Alle Publikationen
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2018
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(2018): People are averse to machines making moral decisions. In: Cognition 181, S. 21-34. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.08.003 Abstract: Do people want autonomous machines making moral decisions? Nine studies suggest that that the answer is ‘no’—in part because machines lack a complete mind. Studies 1–6 find that people are averse to machines making morally-relevant driving, legal, medical, and military decisions, and that this aversion is mediated by the perception that machines can neither fully think nor feel. Studies 5–6 find that this aversion exists even when moral decisions have positive outcomes. Studies 7–9 briefly investigate three potential routes to increasing the acceptability of machine moral decision-making: limiting the machine to an advisory role (Study 7), increasing machines’ perceived experience (Study 8), and increasing machines’ perceived expertise (Study 9). Although some of these routes show promise, the aversion to machine moral decision-making is difficult to eliminate. This aversion may prove challenging for the integration of autonomous technology in moral domains including medicine, the law, the military, and self-driving vehicles. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2015
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(2015): A prospective framework for the design of ideal artificial moral agents: Insights from the science of heroism in humans. In: Minds and Machines: Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science 25 (1), S. 57-71. DOI: 10.1007/s11023-015-9361-2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-015-9361-2 Abstract: The growing field of machine morality has becoming increasingly concerned with how to develop artificial moral agents. However, there is little consensus on what constitutes an ideal moral agent let alone an artificial one. Leveraging a recent account of heroism in humans, the aim of this paper is to provide a prospective framework for conceptualizing, and in turn designing ideal artificial moral agents, namely those that would be considered heroic robots. First, an overview of what it means to be an artificial moral agent is provided. Then, an overview of a recent account of heroism that seeks to define the construct as the dynamic and interactive integration of character strengths (e.g., bravery and integrity) and situational constraints that afford the opportunity for moral behavior (i.e., moral affordances). With this as a foundation, a discussion is provided for what it might mean for a robot to be an ideal moral agent by proposing a dynamic and interactive connectionist model of robotic heroism. Given the limited accounts of robots engaging in moral behavior, a case for extending robotic moral capacities beyond just being a moral agent to the level of heroism is supported by drawing from exemplar situations where robots demonstrate heroism in popular film and fiction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)
2014
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(2014) : Moral competence in social robots: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering: Chicago, IL, USA: IEEE, S. 1-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ETHICS.2014.6893446 Abstract: We propose that any robots that collaborate with, look after, or help humans-in short, social robots-must have moral competence. But what does moral competence consist of? We offer a framework for moral competence that attempts to be comprehensive in capturing capacities that make humans morally competent and that therefore represent candidates for a morally competent robot. We posit that human moral competence consists of four broad components: (1) A system of norms and the language and concepts needed to communicate about these norms; (2) moral cognition and affect; (3) moral decision making and action; and (4) moral communication. We sketch what we know and don’t know about these four elements of moral competence in humans and, for each component, ask how we could equip an artificial agent with these capacities.
Keywords: Affect, Artificial agent, Cognition, Communities, Context, Decision Making, ethical aspects, Ethics, Human Factors, human moral competence, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, intentionality, Mobile robots, Moral & Ethik, Moral action, moral affect, Moral agency, Moral cognition, moral communication, moral decision making, moral language, norms system, PSYCHOLOGY, Robots, Social Cognition, social robots 2009
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(2009): Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?. In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1), S. 77-96. DOI: 10.1007/s10677-008-9136-4
Abstract: The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814-834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt's research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no 'real' moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.
Keywords: ASPERGER-SYNDROME, ATTITUDES, Automatic processing, AUTOMATICITY, BEHAVIOR, Empathy, Ethik, IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST, INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES, Meta-ethics, Moral, Moral agency, Moral intuitions, Moral judgment, Moralphilosophie, Motivation, PREJUDICE, Psychologie, Reason-responding, Reason-tracking, STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION
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