Alle Publikationen
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2019
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(2019) : Beyond Programming: Can Robots’ Norm-Violating Actions Elicit Mental State Attributions?: 2019 14th ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI): Daegu, Korea: IEEE, S. 530-531
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2019.8673293 Abstract: Social perceivers often view a human agent’s norm-violating behavior as diagnostic of that person’s mental states, while behaviors that conform to norms are viewed as less informative. We developed a series of stimulus videos depicting a DRC-HUBO robot engaging in norm-violating and norm-conforming behaviors. We explored the hypothesis that robots’ norm-violating actions may invite social perceivers to increase their mental state attributions in a similar manner as they do in humans. Surprisingly, we found that norm-conforming behaviors appear to be at least as conducive as norm-violating behaviors, and perhaps even moreso, to mental state attribution to robotic agents.
Keywords: action explanation, actions elicit mental state attributions, agency, Artificial intelligence, behavioural sciences computing, Cognition, control engineering computing, DRC-HUBO, DRC-HUBO robot, human agent norm-violating behavior, Humanoid Robots, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, Künstliche Intelligenz, Mobile robots, multi-agent systems, norms, PSYCHOLOGY, robot programming, robotic agents, social perceivers, theory of mind, Videos 2018
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(2018): People are averse to machines making moral decisions. In: Cognition 181, S. 21-34. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 Abstract: Do people want autonomous machines making moral decisions? Nine studies suggest that that the answer is ‘no’—in part because machines lack a complete mind. Studies 1–6 find that people are averse to machines making morally-relevant driving, legal, medical, and military decisions, and that this aversion is mediated by the perception that machines can neither fully think nor feel. Studies 5–6 find that this aversion exists even when moral decisions have positive outcomes. Studies 7–9 briefly investigate three potential routes to increasing the acceptability of machine moral decision-making: limiting the machine to an advisory role (Study 7), increasing machines’ perceived experience (Study 8), and increasing machines’ perceived expertise (Study 9). Although some of these routes show promise, the aversion to machine moral decision-making is difficult to eliminate. This aversion may prove challenging for the integration of autonomous technology in moral domains including medicine, the law, the military, and self-driving vehicles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2017
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(2017): Kant, Oppression, and the Possibility of Nonculpable Failures to Respect Oneself. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (3), S. 285-305. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12242
Abstract: I argue that Kant's ethical framework cannot countenance a certain kind of failure to respect oneself that can occur within oppressive social contexts. Kant's assumption that any person, qua rational being, has guaranteed epistemic access to the moral law as the standard of good action and the capacity to act upon this standard makes autonomy an achievement within the individual agent's power, but this is contrary to a feminist understanding of autonomy as a relational achievement that can be thwarted by the systematic attack on autonomy that occurs within oppressive social conditions. Insofar as Kant's negative duty of self-respect is unable to accommodate the ways immersion in oppressive social environments can warp an individual's understanding of what she is owed and capable of as a moral agent, it perpetuates the cruelty of unjust social systems in the guise of respecting individual autonomy. I conclude by considering Carol Hay's argument that those who are oppressed have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression, in order to explore how this limitation in how Kant conceives of the duty to respect the self may reach expression in contemporary ethical theory inspired by Kant.
Keywords: agency, Autonomie, Diskriminierung, Disziplin, Ethik, feminism, Feminismus, Gender, Handlungsmacht, Hay, Kant, Macht, Modelle/Theorien, Moral, moral agents, moralische Gesetze, moralisches Wissen, Moralphilosophie, oppressive social systems, Philosophie, Respekt, social systems, ethics, Three main normative ethic perspectives Kant, Utilitarismus virtue ethics, Unterdrückungssysteme -
(2017): Artificial agents among us. Should we recognize them as agents proper?. In: Ethics and Information Technology 19 (1), S. 1-17. DOI: 10.1007/s10676-016-9411-3
Abstract: Abstract In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently, as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other-this despite the fact that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and hence as a bearer of rights.
Keywords: agency, Anerkennung, Anerkennung technischer Systeme, Anerkennung und technische Systeme, Artificial agent, artificial agents, doppelter Treffer, Favoriten, Group agent, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Modelle/Theorien, Personhood, RATIONALITY, Realtechnik, recognition and self, responsibility, Rights, Serviceroboter, Soziale Angemessenheit, Soziale Robotik, Technik -
(2017): Automatic actions. Agency, intentionality, and responsibility. In: Philosophical Psychology 30 (5), S. 616-644. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1291928
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1291928 Abstract: This article discusses a challenge to the traditional intentional-causalist conceptions of action and intentionality as well as to our everyday and legal conceptions of responsibility, namely the psychological discovery that the greatest part of our alleged actions are performed automatically, that is unconsciously and without a proximal intention causing and sustaining them. The main part of the article scrutinizes several mechanisms of automatic behavior, how they work, and whether the resulting behavior is an action. These mechanisms include actions caused by distal implementation intentions, four types of habit and habitualization, mimicry, and semantically induced automatic behavior (which is later disregarded because of its lack of clarity). According to the intentional-causalist criterion, the automatic behaviors resulting from all but one of these mechanisms turn out to be actions and to be intentional; and even the behavior resulting from the remaining mechanism (natural ly acquired habits) is something we can be responsible for. Hence, the challenge, seen from close up, does not really call the traditional conception of action and intentionality into question. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von 1
Keywords: agency, Automatism, Causality, Habits, Habitualization, Intention, Philosophie, Verhaltensforschung 2016
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(2016): An introduction to the Moral Agency Scale. Individual differences in moral agency and their relationship to related moral constructs, free will, and blame attribution (PSYNDEXshort). In: Social Psychology 47 (6), S. 295-310
Abstract: The purpose of this research was to develop a psychometric measure of moral agency and explore its relationship with related moral constructs. Although our legal system, daily interactions with others, and most theories about moral psychology assume moral agency, few researchers have studied it, and there is no instrument devised to specifically measure it. Here, we present the Moral Agency Scale (MAS), a self-report instrument designed to assess the extent to which participants feel control over their moral choices. In Study 1, the MAS demonstrated strict factorial invariance; validity is further supported by its relations to similar constructs and reported volunteering behavior. In Study 2, MAS scores were associated with free will beliefs, moral disengagement, and judgments of moral blame. Results are discussed with reference to theory and future directions for research.
Keywords: agency, Attribution, Blame, Moral, Morality, psychometrics, Rating Scales, Self-Report, Sozialpsychologie, Test Construction, Volition -
(2016) : Detailed Record Title: Geschlechtsunterschiede und Geschlechtsstereotype In: Bierhoff, Hans-Werner; Frey, Dieter (Hg.): Soziale Motive und soziale Einstellungen: 1. Auflage: Göttingen: Hogrefe (Enzyklopädie der Psychologie. Themenbereich C, Theorie und Forschung. Serie VI, Sozialpsychologie), S. 759-793
Abstract: Ein Überblick über die sozialpsychologische Forschung zu Geschlechtsunterschieden und Geschlechtsstereotypen wird gegeben. Nach einleitenden Anmerkungen zur Definition von Geschlecht (biologisches versus soziales Geschlecht, Geschlechtsidentität, Geschlechtsschemata) und Geschlechtsunterschieden sowie zu häufigen Fehlannahmen in Bezug auf Geschlechtsunterschiede werden empirische Befunde zu Geschlechtsunterschieden dargestellt. Die Befunde beziehen sich auf Unterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen in folgenden Bereichen: kognitive Fähigkeiten; Persönlichkeit; soziales Verhalten; Präferenzen; Konformität; Attributionen; sozialer Vergleich; ethisches bzw. unethisches Verhalten; hilfsbereites Verhalten; Geschlechtsunterschiede im Beruf. Anschließend werden Theorien zur Erklärung von Geschlechtsunterschieden behandelt: evolutionspsychologische Theorie; sozialer Konstruktivismus; biosoziale Theorie; soziokulturelle Theorie. Der nächst Abschnitt beschäftigt sich mit Definitionen, Wirkmechanismen und Inhalten von Geschlechtsstereotypen ("Agency" und "Communion" als fundamentale Basis der sozialen Wahrnehmung; soziale Rollentheorie nach Eagly und Kollegen; das "stereotype content model" nach Fiske und Kollegen), mit der impliziten und expliziten Messung von Geschlechtsstereotypen und mit deren Wirkung ("Women-are-wonderful"-Effekt; "Think manager, think male"-Phänomen; "Lack-of-fit"-Modell; "Backlash"-Effekt; "Double Standards"; Vorurteile gegenüber weiblichen Führungskräften; "Glass-cliff"-Phänomen). Abschließend wird auf die Anwendung der Befunde und auf Perspektiven für die zukünftige Forschung eingegangen. zitiert von 2
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(2016): A Critical Social Systems View of the Internet. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (4), S. 471-500. DOI: 10.1177/0048393107307664
Abstract: The article discusses principles that form part of evolutionary systems thinking in social sciences and humanities. It is argued that introducing the concept of self-organization relates agency and structures in a way that makes it possible to take up certain features of Critical Theory by which it can meet the demands for a critical social science. These principles are applied to the question of whether there is convergence or divergence in and by means of the Internet. It will be clarified that the Internet is basically a social system and that it is a subsystem of the larger and overarching system of the whole society. It will be shown how the Internet can be perceived as a possible trigger for societal developments bringing about fundamental change in the nature of society. Thus the article cuts across philosophical, system theoretical, social theoretical, sociology of technology, and information society theory considerations.
Keywords: agency, critical Theory, Disziplin, dynamic, epistemology, Evolution, Handlungsmacht, information society, Informations- & Kommunikationstechnik, Internet, Kritische Theorie, mechanism, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Philosophie, Realtechnik, revolution, Selbstorganisation, self-organization, social system, social systems, soziales System, Soziologie, STS, Technik -
(2016): How Not to Structure a Social Theory. In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (4), S. 464-479. DOI: 10.1177/0048393106293456
2015
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(2015): Dynamic Interactions of Agency in Leadership (DIAL). An Integrative Framework for Analysing Agency in Sustainability Leadership. In: Journal of Business Ethics 126 (4), S. 649-662. DOI: 10.1007/s10551-013-1977-7
Abstract: This article investigates agency as a way of being and acting in sustainability leadership. Our primary aim is to enhance understanding of agentic strategies that facilitate transcending systemic complexities in sustainability leadership. We make a distinction in our analytical approach by drawing from Emirbayer and Mische's (Am J Sociol 103:41, 1998) conceptualisation of agency as 'an interactive process of reflexive transformation and relational pragmatics, a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past, oriented towards the future and enacted in the present' (p. 963). We add ontological sources of agency to these dynamics which interact with habit, imagination, judgement and learning in the transformation of social systems. This approach underpins our model 'Dynamic Interactions of Agency in Leadership' (DIAL), an integrative framework for analysing agency in sustainability leadership. We examine the efficacy of our framework in higher education initiatives in which sustainability aspirations, aims and actions are envisioned, articulated and mobilised. We conclude by offering further avenues of research in sustainability leadership designed to advance this burgeoning field and contribute to bridging the gap between sustainability challenges and our abilities to solve them.
2011
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(2011): Autonome Technik als Herausforderung der soziologischen Handlungstheorie / Autonomous Technology as a Challenge to the Sociological Theory of Action. In: Zeitschrift für Soziologie 40 (2), S. 91-111. DOI: 10.1515/zfsoz-2011-0201
Abstract: Die vorliegende Abhandlung entwickelt ein soziologisches Modell, welches das „Mit-Handeln“ von Technik beschreibt und in einer Weise operationalisiert, dass die Frage der Handlungsträgerschaft empirisch untersucht werden kann. Es wird gezeigt, dass die von der Actor-Network-Theory thematisierten Phänomene auch im Rahmen einer soziologischen Handlungstheorie betrachtet werden können, die sich auf das Esser’sche Modell soziologischer Erklärung stützt. Das Ergebnis ist ein Modell soziologischer Erklärung hybrider Systeme, das die Interaktion von menschlichen Akteuren und nicht-menschlichen Aktanten beschreibt. Zu dessen Überprüfung wurden Experimente in einem selbst programmierten Fahrsimulator durchgeführt. Deren Auswertung belegt, dass die Probanden den technischen Assistenzsystemen Handlungsträgerschaft zuschreiben und das Verhältnis Mensch-Technik als ein symmetrisches wahrnehmen. Zudem tendieren sie dazu, sich je nach Handlungsverteilung der Verfolgung bestimmter Ziele zu entledigen, obwohl nach den Spielregeln „humans“ und „non-humans“ gleichermaßen für die Verfolgung aller Ziele verantwortlich waren.
Keywords: actor network theory, Actor-Network-Theory, agency, Agent-based Modelling, Agent-Based Modelling and Simulation, ANT, ANT und ANT mit Esserschem Modell, autonome Technik, Operationiliserung technischen Handelns, Autonomous Technology, Computer Simulation, Disziplin, doppelter Treffer, Esser, Experimental Sociology, Favoriten, Handlungsträgerschaft, Man-Machine Interaction, Model of Sociological Explanation, Modelle/Theorien, Soziologie, Soziologisches Handlungsmodell von Hartmut Esser, Theory of Action 2010
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(2010): The Causal Power of Social Structures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Abstract: This book offers a solution to the problem of structure and agency: a new solution, but one that draws on a number of existing traditions of thought, most significantly philosophical theories of emergence and causality, and the sociological debates around structuration theory. This introductory chapter sets the context by explaining the problem of structure and agency and its significance for sociology, and outlines some of the key points of my argument. It also offers the reader some hints on different ways to read the rest of the book and briefly locates it with respect to critical realism, the main philosophical tradition on which I draw. The problem of structure and agency Sociology is founded on the belief that our behaviour is causally influenced and in particular that there are social factors that influence our behaviour. Karl Marx, for example, famously wrote ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’ (Marx 1978 [1859]: 4). Émile Durkheim, similarly, argued that ‘the individual is dominated by a moral reality greater than himself: namely, collective reality’ (Durkheim 1952 [1897]: 38). Conventionally, the social factors that are held to influence our behaviour are known as social structure, a concept that even today remains implicit in, and indeed essential to, much of the work done in the social sciences. Yet there is also widespread disagreement about what social structure really is and how it could affect us.
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(2010): Plurale Weltinterpretationen und Transdifferenz: Dominanz- und Interaktionsmodell in der alltäglichen Praxis der West-Tyva in Süd-Sibirien. In: Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 135 (2), S. 305-336
Abstract: This article analyses the flexible way of handling plural models of world interpretation in West Tyvan daily practice. Based on fieldwork in the Republic of Tyva (Russian Federation) in 20042005, it is part of a research project that led to a dissertation submitted to Leipzig University in 2010. At least two models of world interpretation could be identified. Both exist as realities of equal value but can structurally be differentiated as "model of dominance" and "model of interaction." The first stresses "the human dominance over the environment, seen as a series of more or less passive objects of human agency," the second emphasizes the "interaction in a world enclosing humans and consisting of both human and non-human subjects." Both models are coherent systems and belong in equal degree to the repertoire of knowledge, behaviour and acting of West Tyvan agents. To them, these models count as equal and mutually contradictory. The models compete and oppose each other, but form a continuum within a single person to the effect that the human agent is constantly positioning itself, depending on situation and context. The empirical material demonstrates that West Tyvans use these models in various ways - replacing, complementing and mixing them according to their needs in specific contexts.
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