Alle Publikationen
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2015
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(2015): An Information-Based Approach to Consciousness. Mental State Decoding. DOI: 10.15502/9783958570276
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15502/9783958570276 Abstract: The debate on the neural correlates of visual consciousness often focuses on the question of which additional processing has to happen for a visual representation to enter consciousness. However, a related question that has only rarely been addressed is which brain regions directly encode specific contents of consciousness. The search for these core neural correlates of contents of consciousness (NCCCs) requires establishing a mapping between sensory experiences and population measures of brain activity in specific brain regions. One approach for establishing this mapping is multivariate decoding. Using this technique, several properties of NCCCs have been investigated. Masking studies have revealed that information about sensory stimuli can be decoded from the primary visual cortex, even if the stimuli cannot be consciously identified by a subject. This suggests that information that does not reach awareness can be encapsulated in early visual stages of processing. Visual imagery representations and veridical perception share similar neural representations in higher-level visual regions, suggesting that these regions are directly related to the encoding of conscious visual experience. But population signals in these higher-level visual regions cannot be the sole carriers of visual experiences because they are invariant to low-level visual features. We found no evidence for increased encoding of sensory information in the prefrontal cortex when a stimulus reaches awareness. In general, we found no role of the prefrontal cortex in encoding sensory experiences at all. However, the improved discrimination of sensory information during perceptual learning could be explained by an improved read-out by the prefrontal cortex. One possible implication is that prefrontal cortical regions do not participate in the encoding of sensory features per se. Instead they may be relevant in making decisions about sensory features, without exhibiting a re-representation of sensory information.
2003
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(2003): Virtual Machines and Consciousness. (Special Issue on Machine Consciousness). In: Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5), S. 133-172
Abstract: Replication or even modelling of consciousness in machines requires some clarifications and refinements of our concept of consciousness. Design of, construction of, and interaction with artificial systems can itself assist in this conceptual development. We start with the tentative hypothesis that although the word 'consciousness' has no well-defined meaning, it is used to refer to aspects of human and animal information processing. We then argue that we can enhance our understanding of what these aspects might be by designing and building virtual- machine architectures capturing various features of consciousness. This activity may in turn nurture the development of our concepts of consciousness, showing how an analysis based on information processing virtual machines answers old philosophical puzzles as well enriching empirical theories. This process of developing and testing ideas by developing and testing designs leads to gradual refinement of many of our pre-theoretical concepts of mind, showing how they can be construed as implicitly 'architecture-based' concepts. Understanding how human-like robots with appropriate architectures are likely to feel puzzled about qualia may help us resolve those puzzles. The concept of 'qualia' turns out to be an 'architecture-based' concept, while individual qualia concepts are 'architecture-driven'.
1995
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(1995): A Social Identity Model of Deindividuation Phenomena. In: European Review of Social Psychology 6 (1), S. 161-198. DOI: 10.1080/14792779443000049
Abstract: This chapter challenges traditional models of deindividuation. These are based on the assumption that such factors as immersion in a group and anonymity lead to a loss of selfhood and hence of control over behaviour. We argue that such models depend upon an individualistic conception of the self, viewed as a unitary construct referring to that which makes individuals unique. This is rejected in favour of the idea that self can be defined at various different levels including the categorical self as well as the personal self. Hence a social identity model of deindividuation (SIDE) is outlined. Evidence is presented to show that deindividuation manipulations gain effect, firstly, through the ways in which they affect the salience of social identity (and hence conformity to categorical norms) and, secondly, through their effects upon strategic considerations relating to the expression of social identities. We conclude that the classic deindividuation paradigm of anonymity within a social group, far from leading to uncontrolled behaviour, maximizes the opportunity of group members to give full voice to their collective identities.
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