Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): SEAI. Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence Based on Damasio’s Theory of Mind. In: Frontiers in Robotics and AI 5. DOI: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00006
Abstract: A socially intelligent robot must be capable to extract meaningful information in real time from the social environment and react accordingly with coherent human-like behavior. Moreover, it should be able to internalize this information, to reason on it at a higher level, build its own opinions independently, and then automatically bias the decision-making according to its unique experience. In the last decades, neuroscience research highlighted the link between the evolution of such complex behavior and the evolution of a certain level of consciousness, which cannot leave out of a body that feels emotions as discriminants and prompters. In order to develop cognitive systems for social robotics with greater human-likeliness, we used an “understanding by building” approach to model and implement a well-known theory of mind in the form of an artificial intelligence, and we tested it on a sophisticated robotic platform. The name of the presented system is SEAI (Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence), a cognitive system specifically conceived for social and emotional robots. It is designed as a bio-inspired, highly modular, hybrid system with emotion modeling and high-level reasoning capabilities. It follows the deliberative/reactive paradigm where a knowledge-based expert system is aimed at dealing with the high-level symbolic reasoning, while a more conventional reactive paradigm is deputed to the low-level processing and control. The SEAI system is also enriched by a model that simulates the Damasio’s theory of consciousness and the theory of Somatic Markers. After a review of similar bio-inspired cognitive systems, we present the scientific foundations and their computational formalization at the basis of the SEAI framework. Then, a deeper technical description of the architecture is disclosed underlining the numerous parallelisms with the human cognitive system. Finally, the influence of artificial emotions and feelings, and their link with the robot’s beliefs and decisions have been tested in a physical humanoid involved in Human–Robot Interaction (HRI).
Keywords: Abstraktionsfähigkeit, Bewusstsein, Damasio's theory of consciousness, emotion, Fähigkeit, sich eine eigene Meinung zu bilden, Intelligenz, Interaktionspartner, Mensch oder Maschine, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Schnelligkeit der Informationsverarbeitung (real time), theory of mind, Theory of Somatic Markers 2011
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(2011): Pathologies of recognition. In: Philosophy & Social Criticism 37 (8), S. 851-887. DOI: 10.1177/0191453711413701
Abstract: Recognition is not only a response to social pathologies. It is also an unstable and often ambivalent relationship that has its own pathologies. Owing to the intertwining between recognition and power, certain forms of recognition turn out to be forms of alienation in or from the world. Such pathologies affect inter-individual recognition as well as the recognition between individuals and the socio-political institutions. The article proposes a joint reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right, which provide norms for identifying and dealing with these pathologies. The norm for inter-individual recognition is set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the norm for state/citizen recognition in the Philosophy of Right. The analysis envisages two other aspects of recognition: the interference of the 'I-Me' with the 'I-You' relationship and the incorporation of the 'I-We' into the 'We-Us' dimension of recognition. As regards the interpretation of Hegel's practical philosophy, the article analyses the link between Hegel's concept of recognition and his theory of action. In this view, the highest form of recognition has more to do with reconciliation - reconciliation between human beings, reconciliation with the 'finitude of action' - than with the problematic of individual and collective identity.
Keywords: alienation, alienation and recognition, Anerkennung, Anerkennung als menschliche Grundkategorie, Disziplin, Entfremdung, Entfremdung bei Hegel, finitude of action, Hegel, Hegels Begriff der Anerkennung, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Philosophie, power relationships, RECOGNITION, Soziale Angemessenheit, Sozialphilosophie, universal freedom 2008
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(2008): Inverse zombies, anesthesia awareness, and the hard problem of unconsciousness. In: Consciousness and cognition 17 (4), S. 1163-1168. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.06.004
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18635380 Abstract: Philosophical (p-) zombies are constructs that possess all of the behavioral features and responses of a sentient human being, yet are not conscious. P-zombies are intimately linked to the hard problem of consciousness and have been invoked as arguments against physicalist approaches. But what if we were to invert the characteristics of p-zombies? Such an inverse (i-) zombie would possess all of the behavioral features and responses of an insensate being, yet would nonetheless be conscious. While p-zombies are logically possible but naturally improbable, an approximation of i-zombies actually exists: individuals experiencing what is referred to as "anesthesia awareness." Patients under general anesthesia may be intubated (preventing speech), paralyzed (preventing movement), and narcotized (minimizing response to nociceptive stimuli). Thus, they appear--and typically are--unconscious. In 1-2 cases/1000, however, patients may be aware of intraoperative events, sometimes without any objective indices. Furthermore, a much higher percentage of patients (22% in a recent study) may have the subjective experience of dreaming during general anesthesia. P-zombies confront us with the hard problem of consciousness--how do we explain the presence of qualia? I-zombies present a more practical problem--how do we detect the presence of qualia? The current investigation compares p-zombies to i-zombies and explores the "hard problem" of unconsciousness with a focus on anesthesia awareness.
Keywords: Advance Directives/ethics, Anesthesia, General, Awareness, Bewusstsein, Brain Death, Cognition, Comprehension, Emotions, Ethics, Medical, Ethik, Fähigkeit, sich auszudrücken/mitzuteilen, Humans, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, Intention, Kommunikation, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Models, Psychological, Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, Persistent Vegetative State/psychology, Personal Construct Theory, philosophical zombie, Philosophy, philosophy of mind, p-zombie, p-zombies, p-zombies vs i-zombies, Reflexionen über MTR, Unconsciousness 2005
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(2005): Consciousness, Agents and the Knowledge Game. In: Minds and Machines 15 (3-4), S. 415-444. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-005-9005-z
Abstract: This paper has three goals. The first is to introduce the “knowledge game”, a new, simple and yet powerful tool for analysing some intriguing philosophical questions. The second is to apply the knowledge game as an informative test to discriminate between conscious (human) and conscious-less agents (zombies and robots), depending on which version of the game they can win. And the third is to use a version of the knowledge game to provide an answer to Dretske’s question “how do you know you are not a zombie?”.
Keywords: Bewusstsein, Dretske, Favoriten, human versus robots, Im (wissenschaftlichen) Diskurs, knowledge game, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Mensch-Technik-Relationen (MTR), Ontologische Differenzierungen: Tier, Mensch, Maschine, philosophical zombie, Reflexionen über MTR, Technikphilosophie, Voraussetzungen für sozial angemessenes Verhalten 1999
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(1999): On becoming a person. In: Philosophical Psychology 12 (1), S. 79-98. DOI: 10.1080/095150899105945
Abstract: How does an entity become a person? Forty years ago Carl Rogers answered this question by suggesting that human beings become persons through a process of personal growth and self-discovery. In the present paper I provide six different answers to this question, which form a hierarchy of empirical projects and associated criteria that can be used to understand human personhood. They are: (1) persons are constructed out of natural but organic materials; (2) persons emerge as a form of adaptation through the process of evolution; (3) persons develop ontogenetically; (4) persons are created through the unifying activity of self-narrative ; (5) persons are constituted through socio-historical and cultural processes; and (6) the concept of person is a normative ideal . I suggest that it is important to consider all of these projects and related criteria in order to appreciate fully how an entity becomes a human person.
1993
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(1993): The emotional origins of social understanding. In: Philosophical Psychology 6 (3), S. 227-249. DOI: 10.1080/09515089308573090
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co‐ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of ‘persons’ who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism.
Keywords: Autismus, Entwicklungspsychologie, Evolutionsbiologie, Herkunft von Sozialität, Interpersonale Wahrnehmung, Kognitionswissenschaft/Social Sciences/Humanities, Menschsein als Voraussetznug für soziale Angemessenheit?, Pathologie, Person Sein, Philosophical Psychology, Soziales Miteinander, soziales Verhalten, Sozialphilosophie, Spezifika von Menschen, Verstehen
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