Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Implicit moral evaluations. A multinomial modeling approach. In: Cognition 158, S. 224-241. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.013
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27865113 Abstract: Implicit moral evaluations-i.e., immediate, unintentional assessments of the wrongness of actions or persons-play a central role in supporting moral behavior in everyday life. Yet little research has employed methods that rigorously measure individual differences in implicit moral evaluations. In five experiments, we develop a new sequential priming measure-the Moral Categorization Task-and a multinomial model that decomposes judgment on this task into multiple component processes. These include implicit moral evaluations of moral transgression primes (Unintentional Judgment), accurate moral judgments about target actions (Intentional Judgment), and a directional tendency to judge actions as morally wrong (Response Bias). Speeded response deadlines reduced Intentional Judgment but not Unintentional Judgment (Experiment 1). Unintentional Judgment was stronger toward moral transgression primes than non-moral negative primes (Experiments 2-4). Intentional Judgment was associated with increased error-related negativity, a neurophysiological indicator of behavioral control (Experiment 4). Finally, people who voted for an anti-gay marriage amendment had stronger Unintentional Judgment toward gay marriage primes (Experiment 5). Across Experiments 1-4, implicit moral evaluations converged with moral personality: Unintentional Judgment about wrong primes, but not negative primes, was negatively associated with psychopathic tendencies and positively associated with moral identity and guilt proneness. Theoretical and practical applications of formal modeling for moral psychology are discussed.
Keywords: Adult, Cerebral Cortex/physiology, Cognition/physiology, Electroencephalography, Evoked Potentials, Female, Guilt, Humans, Individuality, Intention, Judgment/physiology, Kognitionswissenschaften, Male, Middle Aged, Models, Psychological, Moral, Morals, Neuropsychological Tests, Personality, Personality Assessment, science direct, Shame, Social Perception -
(2017): Familiarity, Priming, and Perception in Similarity Judgments. In: Cognitive Science 41 (6), S. 1450-1484. DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12418
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27766669 Abstract: We present a novel way of accounting for similarity judgments. Our approach posits that similarity stems from three main sources-familiarity, priming, and inherent perceptual likeness. Here, we explore each of these constructs and demonstrate their individual and combined effectiveness in explaining similarity judgments. Using these three measures, our account of similarity explains ratings of simple, color-based perceptual stimuli that display asymmetry effects, as well as more complicated perceptual stimuli with structural properties; more traditional approaches to similarity solve one or the other and have difficulty accounting for both. Overall, our work demonstrates the importance of each of these components of similarity in explaining similarity judgments, both individually and together, and suggests important implications for other similarity approaches. zitiert von 6
2016
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(2016): Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments. In: Journal of experimental psychology. General 145 (6), S. 772-787. DOI: 10.1037/xge0000165
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27054685 Abstract: Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical theories? Here, we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of moral intuitions whereby typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing a person's likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner. Therefore, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record
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(2016): Does children's moral compass waver under social pressure? Using the conformity paradigm to test preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments. In: Journal of experimental child psychology 150, S. 241-251. DOI: 10.1016/j.jecp.2016.06.006
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27367300 Abstract: The current study tested whether preschoolers' moral and social-conventional judgments change under social pressure using Asch's conformity paradigm. A sample of 132 preschoolers (Mage=3.83years, SD=0.85) rated the acceptability of moral and social-conventional events and also completed a visual judgment task (i.e., comparing line length) both independently and after having viewed two peers who consistently made immoral, unconventional, or visually inaccurate judgments. Results showed evidence of conformity on all three tasks, but conformity was stronger on the social-conventional task than on the moral and visual tasks. Older children were less susceptible to pressure for social conformity for the moral and visual tasks but not for the conventional task. zitiert von: 6
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