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2015
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(2015) : Moral Reasoning in Psychology In: Wright, James D.: International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition): Oxford: Elsevier, S. 803-805
Abstract: Developmental research has focused on reasoning about right and wrong in social relationships. Piaget and Kohlberg each proposed sequences in which children first develop moral judgments that are confused with nonmoral features, such as adherence to social conventions, and then judgments differentiating them from each other. However, subsequent research shows that young children form concepts in the moral domain with understandings of welfare and fairness, differing from judgments about social conventions. Moral decisions entail coordination of different concerns – moral and nonmoral – in situational contexts. Individuals critically apply moral judgments to cultural practices entailing social inequalities.
2007
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(2007): A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding. Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. In: Philosophical Psychology 20 (6), S. 731-748. DOI: 10.1080/09515080701694110
Abstract: Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to a phenomenon they call ‘moral dumbfounding’. Moral dumbfounding occurs when someone confidently pronounces a moral judgment, then finds that he or she has little or nothing to say in defense of it. This paper addresses recent attempts by Jonathan Haidt and Marc Hauser to make sense of moral dumbfounding in terms of their respective theories of moral judgment; Haidt in terms of a ‘social intuitionist’ model of moral judgment, and Hauser in terms of his ‘Rawlsian creature’ model of moral judgment. I show that Haidt and Hauser assume that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of features of a.) moral judgment that are b.) construed in terms of the intrinsic features of individuals. By contrast, I hypothesize that moral dumbfounding is to be explained in terms of moral reasoning, more specifically in terms of the social dynamics of such reasoning. Finally, I argue that this hypothesis points towards an externalistic account of both moral reasoning and moral judgment.
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