to constitute a social group and present reasons to show that they are not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved)
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