Alle Publikationen
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2017
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(2017): Can only one person be right? The development of objectivism and social preferences regarding widely shared and controversial moral beliefs. In: Cognition 167, S. 78-90. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.05.014
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27260661 Abstract: Prior work has established that children and adults distinguish moral norms (e.g., hitting is wrong) from conventional norms (e.g., wearing pajamas to school is wrong). Specifically, moral norms are generally perceived as universal across time and space, similar to objective facts. We examined preschoolers’ and adults’ perceptions of moral beliefs alongside facts and opinions by asking whether only one person could be right in the case of disagreements. We also compared perceptions of widely shared moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is better to pull someone’s hair or share with someone) and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is better to help someone with a project or make cookies for someone). In Studies 1 and 2, preschoolers and adults were more likely to judge that only one person could be right in the case of widely shared versus controversial moral beliefs, treating the former as more objective or fact-like. Children were also more likely than adults t o say th at only one person could be right in a moral disagreement. Study 2 additionally revealed that adults were more likely than children to report preferring individuals who shared their controversial moral beliefs. Study 3 replicated these patterns using a different sample of widely shared beliefs (e.g., whether it is okay to mock a poor classmate) and controversial moral beliefs (e.g., whether it is okay to tell small, prosocial lies). While some aspects of moral cognition may depend on abundant social learning and cognitive development, the perception that disagreements about widely shared moral beliefs have only one right answer while disagreements about controversial moral beliefs do not emerges relatively early. We discuss implications for moral learning and social preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 10
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(2017): Variations in judgments of intentional action and moral evaluation across eight cultures. In: Cognition 164, S. 22-30. DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.012
DOI: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28364713 Abstract: Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or sideeffect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved) zitiert von: 2
Keywords: 80 and over, Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Costa Rica, Cross-Cultural Comparison, cross-cultural psychology, Culture, Honduras, Humans, Intention, Intentional action, Judgment, Kognitionswissenschaften, Kulturelle Unterschiede, Kulturforschung, Mexico, Middle Aged, Moral, Moral cognition, Moral evaluation, Morals, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Side-effect effect, Social Perception, United States, Vanuatu, Young Adult 2015
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(2015) : When will people regard robots as morally competent social partners?: 2015 24th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN): Kobe, Japan: IEEE Robotics & Automation Society, S. 486-491
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ROMAN.2015.7333667 Abstract: We propose that moral competence consists of five distinct but related elements: (1) having a system of norms; (2) mastering a moral vocabulary; (3) exhibiting moral cognition and affect; (4) exhibiting moral decision making and action; and (5) engaging in moral communication. We identify some of the likely triggers that may convince people to (justifiably) ascribe each of these elements of moral competence to robots. We suggest that humans will treat robots as moral agents (who have some rights, obligations, and are targets of blame) if they perceive them to have at least elements (1) and (2) and one or more of elements (3)-(5).
Keywords: Cognition, Context, Decision Making, Ethics, Human Factors, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, Moral & Ethik, Moral action, Moral cognition, moral communication, moral competence, moral decision making, moral vocabulary, morally competent social partners, PSYCHOLOGY, Robots, social aspects of automation, Vocabulary 2014
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(2014) : Moral competence in social robots: 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Ethics in Science, Technology and Engineering: Chicago, IL, USA: IEEE, S. 1-6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/ETHICS.2014.6893446 Abstract: We propose that any robots that collaborate with, look after, or help humans-in short, social robots-must have moral competence. But what does moral competence consist of? We offer a framework for moral competence that attempts to be comprehensive in capturing capacities that make humans morally competent and that therefore represent candidates for a morally competent robot. We posit that human moral competence consists of four broad components: (1) A system of norms and the language and concepts needed to communicate about these norms; (2) moral cognition and affect; (3) moral decision making and action; and (4) moral communication. We sketch what we know and don’t know about these four elements of moral competence in humans and, for each component, ask how we could equip an artificial agent with these capacities.
Keywords: Affect, Artificial agent, Cognition, Communities, Context, Decision Making, ethical aspects, Ethics, Human Factors, human moral competence, human-robot interaction, ieee xplore, intentionality, Mobile robots, Moral & Ethik, Moral action, moral affect, Moral agency, Moral cognition, moral communication, moral decision making, moral language, norms system, PSYCHOLOGY, Robots, Social Cognition, social robots
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